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Introduction

The mood is shifting in the contemporary globalisation debate. Only a fewyears ago, talk of the contested and politicised nature of globalisation
would have met with scepticism from those who emphasise the sheer
economic power of globalising forces. The orthodox popular and academic
representations of globalisation have for several decades sustained the image
of a powerful economic and technological bulldozer that effortlessly shovels
up states and societies. The very discourse of the ‘competition state’ (Cerny,
1990) effectively sanitised the globalisation process, removing the messiness of
politics and leaving only the ‘right and necessary’ policy measures. As the
millennium turned, the picture began to change so that we now begin to see
partial glimpses of the push and shove of a social and political contestation
that was, in truth, always present. Now we see the news media popularising
debates about the power of multinational corporations (MNCs), the plight of
the global economy’s ‘new slaves’ and the ‘anti-globalisation’ protests (Klein,
2000; Bales, 1999; British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Panorama, 2000;
Channel 4, 2000). The effect is to bring less comfortable and optimistic images
of globalisation to our armchairs. At the same time, scholars within inter-
national political economy (IPE), international relations (IR) and sociology
have called for the essence of politics to be restored to our understandings of
globalisation and restructuring (Marchand and Runyan, 2000; Hay and
Marsh, 1999; Bauman, 1998; Beck, 2000a).
This book acknowledges and develops the emergent challenge to the
economic and technologically determinist representations of globalisation. It
is critical of the ‘globalist’ representations of transformation as an imperative-
driven and inexorable process. For people in their everyday lives, there is
perhaps no sphere of social life so consistently bombarded with globalist
accounts as that of production and work. For states, such a reading reinforces
the imperative of a policy agenda that creates a competitive and capital-
friendly environment for MNCs. Firms are cast as the primary agents of global
change as they restructure towards the ultimately ‘lean’ and ‘flexible’ organ-
isation. The combined restructuring activity of states and firms is presented as
a fait accompli that demands prescribed responses from individuals and social
Amoore_Global__01_Intro 6/19/02, 12:02 PM1
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groups. Competition states, lean production systems and flexible workers
become the dominant mantra in the grip of an unstoppable globalising process.
Though broadly supportive of the critical turn that has been taken to
counter the globalist dominance, this book also marks a departure from the
central thrust of these contributions. Those who have sought to counter the
economism and determinism of orthodox accounts have tended to focus on
restoring agency to explanations of globalisation. Globalisation is represented
as a project that is driven by the conscious political actions of identifiable
individual and collective agents. In contrast to the globalist emphasis on tech-
nological and economic process, here we have globalisation as either pro-
moted or resisted by governments within distinctive national capitalisms
(Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Weiss, 1998), by a transnational class with
common interests in a neo-liberal global order (Gill, 1995a, Van der Pijl, 1984),
or by new social movements engaged in an anti-globalisation struggle (Falk,
1999). While such diverse perspectives have restored political agency to the
globalisation debate, I argue that there remains too little attention paid to the
contested and contradictory dynamics of social change.
This book develops a perspective that views globalisation as, in significant
part, contested through and contingent upon structured social practices.
Globalisation is imbued with a contingency that rests upon the diverse
concrete experiences, interpretations and meanings that are intertwined with
the dynamics of transformation. From this perspective, it is highly problematic
to assume that state-societies will simply absorb and adapt to global imper-
atives, or that firms adopt convergent global strategies in different historical
contexts, or that workers attribute common meanings to the discourses of
flexibility that confront them. Globalisation, cast in this light, is not a single,
universal and homogenising process, nor is it a clearly identifiable strategic
project. Rather, it is uniquely understood and experienced by people in the
context of their known and familiar social practices. To this end, the chapters
that follow integrate theoretical discussion of the concept of globalisation
with the study of the debates, contests and compromises that are taking place
in the restructuring of production and work.
Perspectives on globalisation
In much of the literature on globalisation the primary focus has been on
outlining the various aspects or dimensions of transformation in, for example,
finance, production, culture, the state and technology, that combine to con-
stitute an identifiable process of change (Amin et al., 1994; Waters, 1995;
Jones, 1995). In identifying these aspects, the first order question has been
‘what is globalisation?’. That is to say, the central guiding objective has been to
evaluate the evidence of the extent and nature of globalisation in each of the
spheres. This has served a useful function in that it has revealed the un-
evenness of globalisation as it cuts across the multiple layers of social life.
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However, the ‘what is it’ question does limit inquiry when we consider that the
aspects or layers of globalisation are selected, defined and explained in
divergent ways so that both the theory and the practice of globalisation could
now be said to be contested (Scholte, 2000: 12; Amoore, 2000: 200; O’Brien et
al., 2000: 2–6). With this caveat in mind, perhaps the only answer to the
pressing contemporary question ‘what is globalisation?’ can be ‘it depends on
how you look at it’. Framed in this way, the first order question becomes ‘how
has the problem been approached, interpreted and understood?’. The singu-
larity and universality that so often surrounds ideas about globalisation is
replaced by the possibility of multiple and multi-layered conceptions, each
with a distinctive epistemological and ontological commitment.
It is only in the most recent phase of the globalisation debate that scholars
have begun to seriously address the question of divergent conceptions of
globalisation. This has tended to take the form of the development of typolo-
gies or categorisations of perspectives on globalisation. Held et al. (1999: 2–10)
have developed a threefold typology of perspectives – the ‘hyperglobalists’,
‘sceptics’ and ‘transformationalists’. The typology is based upon the divergen-
ces that exist between accounts of the extent of globalisation and, in particular,
the implications for nation-states. Thus, for the hypergloblists, economic and
political power becomes ‘denationalised’ and ‘borderless’ in the face of
extensive global forces (1999: 3). By contrast, the sceptics share the view that
globalisation is an overstated and convenient myth that facilitates the imple-
mentation of unpopular policies, effectively extending state power (1999: 6).
For the transformationalists, the extent of globalisation is uneven and multi-
layered as national governments reconstitute and restructure their power in
response. Within this typology, the focus on the intensity and extensity of
globalisation does result in some rather incongruous groupings. For example,
Stephen Gill (highly critical of neo-liberal policies) is referenced alongside
Kenichi Ohmae (supportive of neo-liberal policies) on the grounds that they
share a hyperglobalist account of the emergence of a global economy (1999:
4). They do, of course, have very different conceptions of how we produce
knowledge about the global economy (GPE), or indeed whether it is the global
economy or the global political economy that is the object of analysis. The
Held et al. typology does, to an extent, limit the analysis of epistemological
and ontological divergence in the globalisation debate.
A second influential typology of perspectives has been that advanced by
Jan Aart Scholte (2000). This typology categorises the perspectives according
to their view of the nature of the globalisation process – globalisation as inter-
nationalisation, liberalisation, universalisation, westernisation or deterritor-
ialisation. It is argued that the first four perspectives cannot adequately
capture the nature of contemporary globalisation because they reduce it to
pre-existing processes. Scholte favours ‘deterritorialisation’ as an account of
globalisation that emphasises ‘far-reaching change in the nature of social
space’ (2000: 46). His rejection of the first four perspectives reinforces his own
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perspective on globalisation as the transformation of social relations and
social space. Scholte’s important contribution has been to bring consideration
of globalisation out of the realms of ‘economic forces’ and into the realm of
society and social relations. However, his typology of perspectives does not
bring us any closer to considering why globalisation is represented in certain
ways in particular settings, and at specific historical moments. Though he
argues that the first four perspectives ‘cover most academic, official, corporate
and popular discussion of things “global”’ (2000: 46), he does not ask why this
might be so. Why is globalisation most commonly defined as a process of
universalisation or liberalisation, for example? Why do opposing perspectives
seek to ‘put globalisation back in its box’ by defining it as nothing more than
internationalisation? What are the implications of the framing of the globalisa-
tion debate for our understanding of the contemporary global problematic?
In order to address such questions we would need a typology that helps us
to think about the relationship between conceptions of globalisation and
particular sets of interests in the framing of restructuring discourse. We would
need to consider the different perspectives on globalisation as distinctive
constructions of knowledge that have significant implications for what we see
– and importantly what we do not see – in contemporary processes of restruc-
turing. Below I advance a threefold typology of perspectives on globalisation,
each of which has particular implications both for the study of global change
and for the restructuring discourse that emerges in production and work. I do
not suggest that these perspectives are either internally coherent and cohesive,
or entirely discrete and separate entities. They are simply constructions that
aid thought about the relationship between particular modes of knowledge
about global change, and the ‘common sense’ that emerges to deal with that
change via a programme of restructuring.
Process
Under the predominant process perspective, globalisation is a master concept
that is used to capture material and institutional transformations across
contemporary economy, politics and society. In broad terms it encapsulates
the orthodox representation of globalisation, one that can be found in the
statements of national governments, international organisations and media
commentators.1 Globalisation is cast in teleological terms as the inevitable
outcome of the expansionary ambitions of a global market economy and the
transnationalisation of technologies (Amoore et al., 1997). In this vision,
states, societies and firms have no alternative but to conform and compete
amidst processes of change that occur above and beyond them. The social
costs of globalisation are commonly presented either as the temporary
problems of transition, or as the inevitable short-term losses in a process that
will yield benefits in the longer term.
The process perspective on globalisation has done much to inform
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dominant common sense understandings of transformation in the everyday
practices of work. The discursive representation of globalisation as an inexor-
able process enables particular neo-liberal deregulatory interventions to be
made and legitimated. So, for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) ‘the globalisation process requires economies to be
more adaptable and workers more willing to change’ (1996: 13). For the World
Bank: ‘Governments and workers are adjusting to a changing world. The
legacy of the past can make change difficult or frightening. Yet realization of a
new world of work … is fundamentally a question of sound choices in the
international and the domestic realm’ (1995: 11).
A similar vocabulary of globalisation and the imperative of transform-
ation in the form and nature of work can be found in Group of Seven (G7)
government policy documents, International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural
adjustment programs, management journals and corporate strategy docu-
mentation. Here the message is that in order to respond effectively to
globalisation it is necessary for production costs to be reduced through the
removal of barriers to the free market in factors of production – predom-
inantly in labour. Globalisation is cast as an indomitable process, equated with
a shift to new forms of work organisation in line with lean production, just-in-
time (JIT), teamwork and kaizen. Workers are assumed to move towards more
flexible working practices and ‘atypical’ forms of employment such as part-
time, temporary, zero-hours and fixed contracts, outsourcing and home-
working.2 This reading treats labour as a commodity that must be restruc-
tured in line with global logics. The concrete transformation of social
practices is not problematised and the whole process is sanitised of politics.
Indeed, it is those societies and workers who fail to adapt to the new realities
who are perceived to incur the ‘costs of inaction’ (OECD, 1996: 21). All
distinctive social practices are subsumed by a single global ‘best practice’ of
flexibility. Hence, any discussion of politics is confined to an instrumental role
in implementing prescribed reforms. The globalisation process is taken as
given, and what Robert Cox refers to as a ‘problem-solving’ mode of
knowledge is generated to ‘deal effectively with sources of trouble’ (1996: 88).
Project
When broadly represented as a form of ‘project’, globalisation is tightly inter-
woven with the liberal ideological and neo-classical economic doctrines in
whose name powerful actors seek to restructure the material and institutional
bases of the contemporary world order.3  Globalisation is given concrete express-
ion in and through the various restructuring projects that are carried out
under the neo-liberal banner. From the field of IPE it is possible to distinguish
a number of schools of thought that contribute to the impression of an identifi-
able project of global transformation. First, what might be termed the ‘trans-
national school’ identify transnational interests that consciously act to produce
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and reproduce a globalised economy. Such interests may take the form of a
global elite or ruling class whose conscious actions become a ‘directive, strategic
element within globalising capitalism’ (Gill, 1994: 179). In a similar representa-
tion, the project of globalisation may be viewed as driven by the expansionary
ambitions of MNCs (Stopford and Strange, 1991; Sklair, 1998). Transforma-
tions in production and work are thus viewed as central to a strategy of global
capitalism pursued by corporate actors, a range of international institutions
such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), IMF and Trilateral Commission
(Gill, 1990; Overbeek, 1990), together with government interests, that may
constitute some form of class alliance (Van der Pijl, 1984; Sklair, 2001).
Second, a broad ‘national capitalisms school’ represents globalisation as
overstated, mythical and rooted in the institutions and actions of national
authorities. The world economy is held to be essentially international or regional
rather than global and thus can be shaped or directed by the policymakers and
institutions of competing nation-states and regions (Zysman, 1996; Weiss,
1998; Albert, 1993; Hirst and Thompson, 1996). In terms of the restructuring
of production and work this implies that embedded systems of production and
industrial relations give distinctive character to divergent national restruc-
turing pathways (Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1995).
There are, of course, fundamental differences between the approaches
taken by the above scholars. If we take Held et al.’s (1999: 3-5) schema, for
example, we would identify both Stephen Gill and Susan Strange with a
‘hyperglobalist’ position, while Linda Weiss and Graeme Thompson would
stand at the opposed ‘sceptical’ pole. However, in terms of ontology, Susan
Strange’s work on production has more in common with Winfried Ruigrok’s
work than with Kenichi Ohmae’s work (a fellow globalist). Identified as
theorists united by their attention to an emergent global project, this
perspective demonstrates that globalisation can and should be analysed in
terms of the restructuring done in its name. Furthermore, adherents to the
project perspective tend to normatively oppose neo-liberal programmes of
restructuring and to seek out the political space for alternatives amidst
structural constraints. However, the politics of globalisation is presented as
coherently designed and directed by rational collective agents. These agents,
whether MNCs, classes or states, are imbued with a unitary identity that is
defined by the shared project itself. The tensions, contests and conflicts that
surround the form of the project are seriously underestimated. The project
perspective can tell us much about the elite actors who contribute to a
discourse of global restructuring, but little about the everyday forms of
thought and action that characterise the nature of that restructuring.
Practice
The central terrain of the globalisation debate has been occupied by the
disputes between those who claim that globalisation is essentially inexorable
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(the process perspective) and those who claim that globalisation is driven by
the purposeful actions of individual and collective agents (the project
perspective). The difficulty is that globalisation may well take on both these
dynamics simultaneously, and to a differentiated degree in the experiences
and practices of people in specific historical contexts and social spaces. So,
how might it be possible to capture the contested and highly contingent
nature of contemporary global transformation? The argument to be made in
this book is that a third perspective – what I term a ‘practice’ perspective, can
illuminate the tensions, contradictions and politics of globalisation that are
left in shadow by many existing frameworks of analysis. A number of scholars
have begun to map out a perspective that represents globalisation in terms of
emergent patterns of globalised social relations and the structured social
practices that make these possible (see Langley, 2002). For Jones, the contem-
porary world is characterised by a ‘multiplicity of purposes’ that expose the
controversial, incomplete and potentially reversible nature of globalisation
(2000: 245). In the same volume Germain posits that ‘globalization is as
inherently contested as a “reality” as it is as a concept or representation of that
reality’ (2000: xiii). The common thread here is that what we call globalisation
is best understood as representative of sets of complex and often contradictory
globalising social practices.
It is, however, difficult to find among the various IPE perspectives on
global social practices, a genuine effort to explore the normal, commonplace
or everyday social practices that make up peoples’ experiences of life in a
proclaimed global era. Existing avenues into globalisation as social practice
have tended to focus almost exclusively on the social practices of elite groups
whose actions produce direct effects in the GPE – for example, bankers, corpor-
ate managers, politicians and media actors, among others. An understanding
of the role of such practices is undoubtedly crucial in the mapping of the
contours of global social change. However, the argument to be made here is
that globalisation is experienced, given meaning, reinforced and/or challenged
in the everyday social practices of individuals and groups at multiple levels,
from state-societies and MNCs through to the routine practices of the workplace.
The development of a practice perspective on globalisation, I will argue,
follows a ‘new’ or ‘heterodox’ approach to IPE in its challenge to the dicho-
tomies of state/market, domestic/international, public/private and local/
global (see Murphy and Tooze, 1991; Amin et al., 1994). Social practices by
their nature intersect and cut across these dichotomies. This may occur
through direct means such as the use of transborder communications in the
organisation of global production, or via indirect means such as the
emergence of a ‘global consciousness’ that connects discrete social practices
through global frameworks of thought (Scholte, 2000: 54). James Rosenau
has, for example, argued for the consideration of the ‘micro-macro’ dynamics
of contemporary transformation (1997: 59). Tim Sinclair has called for the
theorisation of the relationships between ordinary everyday lives and wider
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structural change, to reveal the ‘international political economy of the
commonplace’ (1999: 165). Matt Davies and Michael Niemann have explored
the means by which globalised social relations are produced in the ‘daily
practices of workers, families or consumers’ (2000: 6). Feminist scholars have
encouraged reflection on concrete everyday experiences in order to make
sense of the ‘abstract structure known as the international political economy’
(Enloe, 1989: 4; see also Marchand and Runyan, 2000).
Considered through the lens of a practice perspective, globalisation is
characterised by contests over the reality and representation of social change.
Such contestation can and does take the strategic and organised forms of
promotion and resistance highlighted by the project perspective. However, the
oppositions and tensions of global restructuring are also present in everyday
life. It is helpful to consider the everyday nature of globalisation in terms of
contradictory relationships between ‘near’ and ‘far’. For Bauman, the ‘near’ is
characterised as ‘… primarily that which is usual, familiar and known to the
point of obviousness; something seen, met, dealt or interacted with daily,
intertwined with habitual routine and day-to-day activities’ (1998: 13).
This image of nearness and familiarity can be contrasted with the ‘far’ as
something that is unusual, unfamiliar and unknown to the point of being
obscure and extraordinary. By the very nature of globalisation as a ‘real or
perceived intensification of global interconnectedness’ (Held et al., 1999: 2), it
is the confrontation and assimilation of near and far that mark the restruc-
turing of government policies, corporate strategies and the everyday practices
of the workplace.
Viewed from the perspective of the practices of everyday life, transforma-
tions in production and work bring the globalisation debate into common-
place experience. Productive and working practices lie at the heart of capitalist
social relations and have provided the focus for debates surrounding the need
for adaptation and change. There are indications that the manifestations of
global change in the workplace are beginning to be considered more closely by
scholars from across disciplinary divides (see Panitch, 2001; Leisink, 1999;
Beck, 2000b). It is my view that the restructuring of work is a critical terrain
on which the current and future shape of globalisation will be contested.
While IPE has appeared comfortable with the theoretical and empirical study
of the firm, it has been much less comfortable with the study of labour and
work. Meanwhile, MNCs increasingly have become fractured entities, ‘out-
sourcing’ their production so that work takes place in sites that have become
invisible to IPE inquiry. Where labour and work have been acknowledged in
the globalisation debate this has tended to be confined to the study of trade
unions and their potential as new social movements. This book proposes that
production and work be considered within and across multiple interrelated
layers of restructuring – state-societies, firms and workers. Within each of these
layers the restructuring of productive and working practices is experienced in
diverse ways, varying in its meaning, interpretation and implications.
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This book develops a practice-centred view of globalisation in order to
make visible two central interrelated features of the contemporary global
restructuring of production and work. First, globalisation does not exist
independently of the meanings that are imputed to it by policymakers,
corporate strategists, workers, unions, social groups and citizens. This is not to
say that there are no structural features of globalisation, but that even the
identifiable forces of global financial markets, transborder technologies and
global production have vastly differential effects and elicit distinctive patterns
of accommodation and resistance. I explore the social and political-economic
contests that characterise the distinctive British ‘hyperflexible’ and German
‘flexi-corporatist’ approaches to the restructuring of production and work.
Robert Cox identifies the tensions within and between the German and
British political economies as a ‘proving ground’ for future world order (1993:
286). The historical context that is reflected in state-societal institutions,
norms and practices is not ruptured by globalisation. Rather, it provides one
of many frames of reference within which questions are raised, responses are
negotiated, and social groups find themselves included or excluded. In doing
this, I suggest an alternative value for so-called ‘models of capitalism’. Con-
ventionally conceived, national models of capitalism have been variously used
to refute globalist claims, to bolster claims to a ‘nicer’, ‘friendlier’ social-
democratic mode of capitalism, or to offer best-practice examples to be
emulated and transposed. In my analysis, state-societal contexts are identified
merely as ‘ideal types’ (Cox, 1987: 4-5) of the patterns of compromise, tension
and conflict that define a programme of global restructuring. Despite the
apparent intractability and dominance of the neo-liberal model of restructur-
ing, it is important to challenge the notion that there is normative unanimity
on the model within and across state-societies.
The second key feature of global restructuring that is revealed by a
practice perspective is the disruption and contestation that suffuses a restruc-
turing programme as it enters the everyday lives of workers. While IPE studies
of the globalisation of production have focused almost exclusively on the
MNC, industrial relations scholars have revealed the concrete manifestations
of flexibility in the workplace, directly connecting workplace to world order
(Harrod, 1997a; Leisink, 1999). A focus on the workplace reveals the tensions
that permeate the juxtaposition of near and far as established working
practices confront demands for change based on some distant and unfamiliar
‘best practice’. Such tensions are exacerbated as the restructuring of working
practices create new patterns of inclusion and exclusion, reinforcing or chal-
lenging prevailing social power relations. The strategic projects of restruc-
turing may be undermined via ‘silent resistance’ (Cheru, 1997: 153) and tacit
opposition (Scott, 1990), ‘blunting the action’ in a Polanyian ‘double
movement’ (1957: 76). Capturing the vacillations of global restructuring serves
to challenge economistic and teleological accounts, restoring the human and
political essence of globalisation.
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Structure of the book
Chapter 1 explores the conceptions of globalisation and restructuring on
which the discourse of labour flexibility is based. Of course, entire books have
been devoted to the subject matter of globalisation alone. However, this
chapter explores the particular representation of globalisation as an indomit-
able process that demands specific restructuring responses. The analysis is
focused on five defining aspects of the process-centred view of globalisation:
exogenous transformative forces, disciplinary imperatives, historical conver-
gence, social prescription and the death of conflict. I argue that these guiding
assumptions about the nature and form of contemporary social change have
much in common with the modernisation thesis of the industrial society
school. Rather than constituting a fundamental break with past practices, the
global process model of social change has recast a set of ideas that are deployed
to legitimate a programme of labour flexibilisation. The contemporary
fixation with flexibility in work and labour is effectively legitimated and
perpetuated via a discursive attachment to representations of a natural,
automatic and imperative process of globalisation. Such representations have
enabled the restructuring of work to be undertaken in a depoliticised atmos-
phere of ‘essential’ management strategies. The chapter, therefore, presents the
case for a renewed emphasis on the social power relations and social contests
that condition and shape the restructuring of work.
Chapter 2 investigates the contribution that the field of IPE can make to
raising the visibility of alternative politicised understandings of social change.
In many senses the field has defined itself in terms of its capacity to shed light
on the dynamics of contemporary global social transformation, strenuously
arguing that it captures change in a way that ‘static’ IR cannot grasp (see
Strange, 1994). I sketch out the parameters of the claims made by so-called
‘new IPE’ scholars, and analyse their departure from ‘orthodox’ IPE perspec-
tives. Though I use some of the insights of the ‘new IPE’ in the chapters that
follow, I do so with criticism and caveats. There are further steps to be taken in
prising open some of the doors that have been closed by dominant IPE
ontologies, and I outline one of them here: an IPE of social practice. I propose
that such a perspective can reveal the politics and contingency of globalisation
as it is characterised by contests over the reality and representation of social
change. First, a sensitivity to the historicity and contingency of global social
change serves to uncover the diverse interpretations and experiences of
restructuring within and across state-societies, firms and worker groups.
Second, attention to the webs of power that surround and suffuse a pro-
gramme of global restructuring challenges the notion that a prescribed ‘best
practice’ such as labour flexibility is merely a matter for apolitical technical
adaptation. Finally, an emphasis on the ‘everydayness’ of the restructuring of
work brings the rarefied world of global finance, production and technology
into a domain where it can be opened up to debate and contest. The IPE of
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social practice perspective is further developed in the chapters that follow,
focusing on the restructuring debates within state-societies, firms and the
daily lives of workers.
Taken together, chapters 3 and 4 explore the distinctive meanings of
globalisation that are constructed through the restructuring programmes of
different state-societies. I argue that state-societies debate and represent the
problematic of globalisation in ways that are historically specific, and that
interventions are made on the basis of these representations. Chapter 3 dis-
cusses the representation of globalisation underpinning British programmes
of ‘hyperflexibility’ in the restructuring of work. The chapter addresses the
‘national capitalisms’ debate, exploring the making of a distinctively British
capitalism, and discussing the contemporary discursive remaking of a ‘global
Britain’. I am particularly concerned here to use the IPE of social practice to
reveal the tensions and contradictions of British hyperflexibility.
Chapter 4 moves to consider the restructuring debate taking place in
German state-society. In popular and academic discourse Germany is often
presented either as a proving ground for globalisation (the assumption being
that the state-society may be forced to abandon its distinctive social market
model in the face of global forces), or as a rebuttal to globalisation (the
assumption being that the institutions and practices actively resist neo-liberal
restructuring). In this chapter I argue that perceptions of the German relation-
ship to globalisation, both inside and outside the state-society, are contra-
dictory and contested. I explore the historical institutions and practices of
state, capital and labour that have made possible particular programmes of
restructuring in Germany. The contemporary restructuring of working
practices is discussed, revealing the dominant negotiated programme of ‘flexi-
corporatism’.
In the context of the globalisation of production, MNCs have been most
commonly depicted as the key vehicles of global transformation. They have,
however, tended to be considered as unitary ‘non-state’ actors, that is to say
defined in terms of identifiable agency that is significant because of its
‘bargaining power’ with states (see Stopford and Strange, 1991; Strange, 1996).
Chapter 5 opens up the presumed unity of the MNC to explore the social
power relationships that constitute this ‘global actor’. Defined in terms of the
relationships between corporate managers, financiers, shareholders, suppliers
and a diverse range of worker groups, the firm represents a site of contest in
the ascription of meanings and realities of globalisation. Chapter 6 extends the
inquiry into the contested nature of restructuring in production and work by
exploring the concrete everyday experiences of workers. In line with an IPE of
social practice approach, the chapter explores the everyday practices of work
that variously enable, contest or confound the emerging social relations of
globalisation. How do workers, broadly defined, engage with processes of
global restructuring? What are the patterns of tension and co-ordination
between different worker groups? As firms intensify their efforts to outsource
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production functions, what are the implications for unprotected workers?
Overall, this chapter takes the analysis of the restructuring of work beyond a
discussion of the politics of states and firms, toward an increased visibility for
the concrete experiences of workers who are differentially positioned in the
IPE of work.
In essence, the argument presented in this book seeks to extend the politi-
cisation of globalisation beyond the image of direct street demonstrations and
protests. The ‘Seattle effect’ is an undeniably significant feature of the contem-
porary contests surrounding globalisation. However, it is but one element of a
much broader acknowledgement that globalisation is political by its very
nature, not least as a result of its intertwining with the thoughts and actions of
our everyday lives. Multiple modes of contestation can be revealed that open
up both the concept and the experience of globalisation to political inquiry –
for instance the politics of the making of particular policies of restructuring,
the politics of accommodation and compromise that enable particular forms
of restructuring, and the politics of tension and resistance that confound and
transform a restructuring agenda.
Notes
1 At the closure of the Fujitsu Corporation’s semi-conductor plant in north-east
England, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, announced during a television inter-
view that ‘regrettably there is little a government can do about the twists and turns of
world markets in a global economy’. Under the heading of ‘globalisation’, a recent IMF
paper noted that ‘The last decade of the 20th century has been marked by immense
changes in the world economy. The new phase of the technological revolution and the
far-reaching internationalisation of capital have changed the patterns of economic
performance … Hence, on the eve of the new century, there are not only mounting
structural problems, but several new issues that must be addressed properly’ (2000b:
6). A similarly process-centred statement is made by Jonathan Freedland, for whom
‘… the economy has moved ahead of politics… vast global corporations influence
every aspect of our day-to-day lives. Our only weapon is national governments – and
these have proved themselves all but powerless’ (The Guardian, 1 December 1999: 21).
2 A focus on broad shifts in industrial and workplace relations in ideal-type neo-liberal
and neo-corporatist political economies would indicate that globalisation has indeed
been accompanied by transformation in forms and modes of work. The 1998 British
Workplace Employee Relations Survey reports that 47 per cent of firms located in
Britain had no union members, a figure that has increased from 36 per cent in the
1990 survey (Cully et al., 1998). The number of part-time workers grew by 5.4 per cent
over 1999 to total 24.9 per cent of total employment (European Industrial Relations
Observatory (EIRO), 1999). Ninety per cent of British firms use subcontracting, 44
per cent use fixed-term contracts and 28 per cent use agency workers (EIRO, 1999).
Figures for Germany show that trade unions lost 30 per cent of their membership
between 1991 and 1998 (Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft (IDW), 1999). Part-time
working accounted for 18.3 per cent of total employment in Germany for 1999, while
temporary work accounted for 10.8 per cent (EIRO, 1999). Eurostat figures suggest
that the use of non-standard (temporary, part-time, fixed contract) employment has
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increased in all EU member states over the last decade, though this has been accom-
panied by varying degrees of legislative protection in different states (information
sourced from personal enquiry to Eurostat, June 2000).
3 While the key elements of a project perspective have been discernible for some time,
there are now analyses that explicitly refer to a globalisation project (see Rupert, 2000,
ch. 3; McMichael, 2000; Sklair, 2001: 1).
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Globalisation, restructuring
and the flexibility discourse

Industrialisation characteristically redesigns and reshapes its human raw
materials, whatever the source … The development of an industrial
workforce necessarily involves the destruction of old ways of life and
work and the acceptance of the new imperatives of the industrial work
place and work community. (Kerr et al., 1962: 193)
Industries and firms almost everywhere are said to be leaving behind the
old, tired, boring, inefficient, staid past and entering into the new, highly
efficient, diverse, exciting, and flexible future; and if they are not, they
should be. (Curry, 1993: 99)
Throughout much of the twentieth century the social sciences haveinvoked ‘master concepts’ (Giddens, 1982) in the explanation and shap-
ing of patterns of social change. The use of the action-process verb form1 – in
modernisation, industrialisation, globalisation – imbues the concepts with a
sense of movement, logic and direction. Simultaneously, they operate as
nouns that name and describe a historical condition, thus offering an elusive
promise of a destination that can never quite be reached (Ashley, 2000). For a
group of sociologists writing in the 1960s, the master concept of industrial-
isation captured the dynamics of transformation in a form that effectively
enabled social change to be ordered and mastered. Industrial capitalism, with
its inherent contradictions, was viewed as a temporary and transitory form of
industrial society. The processes of industrialisation and technological advance
defined all economic and social organisation, ultimately leading all societies
passively to a convergent system of ‘pluralistic industrialism’ (Kerr et al., 1962:
266). The concept of industrialisation itself acquired an imperative logic that
named and defined the parameters of new forms of production, work and social
life. It offered the enticing prospect of a defined destination, coupled with an
explanation of the transformations that should be expected along the way.
In contemporary times the new master concept of globalisation has
become the explanatory tool that is applied to all areas of economy, polity and
society. The concept has become a kind of horse for every course, infinitely
malleable and amorphous, ‘vague in referent’ and ‘ambiguous in usage’ (Jones,
Amoore_Global_02_Ch1 6/19/02, 12:06 PM14
15Globalisation, restructuring and flexibility
1995: 1). Indeed, some have concluded that the term should be abandoned to
prevent its reification in political, academic and corporate debates. However, it
is precisely the amorphous and empty nature of the concept that gives it the
capacity to exercise power. It can be filled with multiple meanings and used to
legitimate a range of restructuring programmes, from labour market flexi-
bility and mobility, to privatisation. Of course, the contemporary period of
globalisation is commonly defined as a break from the logics of industrialisa-
tion, taking the form of, for example, the ‘post-industrial society’ (Castells,
1989) or ‘post-Fordism’ (Lipietz, 1987; Piore and Sabel, 1984). However, the
representations of industrialisation and globalisation make common appeals
to notions of technological externality, epochal newness and novelty and
convergence in economic and social organisation. As devices employed to
explain the human and social world, the concepts of industrialisation and
globalisation as ‘processes’ represent highly simplified understandings of
social change. They embody ‘problem-solving’ approaches to knowledge (Cox,
1981: 128), reflecting a preference for generalisable and codifiable modes of
thought, and informing the terms of a policy discourse.
In the attempt to highlight the contested nature of globalisation in
production and work, a first step is to question its role in underpinning and
legitimating the all-pervasive discourse of flexibility. In this chapter the
common discursive dynamics of the industrialisation and globalisation theses
are explored. The analysis focuses on five common aspects that reveal a central
dominant representation of social change: the identification of exogenous
transformative forces, disciplinary imperatives, historical convergence, social
prescription and the death of conflict. I argue that it is these assumptions
about social change that underpin and perpetuate the contemporary discourse
of imperative labour flexibility. Flexibility itself has an amorphous quality that
allows it to be applied ‘flexibly’ to describe the many facets of the contem-
porary restructuring agenda. In line with globalisation, flexibility comes
simultaneously to mean all things and yet nothing precise at all. The discourse
on flexibility pervades the policy agenda of the competition state (Cerny,
1990; Porter, 1990), the restructuring strategies of firms (Ruigrok and van
Tulder, 1995) and the everyday experiences of workers (Pollert, 1991; Beck,
2000b). The conception of globalisation as a process reinforces the assumption
that the state is compelled to ‘retreat’ or adopt new policy instruments
(Strange, 1996), the flexible firm in a ‘global web’ is the essential corporate
strategy for a global era (Atkinson, 1985; Reich, 1991) and that workers must
accept greater risk and insecurity as they ‘make the leap’ to new practices.
Transformative forces
The proponents of the industrial society thesis identified exogenous factors as
the central driving forces of industrialisation. A society is driven into adaptation
by the challenges that exist ‘on the outside’ or ‘by the exigencies of the situation
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external to it’ (Parsons, 1960: 138). Viewed in this way, the principal charac-
teristic of all industrial societies is that progress is dependent upon the
absorption of exogenous technological advances and the adaptation of social
practices to their dictates. The assumption is that the ‘more modern’ is always
the ‘more superior’ (Kerr et al., 1962: 279) so that the diversity of the pre-
industrial world is gradually homogenised through the advancement of
technology: ‘Technology is a unifying force. At one moment in time there may
be several best economic combinations or social arrangements, but only one
best technology’ (Kerr et al., 1962: 284). Technology is presented as a universal
force that imposes common challenges on all advanced states and societies.
The progress of science, technology and production methods essentially
determine the actions to be taken by state actors, industrialists and workers. In
a sense technology becomes both structure and agent as it simultaneously acts
to initiate change and defines the structures within which change takes place.
Transformations in social relations, practices and values are held to emerge
out of technological change and this unilinear logic is never reversed.
The predominant image in the orthodox accounts of globalisation is of
similarly exogenous forces that act upon states and societies. Conventional
logic would have it that a series of conjunctural events in the 1970s effectively
freed the globalisation ‘genie’ from his lamp and marked the emergence of a
distinctive global era. The collapse of the Bretton Woods System, the oil
shocks, the claims to US decline and the subsequent emergence of globalised
financial and productive systems, all are offered as explanations of a trans-
formed world order. However, it is not the events themselves that have
informed the predominant explanations of global change. Rather, it is the
technological and market forces held to lie behind them that are most
commonly perceived as ‘creating globalisation’. Susan Strange argues that
‘technology has got ahead of regulation’ (1997a: 54) with the effect that tech-
nological change has become the ‘prime cause of the shift in the state-market
balance of power’ (1996: 7). Others assert that ‘at the heart of the flexibiliza-
tion of both production processes and firms themselves has been the explosive
development of information technology’ (Cerny, 1995: 615). Variants of post-
Fordist analysis position technology as the driving force of change, arguing
that the productivity gains central to the Fordist system become eroded by
maturing technologies. The system of production itself then transforms from
Fordist mass production and consumption with its associated technologies, to
post-Fordist ‘flexible specialisation’ (Freeman and Perez, 1988). There is an
overwhelming sense of inevitability in these accounts of the ‘domino effect’ of
technology acting on states and societies that, in turn, act to restructure
production and work. Strange writes: ‘Accelerating technological change …
explains the rapid internationalization of production in the world market
economy, a process which, inevitably, relaxes the authority of the state over the
enterprises based and directed from inside their territorial borders’ (Strange,
1995: 59, emphasis added).
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Globalisation is thus presented in terms of the opposing forces of, on the
one hand, technology acting from without and, on the other, politics and
society simply responding from within. The ‘deterritorialised’ forces of finance
(Wriston, 1988; Cerny, 1996; McKenzie and Lee, 1991), production and trade
(Porter, 1990; Reich, 1991) and culture (Fukuyama, 1992) are cast in opposi-
tion to the presumed territorial realities of state and society. States and societies
are consistently positioned as passive receivers of technological transforma-
tion. We are left with the impression that global restructuring is nothing more
than an effect of the ‘global process’ of technological interpenetration. As
Marchand and Runyan argue, a mythical image is created in which globalisa-
tion becomes ‘a process generated outside our own (immediate) environment’
(2000: 7). When conceived as ‘outside’ our immediate experiences, the
technologically-driven globalisation process becomes conveniently and safely
insulated from the politics of negotiation, contestation and resistance.
Disciplinary imperatives
To represent globalisation and industrialisation as the products of exogenous
forces is to assume that transformation is to some degree an inevitable
response to irresistible pressures. It is but a short step from this inevitabilism
to the assertion that there is no alternative for states and societies but to adapt
and restructure their policies, structures and practices. For the scholars
writing at the peak of post-war growth, the most significant transition was
considered to be that from traditional to industrial society. This shift
represented the underlying movement in all state-societies as they responded
to external pressures. Talcott Parsons’ systems-centred social theory sought to
understand the adaptation of social systems in line with pressures from
‘outside’: ‘In the present situation, for the “diffusion” of this organizational
type [industrialism] from the Western world to other areas, it seems clear that
the most favourable conditions will center on the right type of political initi-
ative’ (1960: 128, emphasis added).
There is an in-built disciplinary imperative here – it becomes incumbent
on states and societies to respond with the ‘right’ strategies. The imperative of
industrialisation is expressed in terms of political responses that are ‘essential’,
‘rational’ and ‘right’. A reading of Daniel Bell reveals a belief in a generally held
consensus on the ‘right’ forms of political organisation: ‘the acceptance of a
welfare state; the desirability of decentralised power; a system of mixed
economy and of political pluralism’ (1961: 402). Viewed in this way there can
be no impediment to, or contingency in, the processes of restructuring and
transformation. Social relations, institutions and practices are at once struc-
turally determined, yet rendered inherently malleable and adaptable: ‘Even the
most economically advanced countries today are to some degree and in some
respects underdeveloped. They contain features derived from earlier stages of
development which obscure the pure logic of the industrialization process’
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(Kerr et al., 1962: 33). Social change is characterised in periods or epochs of
social arrangements that prevail until external conditions dictate that they
undergo further transformation. The disciplinary dynamic of the process is
reinforced by a presumed desire for modernisation that ultimately drives out
difference and distinctiveness, leaving one clear route. Societies are assumed to
absorb the imperatives of transformation such that they sustain them with
their own thoughts, actions and desires.
The notion of an epochal shift and essential political and social adaptation
is inherent within diverse accounts of globalisation. In common with the
industrial society theories, the external forces of the global economy are
viewed as creating imperatives for the restructuring of state and society. In
contrast with these theories, however, the norms that are established are for
the ‘retreat of the state’ (Strange, 1996), the ‘hollowing out of the state’ (Cerny,
1996: 91) and the rise of the ‘competition state’ (Cerny, 1990). The trans-
formations from a perceived old to a new epoch are characterised in terms of
shifts: from ‘comparative’ to ‘competitive’ advantage (Porter, 1990); from the
‘decommodifying’ to the ‘commodifying’ state (Cerny, 1990); and from
‘industrial’ to ‘post-industrial’ society (Hepworth, 1989; Block, 1990). While
commentators do not agree on the normative aspects of such transformations
(some celebrate the process, while others condemn it), both liberal and neo-
Marxist theorists share common ground on the extent of global change.
Among the more extreme formulations we read that: ‘The nation-state has
become an unnatural, even dysfunctional, unit for organizing human activity
and managing economic endeavour in a borderless world’ (Ohmae, 1990: 93).
The dissolution of state authority and the rise of marketised frameworks of
authority are presented as imperative transformations in a globalisation
process. Fundamental breaks with the past are staked out and labelled in
diverse ways, though with remarkably similar effects. Among the diverse per-
spectives on post-Fordism, common notions of epochal shifts are communi-
cated, whether through ‘regimes of accumulation’ (Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz,
1987; Boyer, 1986), ‘techno-economic paradigms’ of the neo-Schumpeterians
(Freeman and Perez, 1988) or ‘industrial divides’ (Piore and Sabel, 1984).
In process-centred accounts of globalisation there is a certain predilection
for claims to novelty, the staking out of a capitalist ‘crossroads’ and the
establishment of a qualitative break with the past. As Rob Walker observes ‘... it
is undoubtedly tempting to exaggerate the novelty of novelty’ (1993: 2). With
the ethereal lure of industrialism or globalism on the horizon, it becomes
possible to legitimate particular policy decisions on the basis of ‘no alternative’.
The very idea of an imperative process of change creates a sense of urgency
that dictates a particular response from society. While acknowledging the
competing normative views within the ‘globalisation as process’ perspective,
there is an identifiable common emphasis on discontinuity. It is possible to
either celebrate or condemn the process but still to agree that it is essentially
inexorable. A sense of ‘no alternative’ prevails and politics becomes confined
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to instrumental discussions of the ‘right’ and ‘competitive’ way to respond and
harness the opportunities of the new stage. In effect, the ‘no alternative’ logic
reinforces the sense of disciplinary imperatives. The hypermobility of foreign
direct investment (FDI capital, for example, can be constructed and reinforced
through the ‘talked up’ threat of exit (Watson and Hay, 1998). The state and
public policy become disciplined by the need to prove their credibility and
consistency and secure the confidence of their investors (Gill, 1999). In this
way, sometimes wholly inadvertently, the ‘disciplinary forces of neoliberalism’
(Gill, 1995a) can be perpetuated and reinforced by the straightjacket effect of
dominant modes of thought.
Historical convergence
The assumption that technological advances force change, and that this
change is part of an inexorable and inevitable process, has tended to lead to
the perceived logic of convergence. From divergent historical and cultural
viewpoints, diverse institutional arrangements and distinctive social power
relations, societies are believed to become increasingly alike in their basic
structures. As John Goldthorpe argues:
This is the general model of society most consistent with the functional
imperatives that a rationally operating technology and economy impose:
and it is in fact the pressure of these imperatives which must be seen as
forcing the development of industrial societies on to convergent lines,
whatever the distinctive features of their historical formation or of their
pre-industrial cultural traditions. (1984: 316, emphasis in original)
Industrial society was said to take precedence over capitalist society because
all technologically advanced countries displayed similar structures, whether
capitalist or not (Aron, 1967). In this sense capitalist industrialisation was but
a moment in a longer historical drive to industrialism. Much of this argument
was based on the analysis of the ideologically divergent US and Soviet Union,
arguing that they were following a convergent path of industrialisation, as in
Talcott Parsons’ work: ‘Virtually the whole world has, within our time, come to
assign to economic productivity a very high value indeed. The essential
differences between American and Soviet orientations, which some feel is the
deepest difference in the world, is not primarily a difference over the valuation
of productivity’ (Parsons, 1960: 100).
The suggestion is that despite divergence in ideologies, institutions and
practices, the overriding trend is towards a convergence around basic organ-
ising principles. Societies may be ‘travelling at different speeds on different
roads’ (Kerr et al., 1962: 2), but the consensus is that the direction and
destination are the same. The ‘uniformity of texture’ and similarities in ‘patterns
of behaviour’ are considered to be the significant features of social trans-
formation (Shonfield, 1965: 65). The focus lies firmly on the commonalties
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between societies and these are then ‘aggregated up’ to form a systemic theory
of social change.
The tendency to presuppose a process of historical convergence is charac-
teristic also of many contemporary accounts of the globalisation process. It is
striking that Susan Strange associates IPE with the study of the structural
dynamics of the world economy as a whole: ‘As an international political
economist, I am more interested in the pace and direction of change in the
whole world market economy than in the pace and direction of change in
particular parts of it contained within the rather arbitrary territorial borders
of states’ (Strange, 1997b: 182). With a particular focus on the future of
distinctive national ‘versions’ of capitalism, Strange argues that the ‘common
logics’ of world markets would lead all states and societies on to a convergent
pattern of change (1997b: 182). Of course, Strange does this to emphasise the
extent of transnational sources of power and authority. However, it would
seem problematic to represent globalisation as a singular process of political
and social convergence and, in doing so, to ignore the many different inter-
pretations of globalisation. Social change becomes a matter of common
pressures promoting convergent solutions. Where difference is acknowledged
this tends to be framed in terms of a ‘pathway’ that may temporarily diverge
from the dominant route.
Within the convergence accounts there are specific policy instruments
suggested as the common ground for states and societies. In the 1960s the
convergent trends were identified as the extension of public power in a modern
capitalist system, the preoccupation with social welfare and the acceptance of
a steady growth in incomes and wages (Shonfield, 1965: 65). As discussion of
globalisation took hold in the 1990s, convergent trends were mapped out that
represented the complete reversal of these ideals. We see the extension of
private power in the global system, the shift from welfare state to competition
state (Cerny, 1990), and the acceptance of labour flexibility and wage restraint
as policy doxa (World Bank, 1995). The global competition imperative is
overwhelmingly adopted as a business mantra, provoking debates regarding
the ‘right path’ for the twenty-first-century organisation of the production
and labour processes (see Peck and Tickell, 1994; Peters and Waterman, 1995),
and for nations to follow in their response to globalisation (Reich, 1991;
Department for International Development, 2000). The overwhelming image
is one of a convergence of state policy, firm behaviour, and societal response
around a single ‘best’ solution. Much of this analysis subordinates the politics
of restructuring to the economic imperative of particular policy responses.
Distinctive social institutions, understandings and practices are neglected in
the process of identifying converging agendas.
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Policy prescription
The defining of social change in ‘process’ terms – as industrialisation or
globalisation – tends to avoid engagement with the inherent ‘messiness’ of
social and political life. This problem-solving mode of knowledge simplifies
and codifies social change into a series of identifiable (and predictable) shifts.
In a pure form, this approach seeks to emulate the natural science model of
observation, rule-generation and application. The post-war behavioural
revolution in social science embodied a search for reliable causal theory that
could explain social and political activity. The ambition was to simplify the
complexity of social and political processes into a generally applicable theory.
As Easton has it: ‘Industrialism need not force us into what we consider to be
the evils of urban life. Knowing what the effects of undirected industrial
development are, we can use relevant generalizations to help construct a new
pattern of life’ (1965: 30).
The idea that if we can identify and know the process then we can learn
how to respond to it is never far from view. There is a close relationship
between process-centred models of social change and the desire to discipline
or manage a political response. I am not suggesting that contemporary
accounts of globalisation adopt a behavioural approach to social science, but
the instrumental rationality of behaviouralism is echoed in many of the
dominant academic, media and corporate claims about globalisation:
People who construct knowledge in secular, anthropocentric, techno-
scientific, instrumental terms have generally exercised the greatest power
in global spaces. Rationalist epistemology has reigned supreme in global
enterprises, global governance agencies and the more influential parts of
global civil society like think tanks and professional NGOs. (Scholte,
2000: 187)
It is at this point that we begin to see the power that is exercised within
and through dominant representations of globalisation. As Palan has it ‘state
or transnational firms are assumed to be rational, calculating actors, with clear
… preferences and goals’ (2000: 15). Where complex and contingent dynamics
of change are presented in instrumental and rational terms descriptively, it
becomes possible to use these generalisations prescriptively. The nuances and
contradictions of contemporary global restructuring become obscured by a
burgeoning literature prescribing ‘best practice’ policy models. Following from
the identification of exogenous forces that demand imperative responses,
there is a space opened up for the prescription of best practice models. As
Winfried Ruigrok and Rob van Tulder have argued: ‘there is a grateful market
for those who translate the “new complexity” into simple formulae and unam-
biguous recommendations’ (1995: 1). Those analysts, consultants and auditors
who make it their business to offer global solutions become the key players in
both state and corporate strategy. Their pre-eminence is difficult to challenge
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from within a perspective that positions them as the problem solvers in the
process. Academic analysis cuts across business management and political
strategy and we see the rise of gurus who occupy central space in academic,
political and corporate arenas (see Ohmae, 1990; Drucker, 1995; Toffler, 1980;
Giddens, 1998). Borrowing from the generalisations of the industrial society
school, everything becomes ‘manageable’, society becomes a ‘social system’,
politics a ‘political system’ and global social relations part of a ‘global system’.
The emphasis has been predominantly placed on the mapping of the contours
of global change so that a ‘route guide’ can be produced to ensure successful
navigation.
The death of conflict
It is commonplace in social science to find claims to the ‘end’ of particular
struggles at particular historical moments. In particular, there seems to be a
temptation to claim that a consensus around basic core values and ideas in a
society brings the end of a period of social conflict or contestation. Thus, for
example, the industrial society was conceived as a pluralist system of peaceful
political competition and industrial negotiation (see Dahrendorf, 1959: 67).
Daniel Bell’s ‘End of Ideology’ thesis, proclaimed that the consolidation of a
Keynesian compromise had effectively erased the grounds for disruptive class
conflict, offering in its place a more manageable kind of conflict (see Bell,
1961; Lipset, 1960; Waxman, 1968). In these formulations the politics of
negotiation, contestation and compromise represent the struggles of transition.
They are ultimately by-products of social change and can only temporarily
disrupt the process. The dynamic behind social transformation is argued to
lie, not in the contradictions and tensions of capitalism, but in the rational
progress of technology. The rationality, achievement, mobility and plurality of
the adaptive industrial society signals the ‘supercedence of capitalism’ (Dahren-
dorf, 1959: 67). Kerr et al. similarly argue that analysis should move beyond a
focus on conflict to an examination of the ‘universal phenomena affecting all
workers’ (1962: 7). Ultimately, this view of social change envisages a role for
contest and conflict only in an unstable transitional phase that will be
followed by a new and stable order with the reconciliation of social groups.2
The contemporary globalisation debate operationalises similar ideas
about the dissolution of sources of social and political conflict. Among IR
scholars there is debate as to the extent of the ‘triumph’ of liberalism (Brown,
1999). Fukuyama’s (1992) End of History thesis represents perhaps the strong-
est statement that disagreement over the form and nature of politico-
economic and social organisation is now of marginal concern. In terms of
party politics, there is the suggestion that advanced industrialised countries
have witnessed the death of socialism and the convergence of left and right
(Giddens, 1998). In terms of industrial conflict, it is argued that this is con-
fined to an adjustment phase in which the corporatist arrangements of a
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Fordist era are replaced by a ‘yeoman democracy’ of informal networks of
trust (Piore, 1990; Sabel, 1992). The emergence of the ‘network society’
(Castells, 1996) has been heralded by some as the harbinger of individual
autonomy and freedom in the workplace (Negroponte, 1995). In these repre-
sentations, political thought, action, conflict and contestation are institution-
alised phenomena; they are contained by ideological positions, party politics
and formalised industrial relations. As a result, it is held that once the
embedded norms of the perceived past era have been totally displaced by ‘new’
and individualised arrangements, conflict becomes a thing of the past. A
wholly benign image of global restructuring is created, within which the con-
flicts and struggles that characterise and condition processes of social change
are invisible.
The restructuring of work and the flexibility discourse
Within the mode of knowledge that frames globalisation as an essential and
inexorable process, there has been a central proposed solution to the conun-
drum of what to do. The answer that has come back from public and private
managers is to ‘flexibilise’, to introduce flexibility into all spheres of social life.
The emergence of a political, corporate, societal and academic discourse of
flexibility has become a highly visible everyday face of the globalisation
debate. Flexibility, as featured in the statements of international economic
institutions, national governments and corporations (see, for example World
Bank, 1995; OECD, 1996; Beatson, 1995; Department for International
Development, 2000), has become a multifarious concept and a universal
panacea. It is presented as synonymous with deregulatory government, lean
production and the flexible firm, the decollectivisation of industrial relations
and the overall dissolution of work and employment into a fluid and transient
form. In its broadest usage, flexibility has come to define the properties of a
society that has embraced the imperatives of immediacy and risk within
globalisation and has accepted the required adaptations. At its most specific
and precise, flexibility defines the techniques and practices of JIT production,
kaizen (continuous improvement), teamworking and ‘total quality manage-
ment’ (TQM). In its many guises, flexibility in production and work means
that entire countries, individual firms and workers can respond without delay
to shifts in global demand for a good or service, and to global market shocks.
In this section I will explore the close relationship between the ascendant
‘common sense’ representations of globalisation as process, and the contem-
porary preoccupation with all things flexible. The previous section outlined
the key features of such a globalist mode of knowledge: transformative forces,
disciplinary imperatives, historical convergence, policy prescription and the
death of conflict. The section that follows will map out the terrain of the
flexibility discourse through these features. In common with some other
scholars, I propose that the study of global restructuring can reveal the power,
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agency and contingency that is absent from much contemporary discussion of
the ‘G word’ (Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1995: 130; Marchand and Runyan,
2000: 7). The formulae of flexibility present in global restructuring discourse
offers a particularly powerful example of the reification of a particular
representation of global social change.
Technology, markets and the restructuring of work
It has become commonplace to locate the intensification of global com-
petition and the onset of neo-liberal restructuring in a particular historical
period, and in relation to apparently exogenous technological and market
forces. For many commentators on the transformation of work, the 1970s
represent a turning point in the regulation of the international system and a
benchmark for contemporary globalisation. Despite fierce disagreement over
the causes and implications of the unravelling of the Bretton Woods System,
the oil crises and the rejection of Keynesian demand management and
welfarism, there is general agreement that the nature of regulation, product-
ion and work underwent fundamental change in response. The competitive
challenge of Japan and Germany, the consolidated power of the MNCs, the
crisis of Fordism and the ascendancy of ‘offshore’ production and finance have
all become emblematic of a new world order in which the buffers between
production and global markets have been eroded. Furthermore, they have
become central to explanations of the ‘necessary’ transformations in the
policies and practices of states, firms and workers in response.
The question is not whether technological and market transformations
have been significant in the restructuring of production and work; of course
they have played a fundamental role. Rather, the central question raised here is
how these transformations have been represented as external events that are
somehow decoupled from the realms of politics and social life. The claims that
nation-states have, by necessity, become ‘marketised’, that firms adopt ‘lean’
strategies (Womack et al., 1990), and that labour must become more flexible
(Oliver and Wilkinson, 1988), are established in the context of a linear and
opposed relationship between technology/markets and society/politics. The
globalisation of markets in goods, services and finance is presented as a reality
that is imposed ‘from without’ and must be seized ‘from within’: ‘International
flows of goods, services, capital, and people bring new opportunities for most
… Some workers will indeed be hurt if they are stuck in declining activities
and lack the flexibility to change’ (World Bank, 1995: 4). In the World Bank’s
statement the ‘flows’ are presented as external forces that may ‘bring’ oppor-
tunities or threats into the lives of workers. States, industries and workers that
fail to recognise the shifts in their external environment will be ‘left behind’ in
the competitive race. Flexibility is itself defined as an attribute of rapid and
adaptive responsiveness to ‘outside’ pressures. There is a strong emphasis on
the embracing of new and superior technologies and the adoption of new and
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flexibilised productive and working practices in line with their dictates (see
Womack et al., 1990; Hirst and Zeitlin, 1989). Fordist mass production is
presented as technologically outmoded as new information and communi-
cation technologies (ICTs) increase the possibilities for flexibilisation and the
geographical and temporal dispersal of production. The ‘flexible firm’
becomes the fêted site for global production, bringing with it new demands
for the reorganisation of work (Atkinson, 1985). The combination of techno-
logical advances, intensely competitive markets and new models of production
is discursively tied to ‘new opportunities’ for the organisation of work:
Three factors – human resources, markets and technology – have a
fundamental impact on the way workplaces are organised … The new
flexible firm is a demanding form of organisation of work … In the new
decentralised and network-oriented organisations, workers perform a
range of tasks, rather than pass the job on from one to another … As
workers develop a wider range of skills and become more adaptable, the
new organisation of work will further facilitate geographical mobility.
This in turn will enable workers to exploit their potential more fully and
exercise their rights in this respect. (Commission of European Commun-
ities (CEC), 1997: 7)
The European Commission positions the restructuring of work as a direct
response to exogenous technological and market forces. Indeed, the flexibili-
sation of work is represented in terms of the opportunities and rewards of ‘up-
skilling’, training and greater labour market mobility. The discourse that has
emerged and made flexibility ‘common sense’ for the global era has firmly
positioned technological change on the outside, and states, firms and workers
on the inside in a responsive mode. There is no acknowledgement that market
competition and technological development may themselves be constituted in
part by the social forces engendered by the production process in specific
places and at specific historical moments (Cox, 1987). For example, the
relationships between states, firms and financial institutions in a particular
context may place limits on the development of particular technologies. To
take this further we may want to question the alliance that is presented
between high-tech/high-skill work and workers performing ‘flexible’ roles and
tasks in the GPE. In many instances flexibility is associated with repetitive,
low-skill and intensive working practices (Pollert, 1991; Anderson, 2000;
Moody, 1997), and with sectors that are not internationally traded. Viewed in
this way, the linear and deterministic relationship between techno-economic
globalisation and the restructuring of work is tenuous. A consideration of the
social relations that intimately bind ‘workplaces’ into the dynamics of ‘world
order’3 reveals that the inside/outside dichotomy of the flexibility discourse is
a convenient illusion that masks the political power and social contest that
surrounds the restructuring of work.
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Flexibility as disciplinary imperative
In recent times there has been a subtle change in the discourse surrounding
policy responses to globalisation. That change involves a greater willingness to
acknowledge the inequities and unevenness of globalisation. The British
Government acknowledges that ‘the impact of globalisation on poor people
varies widely’ (Department for International Development, 2000: 18), the
United Nations equates a globalising world with ‘new threats to human
security – sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of daily life’ (United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), cited in Held and McGrew, 2000)
and the World Bank states that ‘widening global disparities have increased the
sense of deprivation and injustice for many’ (2001: vi). In every case, however,
the acknowledgement of inequity is qualified by judgements on which state-
societies have most successfully ‘harnessed globalisation’, thereby avoiding the
negative effects. Put simply, the message is that globalisation simultaneously
presents opportunities and threats, and that individual governments, indus-
tries and people take responsibility for ensuring that they avoid the threats
and embrace the opportunities. Thus, the World Bank refers to ‘harnessing
global forces for poor people’ (2001: 179), the British Government seeks to
‘make globalisation work for the poor’ (Department for International Develop-
ment, 2000), the British Prime Minister states that ‘the global market is a good
thing for us’ (Held, 1998: 26), and The Economist puts the ‘case for
globalisation’ (23 September 2000: 19).
The problems that are associated with globalisation are viewed as inher-
ently ‘treatable’ in the sense that effective policy responses can be formulated.
The ‘golden solution’ to ‘make globalisation work’ has been flexibility – pro-
viding both a disciplinary ethos and a concrete set of strategies through which
to ‘harness’ globalisation. The central question on the global agenda becomes
‘what reforms would improve the capacity of the labour markets to accom-
modate structural changes smoothly and rapidly?’ (OECD, 1994: 12-15). The
flexibility discourse thus has a strong disciplinary effect and becomes a ‘no
alternative’ policy imperative. A failure to create flexible labour markets and
flexible workers is presented as a failure to grasp the opportunities of globalisa-
tion and, in all likelihood, will ‘incur the costs of inaction’ (OECD, 1996: 21).
The dominant thesis in policy and corporate literature is that labour
flexibility is the solution to the challenge of mobile global capital or, to put it
another way, that firms will locate where labour is malleable and deregulated.
What globalisation means, according to those who reproduce the flexibility
imperative, is that ‘old’ systems of production, labour and regulation become
rigid constraints in otherwise free markets. For the World Bank, for example,
the countries that have achieved the greatest gains for their workers are those
that decided early on to take advantage of international opportunities, and to
rely increasingly on market forces rather than the state in allocating resources’
(1995: 10). The neo-classical view, that the operation of the global market
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stands in tension with the rigidities of an interventist or regulatory state, lies at
the heart of the flexibility discourse. The major OECD governments become
wrapped up in a constraining neo-liberal mantra that says ‘make space for
capital’ and this is projected to less developed countries in similar terms. As
the European Commission has it: ‘… firms must achieve global competitiveness
on open and competitive markets. It is the responsibility of the national and
Community authorities to provide industry with a favourable environment’
(CEC, 1993: 57). A central feature of this ‘favourable environment’ is assumed
to be a flexible and adaptable workforce. Part of the ‘responsibility’ of political
authorities, then, becomes the task of removing regulatory impediments to a
flexible labour market (Baglioni and Crouch, 1990). For policymakers and
corporate managers this has signalled moves towards explicit (formalised and
institutionalised) and implicit (informal and tacit) forms of flexibilisation in
labour and work. Within the flexibility discourse it is possible to identify a
number of interrelated conceptions of the nature and implications of
flexibility.
Functional flexibility implies that working tasks and practices can adapt to
changes in demand on the production process (Pinch, 1994). The focus here is
on internal or firm-centred flexibility. The assumption is that traditional job
demarcations and hierarchies create rigidities that should be eroded or
‘flattened’ to be replaced by multi-functional ‘teams’ or production ‘cells’. In
this model the firm becomes the locus for determining the necessary skills,
and training is likely to be ‘in-house’ and task specific. In essence skills are
owned and defined by the firm and are not carried by the worker in the wider
labour market.
Numerical flexibility is a labour market ‘textbook’ term for the capacity of
an employer to expand or contract the workforce in line with demand. This is
said to be achieved through a variety of mechanisms such as working time
flexibility, casual and part-time working, subcontracting and outsourcing and
the use of temporary contracts or agency staff. The underlying imperative is
that traditional employment relations must be dissolved via, for instance, the
relaxation of dismissal, redundancy and benefits regulations. A parallel and
related shift has occurred in the composition of the workforce, with an
increase in women’s participation in the workforce, the use of early retirement
policies (Rubery, 1999), and the employment of unprotected migrant workers
attributed with ‘… an uncommon willingness to work hard at unappealing
jobs’ (The Economist, 6 May 2000: 19). There is an underlying assumption that
welfare and active labour market policies must be limited in order that there
may be no disincentives to take on ‘flexible’ work: ‘To ensure that most
participants are poor and to maintain incentives for workers to move on to
regular work when it becomes available, programs should pay no more than
the average wage for unskilled labor’ (World Bank, 2001: 156). This example,
drawn from the World Bank’s ‘principles of successful workfare programmes’,
demonstrates the market-centred logic of the flexibility discourse. Taken to its
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conclusion, so-called numerical flexibility has led to the use of child and
sweatshop labour. Indeed, where this has arisen the response has been to
appeal to ‘corporate social responsibility’ and the implementation of labour
codes of conduct (Department for International Development, 2000: 156). It
is difficult to see how this can be effective when numerical flexibility is
designed precisely to limit the number of workers for whom the firm has
direct responsibility.
The final major strand of the contemporary fixation with flexibility has
been pay flexibility (read cost flexibility). The imperative of decentralised and
deregulated pay bargaining structures has been constructed through the
representation of embedded and unionised industrial relations as punitive
and rigid (Treu, 1992). Ultimately, individualised employment contracts and
performance-related or target-focused pay structures have become the model
of pay flexibility. State-societies that sustain high wage and non-wage labour
costs are presented as uncompetitive and inflexible. The overall effect of this
multi-layered flexibility discourse is to create a disciplinary imperative that
celebrates the dissolution of collective and stable employment relations and
the rise of the self-responsible, risk-bearing individual worker (see Beck,
2000b; Bauman, 1998).
The central problem of the representation of flexibility as an automatic
disciplinary feature of globalisation is that this closes down the possibility for
alternative strategies and tactics. The message that flexibility is the best way to
‘harness’ globalisation, and that a failure to flexibilise will bring out the claws
of globalisation, is a frightening and powerful one. Indeed, it serves to
constrain political and social debate about the restructuring of work as people
feel themselves to be faced with no alternative. The disciplinary character of
flexibility warns that a failure to expose oneself further to the forces of global
markets (through flexibilisation) will result in greater exclusion from the
potential rewards on offer. The portrayal of flexibility as a way of dealing with
the globalisation process has fundamentally oversimplified and depoliticised
the problem. The definition, interpretation and experience of so-called
flexibility is multiple, contingent and diverse. In particular, we do not find the
archetypal blueprint of a ‘flexible’, ‘multi-skilled’, yet ‘empowered’ worker in all
places (if, indeed, we find him or her at all). The disciplinary effects of
flexibility are highly contradictory, not least because they are inseparable from
the proclaimed ‘rigidities’. Flexibility, when viewed in concrete practices, rests
upon its antithesis – rigidity. For example, government policies that empha-
sise flexible labour markets require tightly defined welfare policies where there
is little or no room for political manoeuvre, whether to raise taxes or to use
active labour market policies. Similarly, firms that seek flexibility via the hiring
of agency or temporary workers, accept greater constraints on skills, training
and employee ‘trust’ (Rubery, 1999: 125). Workers that provide optimally
flexible labour in paid work find simultaneously rigid constraints in their
household and family life. Far from being an overarching solution to the
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challenges of globalisation, flexibility comes at a high price that is paid across
the realms of social and political life.
Competition and convergence
The flexibility discourse that has emerged in pursuit of solutions to globalisa-
tion has cut across corporate, academic and policy literature. Flexibility has
thus become an ‘icon or incantation’ (Curry, 1993: 99), strengthened by its
discursive attachment to dominant representations of globalisation. Accord-
ing to the advocates of labour flexibility, the imperatives of globalisation make
flexibilisation a necessity that is common to all societies. As a result it is
assumed that the political and corporate agendas of different state-societies
will be essentially convergent in their post-restructuring institutions and
practices: ‘The debate about reforms is not over a choice between reforms or
no reforms … Rather, the debate is on how reforms to build markets can be
designed and implemented in a way that is measured and tailored to the
economic, social, and political circumstances of a country’ (World Bank, 2001:
62). While it is acknowledged, then, that deregulatory reforms take place in
specific social and historical contexts, there is apparently no space for dispute
over the need for restructuring – the diagnosis is the same and the ‘medicine’
can simply be adapted to suit. The policy priorities of the Washington
consensus shape a convergence of government programmes around the
provision of the optimal location for global capital. A central emphasis is on
the removal of restrictions on the flexible organisation of work in order that
FDI decisions might favour a particular location. As the World Bank has it ‘the
most important reforms involve lifting constraints on labor mobility and
wage flexibility, as well as breaking the ties between social services and labor
contracts’ (World Bank, 1995: 109).
The neo-liberal deregulatory restructuring characteristic of the US and
UK becomes the model around which it is assumed that all social change will
conform and converge. The blueprint offered calls for a diminution in levels of
regulation on labour relations, but also seeks to exert downward pressure on
welfare and social benefits that are presumed to ‘inhibit’ the incentive to work.
The OECD’s Jobs Strategy typifies the policy recommendations that accom-
pany claims to a flexibilised and competitive labour force (see Table 1.1).
Intensified global competition, according to those advocating neo-liberal
flexibilisation, means that all state-societies must restructure along the lines of
this model. Indeed, in a report that compares the relative success of member
countries in implementing the Jobs Strategy recommendations, the OECD
identifies the US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Ireland as having
made ‘significant policy developments’ in the flexibilisation of labour (1997:
8). The Economic and Development Review Committee (EDRC) applaud the
UK for its ‘reform of industrial relations’, New Zealand for its ‘reduced govern-
ment intervention’, Ireland for the lowering of the ‘generosity of unemployment
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benefits’ and the US for its policies ‘consistent with flexible labour’ (1997: 7-8).
These countries are directly identified as converging around the OECD Jobs
Strategy blueprint for labour flexibility. By contrast, Germany, France,
Belgium, Denmark and Sweden, among others, are criticised for their struc-
tural impediments to wage flexibility, their high levels of social transfers, and
their use of active labour market policies: ‘It remains an open question
whether a policy approach that sees public intervention in post-compulsory
education, training and active labour market policies as a substitute for
relative wage flexibility is effective, let alone cost-effective, particularly in a
world of rapid structural change’ (OECD, 1997: 12). The message is that a
failure to converge around the policy requirements for labour flexibility will
result in a failure to attract inward investment, persistently high levels of
structural unemployment and an overall loss of competitiveness. A failure to
adapt along neo-liberal lines is interpreted as a failure to change at all, as a
kind of institutional stasis amid a changing world.
The convergence assumption is closely allied to teleological and depol-
iticised readings of globalisation (Amoore et al., 1997). An ‘inevitabilism’
surrounds the construction of a flexible and deregulated reality, and the social
and political-economic dynamics that frame this reality are never brought
Table 1.1 The OECD’s ‘Jobs Strategy’ recommendations
1 Set macroeconomic policy such that it will both encourage growth and, in
conjunction with good structural policies, make it sustainable, i.e. non-
inflationary.
2 Enhance the creation and diffusion of technological know-how by improving
frameworks for its development.
3 Increase flexibility of working-time (both short-term and lifetime) volun-
tarily sought by workers and employers.
4 Nurture an entrepreneurial climate by eliminating impediments to, and
restrictions on, the creation and expansion of enterprises.
5 Make wage and labour costs more flexible by removing restrictions that
prevent wages from reflecting local conditions and individual skill levels, in
particular of younger workers.
6 Reform employment security provisions that inhibit the expansion of
employment in the private sector.
7 Strengthen the emphasis on active labour market policies and reinforce their
effectiveness.
8 Improve labour force skills and competences through wide-ranging changes
in education and training systems.
9 Reform unemployment and related benefit systems – and their interaction
with the tax system – such that societies’ fundamental equity goals are achieved
in ways that impinge far less on the efficient functioning of labour markets.
Source: OECD, 1996.
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into question. The suggestion that restructuring can, or should, conform to a
menu of deregulatory reforms follows a highly simplified understanding of
social change. The achievement of an ‘attractive location’ for business, or a
‘flexible workforce’, though presented as a convergent process by key public
and private agencies, is a highly contested and contingent possibility. By way
of example, governments may negotiate their policy agenda through estab-
lished and embedded relationships with business, labour groups and employers’
organisations.4 Flexibility, for one society, social group or individual, may
represent inflexibility, insecurity and intensified risk for another. Within the
EDRC’s analysis of the implementation of the OECD Jobs Strategy, the diver-
gent emphases of member countries’ policy agendas are presented as problems
rooted in the failure to adopt the recommended strategies. However, there is
an implicit acknowledgement that fundamental social and political questions
may be interpreted differently in given contexts: ‘… representatives from some
English-speaking countries saw low unemployment as an essential condition
for, or element of, horizontal equity. And those from some continental
European countries saw equity as a more fundamental goal than low unem-
ployment’ (OECD, 1997: 12).
While for the OECD such divergence represents a problem to be resolved,
a different reading of the findings reveals that the identified aims of ‘flexibility’,
‘mobility’, ‘equity’ and even ‘competitiveness’ are interpreted, contested and
given meaning in specific contexts. Space is opened up within the global
restructuring debate that reveals a contingent and contradictory set of
practices. So, on the one hand we see governments pursuing policies that do
not conform to neo-liberal dictates, but that have grabbed the attention of the
business press, as in the case of France: ‘The 35-hour week may be a hassle, but
at least many employers have managed to extract valuable concessions from
employees on more flexible working practices in return’ (The Economist, 1
April 2000: 13). This is a long way from a critique of neo-liberal defined
flexibility and, indeed, the article later goes on to speculate: ‘If the French
economy can power ahead despite the tight grip of the state, just imagine what
it could do if the state let go’. However, there is a tacit recognition here that the
restructuring of work is negotiated and contested in the context of social
power relations, that bargains may be needed and accommodation may be
necessary, that politics may not quite be redundant.
On the other hand, and to reinforce the point, we see the archetypal neo-
liberal competition states experiencing problems that are not anticipated by
the flexibility rhetoric. The decision by US telecommunications corporation
Motorola to close the Bathgate plant in Scotland with 3000 redundancies
appears to defy the logic that the flexibility thesis proclaims. The decision,
taken in April 2001, effectively closed a profitable plant of ‘flexible’ workers in
favour of a lossmaking plant of ‘high cost’ workers in Flensburg, Germany.
Roger Lyons, General Secretary of the Manufacturing Science and Finance
Union, when interviewed by The Guardian, said that it was ‘easier and cheaper
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to sack workers in the UK than elsewhere in Europe’ (24 April 2001). This
example of the ‘flight’ of productive capital from an archetypal ‘flexible’
competition state clearly does not fit the picture of an inevitable competitive
advantage through reduced labour costs. Such contradictory and contested
dynamics of the restructuring of work cannot be understood by recourse to
simplistic notions of a convergence around flexibility. They can only be
revealed by an exploration of the social power relations that condition specific,
contingent and divergent ‘solutions’.
Prescription and human resource management
Alongside the state-centred discourse of flexibility as a policy imperative, there
has emerged a corporate management language that shrouds the restructuring
of work in imagery that appeals to science. Human resource management
(HRM), TQM and employee involvement (EI), among many other strategic
instruments, have been prescribed in the reordering of the employer-
employee relationship.5 These management labels for the restructuring of
work are presented as ‘logical’ and ‘evolutionary’ responses to the competitive
pressures of the global economy (Williams, 1994: 5). Globalisation is offered
as the context within which ‘strategic’ and ‘rational’ instruments are required
to achieve changes in the production process (see Womack, Jones and Roos,
1990; Wickens, 1987). The HRM prescriptions recast the employment relation
so that it is individualised, permitting optimal flexibility. Workers are not
perceived as a collective group, or indeed as conscious people capable of
apprehending the shape of change in the workplace: ‘A management language
has emerged which redefines workers as employees, individuals and teams,
but not as organised collectivities with some interests separate from manage-
ment’ (Ackers et al., 1996: 5).
In positioning workers as essentially malleable, adaptable and flexible
commodities, the HRM literature offers itself as a scientific approach to the
management of restructuring. In effect, it reaffirms the notion that objective
knowledge can be acquired and applied in pursuit of global competitiveness.
The ascendancy of management consultancies whose role it is to ‘legitimate
change in corporate practices’ (Strange, 1996: 138), lends a strategic and
calculable air to the restructuring of work. These agencies explicitly offer to
simplify the complexity of global competition, as one human resources
consultancy put it: ‘to capture the upside of uncertainty’, to make globalisation
manageable and translatable into simple formulae. Corporate decisions can
then be said to be based on the rational judgements of an objective expert who
can prescribe optimal solutions to the problems of intensified global com-
petition. Where once the large accountancy firms were seen to be concerned
with ‘sound’ financial management, they now offer an auditory and advisory
role in all aspects of corporate restructuring. Indeed, their roles have been
constituted within the problem-solving mode of knowledge represented by
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‘globalisation as process’. The management consultancies market themselves
as ‘business process reengineers’ capable of fundamentally restructuring ‘old’
practices in line with ‘new’ imperatives.6 As Charlotte Hooper has argued, a
kind of ‘frontier masculinity’ emerges which offers an inseparable mix of
business and science ‘to solve all our problems’ (2000: 67). In this way
restructuring is represented as a global challenge that can be tackled with the
expertise of consultants armed with an arsenal of HRM strategies.
The HRM mantra of restructuring offers a menu of prescribed ‘rational’
solutions to the perceived process of globalisation. However, this presupposes
that restructuring and social change will simply roll out as prescribed. Indeed,
it implies that social relations can themselves be treated as factors in an
equation. When the restructuring of working practices is viewed in concrete
terms, the quasi-science of HRM is revealed as a construct that ignores the
complex historical and social relations that underlie restructuring. Strategic
and scientific management prescriptions for the reorganisation of work are
decoupled from the prevailing practices of a particular workplace and, indeed,
it is this abstractness that is deemed to lend objectivity to the strategic analysis.
They are cast as though they represent pure and logical responses to the
exigencies of globalisation:
The sources of management preferences do not come from some auto-
matic and innate character to the task of producing and marketing a
good or service, laying down the exact steps to reach corporate goals …
Instead, preferences regarding strategies derive from general practices in
the industry, from technological and managerial knowledge, and from
the society of which the firm and its managers are part. (Haufler, 1999: 201)
We are thus reminded that every apparent ‘strategy’ emerges from the
context of social power relations, within which knowledge and power are
inseparable (Foucault, 1980b). To reproduce HRM, and other strategic manage-
ment tools, as automatic responses to the competitive pressures of globalisa-
tion is to obscure the power that suffuses such dominant modes of knowledge.
So, on the one hand, HRM is not simply ‘exercised’ or ‘implemented’. The
softness of the language employed in notions of ‘involvement’, ‘human’ and
‘empowerment’ is bound up with a subtle power that brings workers into the
monitoring of their own practices. As Garrahan and Stewart observed at
Nissan ‘success depends upon a tight nexus of subordination that can be read
as control, exploitation and surveillance – the other side of quality, flexibility
and teamwork’ (1992: 59).
However, it is insufficient simply to seek to expose the power relations
that are masked by the technical and scientific discourse of flexibility, for this
may lead us to conclude that their dominance crushes all dissent in its path.
Thus, on the other hand we find contestation surrounding the reorganisation
of work around strategic management principles. A number of studies
demonstrate that within a discourse of the flexibilisation of working practices,
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spaces open up for the contestation and disruption of restructuring program-
mes (see McCabe, 1996; Waddington, 1999; Milkman, 1998). The scientific
calculations of strategic human resource managers are confounded by the
contingency of actual concrete working practices.
Industrial relations and the death of conflict
The restructuring of work around the concept of flexibility has become almost
synonymous with the breaking open of embedded systems of industrial rela-
tions. The process of deunionisation across advanced industrialised countries
has been legitimated ‘in the name of globalisation’ (du Gay, 1999). The
contemporary period of intensified global competition is widely understood
to require competitive and open labour markets, a central element of which is
a deregulated industrial relations arena. The shifts in employment from high
trade union density manufacturing to low density service industries, coupled
with a restructured core labour force and the rise of contingent labour, have
contributed to a decline in union membership, density and, arguably, power
and influence. The individualisation of employment contracts has been accom-
panied by a shift in union activity towards the representation of individual
clients (Hyman, 1997). For the advocates of restructured employee represen-
tation, collective forms of representation are ‘outmoded’ and irreconcilable
with workplace realities. Trade unions are cast as unrepresentative, rigid and
inflexible, prone to ‘monopolistic behaviour’ and ‘opposition to reform’
(World Bank, 1995: 80). Resistance to flexibilisation strategies is held to be a
phenomenon of organised labour and, by implication, can be eradicated
through deunionisation and worker individualisation. Regulated and central-
ised forms of industrial relations become part of the ‘burden’ that must be
shed in order that globalisation can be effectively ‘harnessed’. Governments
must create space for firms to flexibly manage their own individual workers
through, for example, the use of ‘no-union’ agreements and decentralised pay
bargaining (OECD, 1991).
Not only is conflict and contestation effaced by the flexibility discourse, but
this is presented as an opportunity for workers to experience the ‘empower-
ment’ of individual self-management (Hyman, 1999a: 108). The advent of the
digital age has been particularly strongly equated with emancipated labour
and rewarding work (Negroponte, 1995). Similarly, adversarial industrial
relations are held to obstruct the possibilities for workers to reconcile their
interests with the corporate mission. Conflict in the workplace is represented
as a transitory by-product of the process of work reorganisation. The collec-
tive and institutionalised politics of the trade unions is understood to be the
only source of political activity in the workplace. Thus, deunionisation is equated
with a depoliticisation of the workplace and, in effect, the death of conflict.
The discourse of labour flexibility draws upon a narrow conception of
politics in its process-centred understanding of social change. The ‘mechan-
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ical solidarities’ (Hyman, 1999a) of organised labour certainly represent one
form of the expression of the politics of labour and work. However, it is not
the case that the squeeze on traditional industrial relations has brought about
the death of conflict, though of course this is a myth that is useful in driving
restructuring. Removing union representation, though undeniably circum-
scribing workers’ political expression, does not remove the social power
relations of the workplace. Nor does the information economy inevitably lead
to an empowered workforce (May, forthcoming), or reduce the contestation
that surrounds challenges to working practices. First, the threats to institu-
tionalised and organised labour have been resisted, both through the defensive
strategies of labour groups in the social market economies (Scharpf, 1998),
and by the informal and everyday tactics of workers (Elger and Fairbrother,
1992; Waddington, 1999). In a lean production system which lacks the buffers
of inventory stock, the everyday practices and tactics of workers may have
significant effects. In this sense, the formation of fluid ‘organic solidarities’
(Hyman, 1999a) may offer alternative sites of political struggle based on
common (if fleeting) experiences and immediate controversies. Indeed, the
politics of the workplace may lie less in the unitary actions of defined organ-
isation, and more in the ‘contradictions, contingencies and unintended
consequences’ (Walker, 1994: 672) that characterise everyday working lives.
Yet, and this brings me to my second point, there are also scholars who are
observing a greater fluidity and mutability of the organised trade unions
themselves. This ‘global social movement unionism’ (Lambert, 1999; Lambert
and Chan, 1999) suggests a decoupling of trade unions from their roots in
nation-states and a desire for a transnational representativeness. The techno-
logies assumed to reduce the need for workplace representation and organised
labour may be used precisely to reconstitute communication between labour
groups (Hyman, 1999b; ILO, 2001). Viewed in this way the politics of the
restructuring of work is not separable from the struggles of a ‘globally con-
scious’ civil society (Scholte, 2000) that transcends received boundaries.
Finally, while not wishing to underplay the very real challenges that face
organised and unprotected workers in the GPE, it is also important to avoid
reinforcing the ‘no alternative’ logic that prevails in the flexibility discourse.
Political agency and social contest are denied in the face of something that is
‘larger than us’ and thus ‘cannot be resisted because the outcome has already
been determined’ (Marchand and Runyan, 2000: 7). While it is clear that
conventional spaces of workplace politics are being closed down, we must
question conceptions of politics that do not enable us to see the opening up of
alternative political spaces.
Conclusion
The dominant representations of globalisation and industrialisation as pro-
cesses offer the alluring prospect of a name for our contemporary condition,
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along with an explanation of how it should be managed. They make common
appeals to economic and technological externalities that create imperatives for
global restructuring. The understanding of social change is purely linear. It
reads that globalisation exerts pressure on states and firms to ratchet-up their
competitiveness through a downward pressure on social welfare, taxation and
labour market regulation. The social practices of everyday life are assumed to
be fundamentally and necessarily restructured and reshaped as a result. In this
way, human and social relations are understood only in a responsive mode,
and politics is conceived only in instrumental ‘management’ terms. The
impetus of social change is represented as dwelling ‘outside’ of social and
political life, thereby securing and insulating global restructuring from the
politics of negotiation, contestation and resistance (represented as dwelling
‘inside’). Indeed, the disciplinary imperatives of globalisation are assumed to
squeeze political agency, social contestation and historical contingency to the
point that they no longer matter.
The conception of globalisation as techno-economic process has done
much to transform perceptions of the ways in which working practices should
function in a global era. Whether or not we consider globalisation to be an
‘ambiguous’ and ‘fuzzy’ concept (Waters, 1995), its amorphous character gives
it the power to legitimate much that is done in its name. It is this global
restructuring conducted ‘in the name of ’ globalisation that is in need of critical
interrogation in our research. The contemporary fixation with flexibility is
legitimated and perpetuated by its discursive attachment to dominant repre-
sentations of a natural, automatic and irrevocable process of globalisation.
There is an explicit assumption that globalisation can be ‘harnessed’, and that
a central means to this end is flexibility in labour and work. If states, firms and
workers adopt policies and practices of flexibilisation, argue the proponents of
labour flexibility, they will reap the rewards of the global economy. The overall
effect of the flexibility discourse has been to create a disciplinary imperative
that celebrates the dissolution of collective and stable employment relations
and the rise of the individualised and ‘risk accepting’ worker.
The disciplinary effect of the threat that the ‘failure to flexibilise’ will
unleash the full fury of global forces constrains political and social discussion
and contestation. The contestation that takes place within and through the
restructuring of work is effaced by deterministic and teleological accounts of
social change. The idea that state-societies, firms and workers may be differ-
entially placed in global restructuring is anathema to this discourse. The
unevenness, inequality and power that suffuse the experiences of flexibilisa-
tion in the workplace have been afforded insufficient attention. It is precisely
the aim of this book to contribute to a conception of global restructuring that
is open to contestation and contingency. In the chapter that follows I explore
the contribution that the field of IPE can make to raising the visibility of the
social power relations that condition and shape global restructuring.
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Notes
1 Ian R. Douglas raised the significance of ‘global[i]zation’ as action-process verb in a
paper presented to the International Studies Association, San Diego, 1996.
2 The diminution of conflict between social groups is argued to arise from the equality
of opportunity envisaged to result from increased mobility within society and the
labour market. See, for example, Durkheim (1964) for the origins of the idea that
inequalities may be eliminated via mobility and the reordering of status according to
skills and talents.
3 The interrelationships between workplace and world order are explored in Cox (1987)
and Harrod (1987). See chapter 2 of this volume for further discussion.
4 The significance of established social relations and practices is evident from European
case studies which illustrate that the historical evolution of trade unions remains a
salient factor in contemporary policy-making. See, for example, Baglioni and Crouch
(1990) or Nolan and O’Donnell, (1991).
5 These concepts function as labels for a diverse set of management practices. HRM can
be traced to the use of individualised employment relationships in the USA from the
1960s. It became common currency in the 1980s, when it became associated with the
strategic management of what had previously been known as ‘industrial relations’.
TQM is a concept that refers to the breaking up of quality monitoring and assurance
functions into stages. These functions are then devolved through the workforce to the
level of individual workers, implying that quality assurance becomes a task that is
performed by all workers. EI seeks to connect workers (as individuals) to the needs of
the firm. This includes, for example, problem-solving teams, performance-related pay
and the use of video and pictorial illustrations of new practices.
6 Insights from interview with British-based international management consultants,
June 2000.
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
International political economy
and global social change

Political economy is concerned with the historically constituted frame-
works or structures within which political and economic activity takes
place. It stands back from the apparent fixity of the present to ask how
the existing structures came into being and how they may be changing,
or how they may be induced to change. In this sense, political economy is
critical theory. (Cox, 1995: 32)
The field of IPE is inextricably bound up with understandings of globalsocial transformation. Indeed, for many, the revival of IPE in the 1970s
precisely coincided with the inability of conventional IR frameworks to ‘fully
comprehend structural change’ (Gill, 1997: 7). IPE, by contrast, claims to offer
a distinctive ontology, one that is attuned to social forces and social relations
on a global scale, and also a distinctive epistemology that is ‘open’ to diverse
insights on social transformation (Strange, 1984; 1994).1 Hence, as Robert
Cox has it, IPE embodies inherent critical potential, an ability to ‘stand back’
from the apparent order of things and to consider ‘the ways reality is defined
for different peoples in different eras’ (Cox, 1995: 35). A significant part of this
critical bent is held to lie in the interdisciplinarity that is embraced by
‘heterodox’ IPE (Amin et al., 1994). The willingness to consider the insights of
a range of scholars; the acceptance of a range of subject matter and issues; and
the raising of voices previously unheard in IR, combine to present IPE as an
effective vantage point from which to view social change. Indeed, the IPE
perspectives on globalisation could be said to bring together the analytical
insights necessary to look critically at global transformation (Germain, 2000).
There is perhaps even a suggestion that IPE has become ‘globalisation studies’
(Payne, 2000) and that global forces will ‘dominate IPE for the foreseeable
future’ (Tooze, 1997: 213).
Despite a potential ‘hijacking’ of IPE by concerns with globalisation, in
recent years there has emerged a critical agenda that directly seeks to challenge
the prevailing globalisation discourse. Scholars have directly called for the
‘political’ to be central to analysis of globalisation (Amoore et al., 1997; Hay
and Marsh, 1999); and for IPE to ‘historicise’ its studies (Amin and Palan,
1996; Amoore et al., 2000). This chapter focuses on the ways in which the field
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of IPE has grappled with the problematic of global social change. Taking
Murphy and Tooze’s (1991) categories of ‘orthodox’ and ‘new’ IPE as analytical
tools, I explore the different ontological and epistemological positions, and
the implications for understandings of social change. The ‘orthodox’ origins
of IPE may be aligned with a problem-solving mode of knowledge that seeks
to ‘manage’ change in the GPE. ‘New IPE’ purports to offer a critical perspec-
tive in that it begins from a position of problematising the making and
transformation of the GPE, thereby restoring reflexive political agency to
global social change. Concurring with the broad spirit of the ‘new IPE’, this
chapter nonetheless raises questions surrounding the extent of heterodoxy
and openness that IPE has achieved. I suggest that, in part, IPE has reproduced
old dichotomies and hierarchies of issues and subjects. In particular, it
continues to represent power as something that is wielded by elite global
actors, thus rendering the ‘ordinary’ realms of work and labour secondary
concerns to finance and production. I identify the central elements of an IPE
of social practice which, I propose, makes everyday practices such as work
visible and amenable to inquiry.
Orthodox perspectives in IPE
IPE as a field of inquiry, a set of questions and a range of assumptions, is a
highly contested discipline (Tooze, 1984). Indeed, it is perhaps misleading to
consider IPE to be a discipline at all, given that it is characterised by diverse
ontological, epistemological and methodological commitments. As a branch
of social science IPE has most commonly been labelled a ‘sub-field’ of IR.
Despite its origins in the apparent inability of IR to deal with a globalising
world, IPE has been an inheritor of certain legacies of the IR tradition. In this
way it perhaps paradoxically comes to represent both a ‘break’ with IR
conventions and an upholding of embedded IR principles. In the context of
post-war American social science, IPE takes on a particular orthodoxy that
derives from the IR ‘science at the service of big-power management’ (Cox,
1996: 57). It is in this historical context, of US scholarship in the early 1970s,
that IPE was defined in a particular way, reflecting dominant modes of
thought and embodying a particular world view. Thus, Stephen Krasner has it
that ‘the achievements of international political economy have been generated
by an epistemology that conforms with the Western Rationalistic Tradition’
(1996: 122). We may consider early ‘orthodox’ IPE to follow the conventions of
rationality and positivist inquiry that were outlined in chapter 1.
Despite IPE’s diverse roots in classical political economy, sociology and
economic history (these are acknowledged more freely by the so-called ‘new’
IPE scholars), its relationship to IR is an important one to explore. The IPE
orthodoxy reproduces significant elements of the realist/liberal IR synthesis,
and in so doing establishes a particular understanding of the dynamics of
transformation. Emerging at a time of change in world politics, nonetheless
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much of the emphasis was placed on how this change should be managed, and
the prevailing order maintained. Though the emphasis on system mainten-
ance has now been critiqued by a proclaimed ‘new’ IPE, the orthodoxy
continues to exert significant influence on the production of knowledge.
If IPE perspectives were to have a unifying feature, a prime candidate
would be the analysis of the interrelationships between the ‘political’, the
‘economic’, the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’ realms of social life. However,
the fundamental cleavages between IPE schools of thought exist around the
matter of how we should conceive of these realms. IPE is thus ‘defined more by
agreement among scholars about what to study than by agreement about how
to study it’ (Murphy and Tooze, 1991: 1). So-called orthodox scholars answer
the question of the relationship between the economic and political realms in
a particular way. Researching at the time of the 1971 collapse of the Bretton
Woods System and the 1973 oil crises, scholars were struck by the potential for
what they considered to be economic issues to impact upon the fundamental
relations between nation-states. In this formulation the ‘economic’ is con-
ceived as the realm of market interactions characteristic of world trade, held to
be separate from the ‘political’ as the realm of state interactions characteristic
of IR. IPE becomes a field of study ‘concerned with the political determinants
of international economic relations’ (Krasner, 1996: 108). The separate and
unitary realms of politics and economics are conceived as in a linear relation-
ship of tension: ‘The tension between these two fundamentally different ways
of ordering human relationships has profoundly shaped the course of modern
history and constitutes the crucial problem in the study of political economy’
(Gilpin, 1987: 11).
Indeed, as Murphy and Tooze argue, the separation and opposition of the
realms of politics and economics was an important part of the raison d’être of
orthodox IPE: ‘What spurred much of the initial IPE research in the early
1970s was a search for new technical rules and norms that could preserve the
division between the political and the economic’ (1991: 4). The decline of US
hegemony and the challenges that were posed to the liberal international
economic order (LIEO) were thus understood to have come about as a result
of the interpenetration of the political and the economic. Thus, the decline of
US hegemony is variously held to have disrupted the operation of the LIEO
(Gilpin, 1987), or to necessitate the construction of political regimes and
institutions to take on this role (Keohane, 1984; Krasner, 1983). The emphasis
is on the problematic of maintaining the LIEO in the absence of a hegemon, or
put another way, on the management of change in the world economy.
Out of the overriding concern to theorise and preserve the dichotomy
between politics and economics emerged a focus that has conventionally
provided the key terrain of debate in IPE – the relationships between states
and markets. Gilpin has it that ‘the interaction of the state and the market’
represent the ‘embodiment of politics and economics in the modern world’
and that this ‘creates political economy’ (1987: 9–11). It is clear that states are
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viewed as the central units of political activity, while markets constitute an
opposed economic realm. In effect, the sphere of the market is simply added as
a ‘variable’ to the interactions of states dominant in neo-realist IR theory.
These spheres are treated theoretically and normatively as discrete entities –
the task of political economy being to analyse their ‘impacts’ on one another.
The opposition of state to market is mirrored in the identification of domestic
and international realms as separately defined spheres. Hence, the focus of
study becomes ‘the causes and effects of the world market economy … and the
significance of the world economy for domestic economies’ (Gilpin, 1987: 14).
We cannot simply assume that this conception of states and markets, and
domestic from international, reflects a particular historical moment in the
study of IPE. Gilpin entrenches the state-market dichotomy still further fifteen
years on:
In this book I define global political economy as the interaction of the
market and such powerful actors as states, multinational firms, and
international organizations, a more comprehensive definition than in my
1987 book The Political Economy of International Relations, although
both take a state-centric approach to the subject. (2001: 17)
It is striking that Gilpin here explicitly opposes ‘the market’ (conceived as a
structure), and the actions of states, and in particular multinational firms
(conceived as agents). To what extent is it possible or even desirable to conceive
of the market as somehow distinct from multinational firms or international
organisations? What are markets without the production structures of MNCs
and the frameworks of the WTO and IMF? So, not only does Gilpin separate
state from market, but also MNCs and international organisations from
markets.
The ontological privileging of states-markets relationships has predis-
posed the IPE orthodoxy to particular methodological concerns. In identify-
ing the ‘agency’ and power fundamentally with states, and ‘structure’ with
world markets, the orthodoxy can only conceive of social change as state-led.
The study of state actions is considered to be at the heart of IPE, just as it was
in traditional IR. Global social change, conceived this way, can only be an
‘outcome’ of changes in ‘relational power’ such as the demise of a hegemon
(Strange, 1988: 24). The preservation of some notion of stability and order, I
would argue, is thus given prominence over the struggles and contests that
mark the potential for change and transformation. Gilpin’s consideration of
the question of globalisation leads him to conclude that states remain the
central ‘power wielders’ in the GPE: ‘Economic globalisation is much more
limited than many realise, and consequently, its overall impact on the econ-
omic role of the state is similarly limited’ (2001: 363). This clearly demon-
strates that the preservation of discrete realms for politics and economics –
with ‘economic’ globalisation and ‘economic’ roles – allows IPE scholars to
avoid contemplation of the political dynamics of global social change. The
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discussion of transformative energies in civil society is effectively closed off, or
even considered to be ‘outside’ the discipline, residing in sociology. For the
orthodox writers ‘plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose’, the more world
politics appears to change, the more it remains static. While they can conceive
of the structural economic environment for the state as transforming, this can
only be a function of state power.
In the orthodox framework the purpose of IPE knowledge is to explain
the maintenance and loss of order in an international system of states. The
expertise of the scholar, so the orthodoxy has it, must be employed objectively
in the study of states and markets as unitary entities. There is an overarching
impression that the scholars in the orthodox IPE school position themselves as
passive observers of the states and markets that they study. It is this claim to
objectivity and rationality that has been central to the objections of scholars
who consider themselves to be ‘doing’ ‘new’ IPE.
New perspectives in IPE
The so-called ‘new IPE’ does not represent a cohesive body of scholarship, or
even a clearly defined research agenda. The loose grouping of scholars do,
however, share a common dissatisfaction with the ability of early ‘orthodox’
IPE to critically address the dynamics of global social transformation. Thus,
Andrew Gamble noted that ‘changes in the ideological, political and economic
parameters of the world system have created the possibility of a new political
economy’ (1995: 516). For Palan, ‘critical international or global political
economy changes the order of the question; it asks how order and change
came about’ (2000: 17). While the new IPE scholars take different issues and
subjects to be the focus of their research, employing a range of theories and
methods, they concur that traditional IR and orthodox IPE are epistemo-
logically and ontologically ill-equipped to deal with contemporary global
social change. From this standpoint the essence of a ‘new IPE’ lies in a reaction
against the positivist epistemology and ontological separation of the ‘political’
and ‘economic’ that is characteristic of the orthodox IPE paradigms.
There have been a number of statements of the ‘essence’ of the new IPE
agenda (Murphy and Tooze, 1991; Amin et al., 1994), and certainly no reading
of this terrain would be complete without consideration of Murphy and
Tooze’s thought provoking ‘four steps beyond the orthodoxy’ (1991: 26).
However, for our purposes it is useful to summarise the central claims of the
new IPE scholars.
First, the new IPE seeks to challenge the ontological centrality of the state
and interstate relationships that has dominated much of IR and IPE inquiry.
This challenge is brought through an ontological commitment to the study of
society and social relations. Thus, for Strange IPE: ‘Concerns the social,
political and economic arrangements affecting the global systems of produc-
tion, exchange and distribution and the mix of values reflected therein’ (1988:
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18). The focus of IPE inquiry becomes ‘the basic values which human beings
seek to provide through social organisation’ (1988). In this way the duality of
states-markets and politics-economics is challenged through an understand-
ing of these categories as ways of organising human society or, indeed, ways of
thinking about social organisation. The claims to objectivity and rationality
made by orthodox scholars are also challenged by a belief in the ‘inter-
subjective making of reality’ (Cox, 1995: 34), thus rendering it neither possible
nor desirable that we separate the categories that bring to IPE inquiry from the
experiences we have of living in the GPE. This brings me to the second central
claim made by the new IPE scholars – that knowledge is historically ‘made’ in
the context of social power relations.
For orthodox IPE scholars, as I have argued, it is important that IPE
generates reliable and scientific knowledge that is ‘testable against external
evidence’ (Krasner, 1996: 108). The new IPE rejects this positivist epistemo-
logy in favour of a historicism that embodies ‘a willingness to investigate and
try to explain the contingent historical social construction of agents or actors,
which, at other times, may be treated as axiomatic in explanations in terms of
rational choice’ (Murphy and Tooze, 1991: 28). The focus of IPE questions
thus shifts from the explanation of the rise and demise of particular states, to a
historically sensitive understanding of why particular agents and structures
may be represented as such. Robert Cox’s oft-cited ‘theory is always for some-
one and for some purpose’ (1996: 87), and Susan Strange’s compelling call that
we ask ‘Cui bono?, Who benefits?’ (1988: 117), lead us to consider that ortho-
dox IPE has tended to produce knowledge for certain purposes and for the
benefit of particular groups. The new IPE, by contrast, claims to reflect
critically on the production of knowledge about the world and on their role in
that production. In a world described as globalising, new and critical IPE
scholars would need also, then, to reflect on their own relationships to, and
experiences of globalisation (see MacLean, 2000).
The third broad claim made by the new IPE scholars is that their IPE is a
more inclusive and ‘open’ field of inquiry. Founded upon a rejection of the
privileging of issues of trade and security by the orthodoxy, the claim is that a
new IPE is better equipped to explore issues of, for example, technology,
finance, production, knowledge, and geography (Amin et al., 1994). Though it
is clear that the new IPE agenda of study has not wholly rejected conventional
issue hierarchies (Denemark and O’Brien, 1997), there is at least an overt
awareness that issues of poverty, struggle and inequality are relatively invisible
and need attention (Tooze and Murphy, 1996). Related to this third claim
concerning the issue agenda of IPE study, is a fourth claim that raises the
question of the theoretical and conceptual ‘toolbox’ of IPE. Across the various
contributions to a proclaimed new IPE there is a unifying thread of ‘openness’
– or, at least, a professed openness to diverse understandings and competing
explanations:
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One small corner of social science is still open and unenclosed …
International political economy is still unfenced, still open to all comers.
It ought, we believe, to remain so’ (Strange, 1984: ix)
Those who practice a new IPE share a culture of openness to different
theories and empirical referents. (Murphy and Tooze, 1991: 30)
In each instance the unifying theme is ‘openness’ and the idea that IPE should
provide a vantage point for an interdisciplinary and heterodox set of under-
standings. Out of a problematising of the orthodox tendency to dichotomise
realms of social life for study, emerges the acknowledgement of the contested
nature of IPE knowledge and an ‘open’ attitude to the structures and agents of
social change.
The final claim identifiable in the new IPE literature is precisely its
potential to place social change at the heart of inquiry. Against the backdrop of
an IPE orthodoxy that explains change in the actions of sovereign states in the
context of international economic relations, the new IPE holds that social
change is perennial, contingent and dialectical in nature. While for orthodox
IPE scholars the purpose of IPE is to bring stability and maintain order, for the
scholars of a new IPE the task is to reveal and explore the contradictions,
conflicts and tensions that bring about social transformation (Cox, 1995; Gill,
1997; Scholte, 2000). Viewed in this way social change potentially becomes
characterised by contestation among agents, and understandings of such
contests may open up spaces for alternative structures and practices.
Of course, to identify the claims of the new IPE scholars is not to say that
the potential represented by each claim has been fulfilled. Is the new IPE
successful in breaking open the linear relationship between politics and
economics conceived in orthodox IPE? How ‘open’ is the new IPE to diverse
issue areas and heterodox voices? Does it simply replace ‘old’ orthodoxies with
a new hierarchy of issues and questions? And what light do the different
strands of the new IPE shed upon the dynamics of contemporary global social
change? Having distilled the essence of a new IPE to its key elements, I will
now go on to explore three specific contributions to what we might term new
IPE scholarship: the work of Susan Strange, the use of Karl Polanyi’s ‘double
movement’ by IPE scholars and the use of Antonio Gramsci’s insights in IPE.
There are two caveats to be made here. First, these contributions do not in any
sense represent the full gamut of contributions to the new IPE; they are chosen
simply because they have become central to the contemporary study of
globalisation and because they have considerable bearing on the subject
matter of this book. Second, the three contributions identified are in many
senses interrelated and provide a common pool from which scholars draw.
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Strange paths to IPE2
Susan Strange’s unique brand of IPE has unquestionably shaped the concerns
and outlook of the field, and will continue to do so. Strange’s work does,
however, serve to demonstrate that there is not such a clear and stark divide
between the orthodox and new ways of ‘doing IPE’. In many ways Strange’s
vast and rich body of work constitutes a ‘bridge’ between the intentions and
assumptions of scholars such as Robert Keohane and Robert Gilpin, and the
agenda of the new IPE that she so clearly embraced in the first volume of the
Review of International Political Economy (1994). This bridge was shifting and
contradictory but persisted throughout her work. On the one hand, Strange
was direct in her criticisms of orthodox scholars, as in her plea to ‘Wake up,
Krasner, the world has changed’:
I would plead with my old friend to re-examine his realist assumptions
about the units of analysis and the central problematic of international
political economy. It becomes much more interesting to teach, to research
and to write about when you drop the idea that states are the units of
analysis and that war is the main problematic of the international system.
(Strange, 1994: 218)
Here, as in many other places in her work, Strange distances herself from a
mainstream IR and IPE that ‘assume the maintenance of order to be the prime
if not the only problématique of the study’ (1988: 14). On the other hand,
however, appreciative critics have, nonetheless, suggested that Strange is
‘prevented from realising the full potential of her radical ontology’ (Tooze,
2000a: 287), that she wastes the opportunity to ‘challenge international
relations theory at its very core’ (Palan, 1999: 128) and that she ‘closes the
Pandora’s box that she has opened’ (May, 1996: 184). Indeed, there is even the
suggestion that she herself invoked multiple forms of ‘realism’ so that her
‘work is torn by internal tensions’ (Guzzini, 2000: 217). Strange’s path to IPE is
highly ambiguous, then. She must be credited with much of the impetus for
the new IPE, and yet she closes off some of the avenues and approaches that
are central to a genuinely critical ontology and epistemology.
Perhaps Strange’s first order contribution to a new IPE is her challenge to
the politics-economics dichotomy, achieved through the development of her
ontology of structural power. Indeed, for Strange questions of power repre-
sent the very essence of IPE: ‘it is impossible to study international political
economy without giving close attention to the role of power in economic life’
(1988: 23). IPE and power form a mutually constitutive relationship for
Strange, it is not possible to study one without reference to the other. This is a
considerable departure from the orthodox representation of power as the
expression of state interests, a conception referred to by Strange as ‘relational
power’ and criticised for its ‘distinction between economic power and political
power’ (1988: 24-25). The opposition and distinction between political and
economic power is apparently not a tenable one for Strange. The concept of
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structural power is her tool for breaking up the distinction: ‘Structural power
is the power to shape and determine the structures of the global political
economy within which other states, their political institutions, their economic
enterprises and (not least) their scientists and other professional people have
to operate’ (1988: 25).
So, for Strange, power in the global political economy does not rest with
single unitary states, but is exercised by a number of public and private author-
ities through the structures of finance, security, production and knowledge.3
Strange opens up a number of possibilities with her identified dimensions of
structural power. She makes it possible for sources of agency to be made more
visible in IPE inquiry, and for this agency to be ‘non-state’ in nature,
exemplified by her probing of the role of MNCs in the production structure
(Stopford and Strange, 1991). She opens up the possibility for markets to be
politicised in the sense of their ‘making’ by states and societies, for example
her work on global financial markets (1997a; 1998a). Simultaneously, she
raises the question of states becoming ‘marketised’, as in her work on the
declining authority of the state (1995; 1996). It is clear that for Strange IPE is
not a rational, unemotional or objective field of inquiry, and that her subject
matter is intrinsically human and social.
In identifying the dimensions of structural power beyond the conven-
tional confines of security and trade (for Strange trade is a ‘secondary power
structure’), Strange also opens the door on a more heterodox IPE. In terms of
issue areas, though she does not fully explore these in her own work, Strange
extends our conventional notions of the realm of the ‘political’ in IPE with
discussion of the activities of the mafia, consultants and accountants (1996),
the roles of telecommunications and technology policy (1988) and environ-
ment and the biosphere (1994). In line with this apparent openness to issues
in IPE, Strange consistently invoked the need for IPE scholars to open up to
the insights of business scholars, economic historians, geographers and socio-
logists (1996: xv; 1994: 218; 1988: 15). Her remonstrations that IPE scholars
should ‘theorise from what they know’ led her to argue that they should
engage with those who ‘know about’ other realms of global social change. For
Strange knowledge is essentially ‘information’, a commodity or resource that is
possessed and used (May, 1996), leading her to invoke heterodoxy but to
pursue this in an empiricist fashion, as ‘data gathering’.
Finally, Strange’s work was influential in focusing IPE on the dynamics of
global social change. Her analysis of the changing shape of the state-market
dialectic led her to pose the question ‘who or what is responsible for change?’,
and to answer ‘technology, markets and politics’ (1996: 185). There is a clear
attempt to address the issue of how and why change takes place in the GPE,
and to extend the agency of change beyond unitary nation-states. Nor does
Strange shy away from the normative implications of global change. For her
the risk and uncertainty of global transformation is unequally produced,
distributed and mitigated (1983; 1998b).
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Despite the groundbreaking nature of Strange’s work, there are a number
of constraints imposed by her approach that throw into question the promise
of an open and ‘unenclosed’ field and place obstacles in the path of a new IPE
as it is outlined by Craig Murphy and Roger Tooze, and as I conceive of it. The
first problem concerns Strange’s reinscription of the very dichotomy between
politics and economics that she seeks to transcend. A number of passages
illustrate this point:
Economics is about the use of scarce resources for unlimited wants …
Politics, though, is about providing public order and public goods.
(Strange, 1988: 14)
The impersonal forces of world markets … are now more powerful than
the states to whom ultimate political authority over society and economy
is supposed to belong. (Strange, 1996: 4)
The orthodox distinction between politics and economics is redrawn
here. Politics is conceived in narrow terms as authority exercised in the
provision of order and stability, and economics as the allocation of resources
by private authorities. We begin to see how Strange might be categorised as
‘hyperglobalist’ (Held et al., 1999) or as holding a ‘process-centred’ view of
globalisation. Her later work strongly asserts the triumph of liberal economics
over state authority (politics as she sees it) and, fundamentally fails to ‘reinte-
grate politics and economics’ (Tooze, 2000b: 176).
Strange’s conception of the nature of the political falls short of allowing
us to conceive of everyday practices as political acts in the global political
economy. Her work, in a sense ‘adds agents’ to IPE inquiry but without
reflecting upon how we arrive at these agents or ‘whom’ they represent. We are
urged, for example, to consider markets and technologies alongside states as
agents of change (see Figure 2.1). In this ‘flow diagram’ representation of
global social change technology is depicted separately and alongside states and
markets, begging the question of how technology can be conceived as a realm
that is separate and comparable to these realms. The model of social change
represented by the flow diagram in Strange’s (1991) analysis identifies agents
acting through structures to produce ‘outcomes’. The representation of social
change is unilinear and deterministic, with contingency only arising out of
different combinations of actors and structures that may affect the outcomes.
The people, workers, firms and social groups inside the markets, states and
technologies are simply invisible in this representation.
Of the four structures that are central to Strange’s conception of global
social change, it is the knowledge structure that has been most widely
critiqued (Tooze, 2000a, 2000b; Palan, 1999; May, 1996; Cox, 1992a). Strange’s
conception of knowledge, as a resource of information that can be wielded or
exercised, allows her to position the knowledge structure alongside the struc-
tures of production, security and finance. Knowledge, in this sense is an
instrument in the global political economy just as a particular production
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structure may be an instrument, for example of US hegemony (Rupert, 1995).
If Strange had embraced the full implications of a new IPE ontology then the
knowledge structure would have to surround and suffuse the agents and
structures she depicts. If knowledge is also to imply ‘intersubjective meanings’
and frameworks of thought, then surely the states, markets, technology and
structures identified by Strange would have, to some extent, to be produced
and reproduced by our frameworks of thought. So, for example, dominant
ideas about how society should be organised at a given historical conjuncture
will both inform and reflect the interactions of structures and agents. Agents
are reflexive; they have the capacity to reflect upon, challenge or reproduce the
structures that they confront. Tooze finds it ‘ironic that it is precisely her view
of knowledge and ideology’ that precludes Strange from achieving a
reflectivist mode of thought in IPE (2000a: 176). If there is a principal missing
element in the Strange path to IPE it is the failure to adequately explore the
relationship between power and knowledge, two concepts that she para-
doxically inscribed deeply in the collective IPE common sense.
Polanyian insights and the new IPE
As the new IPE has sought to bring critical insights to the study of global social
change, a number of scholars have drawn upon the work of economic histor-
ian Karl Polanyi.4  The dominance of linear and deterministic understandings
of the relationship between politics and economics has led some scholars to
search for a society-centred theory from which to develop their critique:
The inclusion of civil society together with a strong historical dimension
constitute important contributions by Polanyi to IPE. In spite of its
ambition to integrate the “political” and the “economic”, current IPE
gives only a partial view of societal change. We can perhaps define a New
International Political Economy as attempts to go beyond the state-
market contradiction. (Hettne, 1995: 5)
We can read the appropriation of Polanyi’s writings by the new IPE as a
reopening of the ‘Pandora’s box’ that is closed by Strange. Polanyi’s work
appears to offer a route into an understanding of the historical and political
contingency of market expansion and social transformation. From Polanyi’s
rich and diverse writings, contemporary IPE has drawn out two central
themes which it finds useful in the study of contemporary global social
change: the embeddedness of economy in society and the ‘counter movement’.
If we are to use Polanyi’s insights to move us closer to the contestation of
global social change, then it is important to consider the context and
problematics of IPE’s retrieval of his thought.
The central question of Polanyi’s The Great Transformation was to explore
the historical transformation of nineteenth-century capitalism, and to explain
the social effects of an imposed ‘self-regulating’ market economy:
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Man’s economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships …
Neither the process of production nor that of distribution is linked to
specific economic interests attached to the possession of goods; but every
single step in that process is geared to a number of social interests which
eventually ensure that the required step be taken. These interests will be
very different in a small hunting or fishing community from those in a
vast despotic society, but in either case the economic system will be run
on noneconomic motives. (1957: 46)
The primacy of society and social relationships in Polanyi’s analysis is
evident here. The market forces of the economy cannot, in Polanyian terms, be
understood separately from the society in which they are situated, so that ‘the
economic order is merely a function of the social, in which it is contained’
(1957: 71). Thus, for Polanyi a market is a politically and socially constituted
entity, made in particular ways in defined historical places and times. He
presents a powerful critique of the economic determinism that says that
societies are shaped by the actions of rational economic man, branding this an
‘economistic fallacy’ (1957: 111–129). A laissez-faire market order is ‘nothing
natural’ and requires a constant process of reproduction and reinforcement,
not least by the actions of the state (1957: 139). Viewed in this way politics and
economics become mutually constitutive within a context of social relations.
The creation of markets in land, labour and capital, for example, are held to
represent ‘fictitious commodities’ (1957: 68) that cannot be traded without
agitating and disrupting the human and social fabric. The commodification of
labour represents for Polanyi the central contradiction of market society, both
the ‘core’ and the ‘core weakness’ of its organisation (Block and Somers, 1984:
57). As Polanyi has it:
To argue that social legislation, factory laws, unemployment insurance,
and, above all, trade unions have not interfered with the mobility of
labour and the flexibility of wages, as is sometimes done, is to imply that
those institutions have entirely failed in their purpose, which was exactly
that of interfering with the laws of supply and demand in respect to
human labor, and removing it from the orbit of the market. (Polanyi,
1957: 177)
Markets for labour do not occur as natural or self-regulating realities.
Their uneasy relationship with the human needs and practices of daily life is
mitigated through sets of social institutions that must be constantly produced
and reproduced if the contradictions are to be masked. Polanyi is not, how-
ever, advocating the taming of capitalism through the protective layer of social
institutions or, as Hannes Lacher puts it he should not be regarded as a
‘prophet of interventionist welfare capitalism’ (1999: 314). At the heart of
Polanyi’s reading of industrialisation is the identification of an intractable
contradiction between the social and human activities of ‘life itself ’ (1957: 72),
and the dictates of the market:
Amoore_Global_03_Ch2 6/19/02, 12:14 PM50
51IPE and global social change
The idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such an
institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the
human and natural substance of society; it would have physically
destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a wilderness.
Inevitably, society took measures to protect itself, but whatever measures
it took impaired the self-regulation of the market, disorganized indus-
trial life, and thus endangered society in yet another way. (1957: 3)
Polanyi does not offer the oft-cited ‘counter-movement’ as a solution or
‘source of resistance’ to the ravages of the market economy. Rather, he
indicates that the inherent tensions and agitations of market society demand
continuous action and intervention to run interference between economy and
society. Yet, this interference in itself is unsustainable since it disrupts the
assumptions on which a market is based. The logics of industrial capitalism
and human life cannot be reconciled in this reading; they are inherently pro-
vocative and contested. This conception of contradiction, provocation and
ambiguity, as Lacher (1999) points out, has been rendered invisible and
obscure by most appeals to the ‘counter-movement’ in the new IPE texts.
New IPE scholars have appropriated the concepts of ‘embeddedness’ and
the ‘counter-movement’ in a number of ways. What we might broadly con-
sider to be an institutionalist strand of thought has drawn on the concept of
embeddedness to counter the economic determinism of the globalisation
thesis. In this reading global economic forces are re-embedded in nation-
states (see Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997; Hollingsworth, 1998) and MNCs
are embedded in national systems of production (see Grabher, 1993; Sally,
1994; Zysman, 1996). The relationship between Polanyian political economy,
historical sociology and comparative institutionalism is, thus, an intimate
one.5 The new IPE has embraced this appropriation of Polanyian analysis on
the grounds that it contextualises global social change, apparently politicising
through attention to the social institutions that may ‘redirect’ global forces.
However, the neo-Polanyian use of embeddedness has imposed a stasis that is
not evident in Polanyi’s work. His sense of agitation and tensions within the
economy-society relation is absent from much of the neo-institutionalist
strand of the new IPE. In its place we get the image of the forces of global-
isation being filtered through the distinctive social institutions of nation-
states. As Block and Somers have it, ‘global opportunity structures shape what
is possible for particular governments’, while a ‘national opportunity
structure’ shapes ‘what is possible’ for societies (1984: 74). The dichotomies of
economics/politics, exogenous-global/endogenous-national, are thus rein-
scribed and globalisation is presented as a ‘project’ directed through national
institutions.
It is Polanyi’s concept of a ‘counter movement’ that has captured the
attention of a large swathe of new IPE scholars. In a supposed era of global-
isation there is considerable interest in a theory that potentially says ‘societies
will seek to protect themselves’ from the ‘disembedding’ of economics from
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the social realm (Bernard, 1997: 79). The idea that there may be space and
opportunity for resistance to globalisation or the possibility to shape global
futures is a seductive one, and has led scholars to identify Polanyi as a
conceptual kindred spirit (Mittelman, 2000: 8; Rice and Prince, 2000: 171).
Polanyi’s society-centred political economy does undoubtedly open up the
possibility for IPE theorists to discuss the responses of civil society groups and
new social movements to the vacillations of globalisation. However, it is
important to recognise that this is not the ‘counter-movement’ envisaged by
Polanyi, who leaves the question of social order wide open. Polanyi’s work
does not conceive of an emancipatory space for the contestation of liberal
logics and the negotiation of alternative futures (though, of course, this does
not preclude others from reading him this way). What should not be forgotten
is that Polanyi demands that we direct our attention to the ‘continuing
contradictions between society and the market’ (Lacher, 1999: 323).
The appropriation of Polanyi’s notion of a ‘counter-movement’ is not
sufficient in itself to further a new and critical IPE that can account for
contingency in global social change. Indeed, it is not a ‘solution’ or ‘strategy’
that is implied by Polanyi, but rather presents IPE with an opportunity to
further politicise and historicise its knowledge. In the terms of this book,
Polanyi’s work is a constant reminder that markets for labour are created and
reproduced over time, that they are contradictory and in tension with the lives
of the people that they embody and that social change is made and contested
in ways that are contradictory and contingent. A critical and historicist6
reading of Polanyi demands that we disrupt the simple notion that global
forces have disembedding effects on societies, to reveal the tensions that
pervade the economy-society relation and the multiple interpretations and
experiences that individuals and social groups may have of the perceived
disembedding.
Gramscian insights and the new IPE
For Gramsci, it is the ensemble of social relations configured by social
structures which is the basic unit of analysis, rather than individual agents,
be they consumers, firms, states or interest groups. (Gill, 1993: 25)
For those IR and IPE scholars who have interpreted Gramsci’s work for con-
temporary problematics,7 the first order questions are concerned with society
and social transformation. In the Gramscian ontology, social relations and
social structures are the primary elements to be considered, for they alone
constitute the limits of the potential space for change to take place. Of course,
while for Gramsci the central terrain of social organisation was the national
social formation, for his IPE interpreters the terrain may be transnational or
global (Germain and Kenny, 1998). Gramsci’s work has been viewed by new IPE
scholars as offering the potential to critique linear and determinstic accounts
of social change via a critical focus on the capacity of political agents to com-
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municate with, mobilise and induce change in society. Social change thus derives
its shape and meaning as it is played out by agents acting within and through
social structures. In this way ‘reality’ becomes a ‘product of the application of
human will to the society of things’ (Gramsci, 1971: 171). The intersubjective
realms of ideas, knowledge, theory and social institutions thus become central
to processes of social transformation (Gill, 1993: 23), and may engender or con-
strain social contestation, conflict and dissent (Femia, 1981: 35; Rupert, 1995: 13).
For the neo-Gramscian scholars, the study of change in IPE has tended to
focus on the reciprocal relationships between forms of state, social forces and
world orders (Cox, 1981). Drawing on Gramsci’s notion of a historical bloc
(blocco storico), social transformation is viewed as complex, contradictory
and multi-faceted. Murphy (1994) interprets Gramsci’s historical bloc as an
apparently unified social order that may be compared, using an architectural
metaphor, to a block of flats and shops that represent an underlying order.
When a historical bloc is stable and hegemony is built on coercion and
consent, life goes on ‘as it should’ (Murphy, 1994: 20). But when the bloc is in
crisis and one of its facades begins to crumble there is space for the structures
to be ‘rebuilt or reclaimed’ (1994: 29). Murphy’s interpretation of Gramsci
serves to problematise representations of social institutions as given or static
entities. The ‘project’ of global restructuring thus becomes part of a wider
fabric of social power relations that may be cut or hewn in new forms, but not
without tension or contest:
The active politician is a creator, an initiator; but he neither creates from
nothing nor does he move in the turbid void of his own desires and dreams
… What ‘ought to be’ is therefore concrete; indeed it is the only realistic
and historicist interpretation of reality, it alone is history in the making
and philosophy in the making, it alone is politics. (Gramsci, 1971: 172)
The contests and bargains over what ‘ought to be’, in the sense of the shape
of a historical bloc or how society should be organised or reorganised are,
thus, for Gramsci and his IPE interpreters, the essence of politics. For a study
such as this, seeking to reveal the contests and struggles that surround and
suffuse the restructuring of work, the Gramsci-derived insights open up the
possibility of a conception of contestation in social change. In our terms of
reference the social forces that intersect workplace, state-society and world
order become key sources of contingency in social transformation (Cox, 1987;
Harrod, 1987). Production and work are conceived in a broad sense, with
production representing ‘life, for the dispensation of energy (work) which
results in life (product)’ (Harrod, 1997a: 109). IPE studies have drawn upon
Cox’s and Harrod’s theses of power and production to demonstrate the
production and reproduction of webs of social power relations over time. As
Rupert has it, attention is directed to the ‘processes through which power has
been produced’ and the ‘conflicting social power relations which at once
underlie and make possible that production, and which also problematise its
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long-term reproduction’ (1995: 1). Gill’s account of the elite that constitutes a
disciplinary set of neo-liberal social forces, similarly emphasises the web of
power relations binding international capital, accountants, consultants, large
firms and workers in supply chains (1995: 400). There would seem to be
potential here to explore the ongoing social contests that paradoxically
underpin a particular historical bloc, yet also raise the contradictions that are
likely to call it into question.
As with all strands of IPE inquiry, the neo-Gramscian ‘school’ cannot be
uncritically applied to studies of global social change. While they open up
critical avenues of inquiry and seek to ‘politicise’ accounts of globalisation,
they do this in a particular way that leaves other avenues opaque and un-
charted. A central problem with the uncritical adoption of Gramscian insights
is the sustained separation of an apparently coherent ‘global elite’ from
potential, and apparently less coherent ‘local resistors’: ‘The writings of open
Marxism present political power as a thing formed outside social formations,
in the rarefied atmosphere of the world economy … imposing closure from
the start on active politics in the world economy, relegating struggles to the
sphere of national social formations’ (Drainville, 1994: 120–121). The image is
one of a transnationally ‘hyperliberal thinking’ organised elite directing a top-
down project, that constrains nationally located social groups who may ‘resist’.
The ‘global’ is thus reinscribed as a realm of expertise, technical knowledge
and strategy, while the ‘local’ is a peripheral space of everyday social relation-
ships. Given that I seek to disrupt the reflex of representing societies as
‘responding to’ the imperatives of globalisation, I suggest that it is just a short
step from ‘responding’ to ‘resisting’. In both formulations, societies and social
groups are separated from, and opposed to, some ethereal process or project
of globalisation. Power is ‘wielded’ in both instances, either by the promoters
of the project, or by the resistors in their ‘anti-globalisation’ strategies.8
Just as social change is conceived by the neo-Gramscians in terms of social
forces within a historical bloc, so it is also presented in ‘periods’ of transition,
from one set of structures to the crisis, and then to the rebuilding. The
dichotomies of the IPE orthodoxy are replaced by a series of new dichotomies
that characterise social change in terms of ‘order/disorder’, ‘Westphalian/post-
Westphalian’,9 ‘hegemony/post-hegemony’10 and ‘starting-point/end point’.11
The assumption that restructuring and social change takes place in a crisis-
ridden interstice between two stable orders raises significant questions. Are we
to distinguish strategic formal restructuring programmes from the more
general and continuous rhythms of social change? The breaking up of social
change into defined periods serves to further marginalise certain issues in IPE
inquiry. The realms of finance, production and technology are privileged
above ‘everyday’ realms of work and social practice since the latter can only
change at the margins or in the gaps in the historic bloc.
The neo-Gramscian frameworks offer one route into the problematising
of transformations in workplace, state-society and world order. However,
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some of the doors that have been closed by these scholars can be pushed
further ajar. There is a particular need to identify ways to break open the
opposition of ‘perpetrators’ and ‘resistors’ of globalisation. I am reminded of a
report from the Seattle protests that asked ‘Did the protester who was filmed
kicking lumps off the Nike sign while wearing Nike shoes see the irony?’ (Elliott,
1999). In this allegory the neo-liberal elite and the actions of the protester are
closely interwoven. In our everyday practices we rarely consciously adopt a
reinforcing or challenging role in relation to the shape of social change.
Further, and in order to challenge the periodisation of global social change, we
need to be able to contemplate how programmes of restructuring communi-
cated by international organisations, governments or corporate actors
intersect with individual and collective social understandings and practices.
Such a focus can begin to challenge the notion that power is wielded in the
global realm and ‘received’ or resisted in the local.
An international political economy of social practice
It is clear from the above analysis that the new IPE has sought to expose and
transcend the bounded terrain of orthodox IR and IPE, exploring alternative
political terrain through firms, institutions, financial centres, technology, and
to a lesser extent labour and work. Susan Strange’s questions of the nature and
sources of power, the neo-Polanyian highlighting of the contradictions of
market society and the neo-Gramscian emphasis on social forces within and
across states and world orders – taken together they lead us to reflect upon
global social change in particular ways. Global social change potentially
becomes a contested, contingent and politicised process that is expressed, first
and foremost, through everyday social practices. However, the boundaries of
IPE knowledge that have been agitated by the new IPE do leave us short of
what Sinclair has termed an ‘IPE of the commonplace’ (1999: 164). The new
IPE has tended to focus predominantly on the politics ‘at the top’, residing in
the actions and interests of global elite groups and organisations. Where
everyday modes of political action and expression are discussed, these have
been located in a ‘local’ or ‘national’ sphere. Yet, it is in the everyday aspects of
people’s lives that global social change is interpreted and experienced. It is in
the realms of everyday thought and practice that competing interests confront
one another, and where the contradictions and tensions of social trans-
formation are expressed. Indeed, we might say that the ‘everyday’ realm is one
where the boundaries of national/transnational, local/global, economics/
politics and states/markets are both constituted and confounded.
In order to bring IPE close to the social practices that characterise our
everyday lives, three further steps can be taken. The first is a response to the
call for a ‘historicised IPE’ (Amin and Palan, 1996; Amoore et al., 2000), that is
to say a representation of social change, and all knowledge of social change, as
historically contingent. The second is a challenge to the prevailing IPE concep-
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tion of power as something that is ‘held’ or ‘wielded’ by particular elite agents
in a global sphere. The final step proposed here is a conception of everyday
social practices as a key terrain of politics and, in particular, as the central
spaces in which global restructuring is played out and contested.
Historicity and contingency
I began this chapter by reference to Cox’s claim that IPE is critical theory by
virtue of its standing apart from structures in order to explore their historical
constitution and transformation. What does it mean to consider social struc-
tures and their transformation to be ‘historically constituted’? And is this a
sufficient step towards a new IPE that is sensitive to historicity and contin-
gency?12 Certainly the new IPE has made claims to an epistemological self-
awareness that infers that all IPE knowledge is historically constituted. Yet, the
historical turn in IPE has been, in the main, rather limited. The work of the
historical sociologists (see Hobson, 1997; Skocpol, 1984), and others who
advocate a ‘historicised IPE’ (Amin and Palan, 1996), can be said to add
history simply as an adjunct to the study of structure and agency. That is to
say, they consider the historical context of the agency of human beings through
a sensitivity to their role in the ‘building’ of institutions, and the constraining
effect of these institutions on their lives. Their concern is thus with what Mills
calls ‘historical push and shove’, and Amin and Palan term the ‘fixity and flow
of social evolution’ (1996: 211).
Such invocations to ‘consider history’ fall some way short of allowing us to
consider global social change as substantially constituted and contested
through the consciousness, reflections and experiences of people. For this we
require a historical mode of inquiry, an approach that views social structures
and institutions as ‘the historically apprehended knowledge of the particular
circumstances of the human condition’ (Amoore et al., 2000: 56). Viewed from
a historicist vantage point, Strange’s knowledge structure is recast as a domain
that suffuses all other structures, thought and action. The configurations of
states-markets, economics-politics, domestic-international and structure-
agency are understood through the dimension of human knowledge of these
relationships:
The real is not “out there” and thought within the quiet lecture theatre of
our heads, “inside here”. Thought and being inhabit a single space, which
space is ourselves. Even as we think we also hunger and hate, we sicken or
we love, and consciousness is intermixed with being; even as we contem-
plate the “real” we experience our own palpable reality. (Thompson, 1978:
211)
We are thus reminded of the nature of IPE as webs of interrelationships of
which reflective human beings form the key constituent elements, and within
which we (and the subjects of our research) act, interact, experience and
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understand. From an extensive body of work that we may broadly term
‘critical history’,13 I draw out the themes that offer insights to the furthering of
an IPE of social practice.
First, a historical mode of thought directs attention to the act of reflection
that connects agents with frameworks of thought and action (Iggers, 1995:
131). Agents and structures do not simply push and pull one another through
periods of social change, rather they are mutually constituted through acts of
reflection, what Collingwood terms ‘thinking about thinking’ (1946: 307).
Others, from sociological perspectives, have developed the concept of
‘reflexive modernisation’ to refer to the ‘changing relationship between social
structures and social agents’ (Beck, 1992: 2; see also Giddens, 1990). Such
readings of history share a view of human beings as participants in the making
of social transformations. As Collingwood has it ‘thought is not mere im-
mediate experience but always reflection or self-knowledge, the knowledge of
oneself as living in these activities’ (1946: 297). The significant contribution
that this mode of knowledge can make to the new IPE is that it grounds global
social change in the reflective self-understandings that people have both of
themselves and their circumstances and surroundings. Global social change
does not simply ‘happen to’ people, it is experienced, interpreted and lived.
The thoughts and actions of those living in the production structure, for
example, become at least as central to the reproduction or undermining of
that structure as the abstract entities of states, firms and technologies are
currently assumed to be.
Second, a historical mode of thought can shed light upon the role of the
historian, researcher or IPE scholar in the constitution of knowledge about
‘our world’. Carr reminds us that the historian is also a participant in the
process of change she or he observes and documents: ‘The historian, then, is
an individual human being. Like other individuals, he (sic) is also a social
phenomenon, both the product and the conscious or unconscious spokesman
of the society too which he belongs; it is in this capacity that he approaches the
facts of the historical past’ (Carr, 1961: 35). Carr thus reminds us that as we
observe, write or teach about society, we also exist within, interpret and experi-
ence its dynamics. The interpretative choices of historians, influenced by their
experiences, their ‘history’, will be reflected in the issues and subjects that are
selected for documentation and theorisation. In an era that is persistently
labelled ‘global’ it is particularly significant that we reflect on the experiences
and perceptions that we bring to inquiry. It becomes possible to account for
globalisation as one particular representation of global social change, and one
that can be interpreted and expressed in numerous and contingent ways.
Finally, attention to the historicity of knowledge reveals the interpretative
nature of all inquiry. History, for Collingwood is the ‘science of res gestae, the
attempt to answer questions about human actions done in the past’ (1946: 9).
Carr’s (1961) retrieval of Collingwood’s ideas captures the ‘philosophy of history’
as concerned with the interrelationships between the past and contemporary
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thought about the past. For him, history is given shape and meaning by ‘seeing
the past through the eyes of the present and in the light of its problems’ (1961:
21). Human activity is made intelligible through acts of reflection that re-
enact possible past social meanings on a stage that is lit by our contemporary
experiences and understandings of social change. From this perspective,
understandings, interpretations and experiences of global social change are as
‘real’ in concrete historical terms, as the technological and economic flows that
so many IPE theorists seek to account for.
In terms of a wider conception of global social change, a historicised
reading makes visible the open-ended and contingent nature of the restruc-
turing of social practices. In the realm of work these insights are particularly
significant. Following the historical mode of thought employed by E. P.
Thompson (1978; 1980), we are led to view the material restructuring of the
production process as intimately bound up with the everyday histories of the
workplace and understandings of workplace realities. Of course, this does not
mean that transformation is impeded (Femia, 1981). Rather, that any attempt
to construct a ‘project’ of the flexibilisation of work does not simply confront
the material factors of the production process, but also the understandings
and shared frameworks of thought between the people that make this process.
A project of restructuring is one expression of how change should be ordered,
but it is not the only one and it makes sense only when played out through
social practices, where it may mutate and take on a very different or unin-
tended form. In this sense, what is often considered to be ‘history from below’
is not in any meaningful sense separate from a global imperative ‘from above’,
since it is in daily histories that global imperatives become contested and
reorganised so as to be understood.
Power and agency
IPE, as I have argued, has generally failed to recognise the agency of non-elite
groupings of people in its understandings of global social change. It has had a
particular blind spot with regard to workers and their relationship to the
power relations that suffuse processes of change. Where labour and work do
feature in the new IPE this has predominantly been in terms of their assumed
‘powerlessness’ in the face of a global restructuring ‘project’ that is executed by
the ‘powerful’ neo-liberal elites. A key source of the invisibility of work and
workers in IPE lies in the conception of power that dominates inquiry. Power
is predominantly considered to be a commodity or resource that is exercised
by particular agents over the lives of others. Thus, for much of the IR and IPE
literature ‘the capacity to wield power as a resource over other agents is an
important proviso of agency’ (Campbell, 1996: 11). Agency is in itself defined
in terms of the ability to hold and apply power, and for those considered
‘powerless’ agency is denied and subjects are considered of peripheral impor-
tance to the field of study. Such conceptions of agency, found particularly in
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neo-Gramscian conceptions, are exacerbated by the identification of ‘global’
and ‘local’ levels of agency, where the global becomes the source of restruc-
turing strategies, and the local has agency only insofar as it responds or resists
through counter-strategies of its own. Technologies are, for example, repre-
sented as having agency in a global sphere that is simply ‘received’ ‘on the
ground’. Where IPE has sought to reflect on the agency of non-elite groups
these are also assumed to be ‘on the ground’, such as in the responses of labour
groups to the global strategies of firms.
An IPE of social practice must reinvigorate the ‘openness’ that is promised
by the new IPE to reflect upon alternative conceptions of power expressed in
philosophical and critical sociological writings. In the first instance power as
an entity that is held, plotted or wielded is problematised. Where power in IPE
is most commonly represented as structural capabilities that constrain and
limit the actions of others, it becomes more fluid in the writings of Michel
Foucault: ‘Power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a
certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a
complex strategical relationship in a particular society’ (1980a: 93).
Power thus becomes a network or matrix of forces that operates through
society and social relationships. In this way power is not simply a static matter
possessed by some individuals to limit others, but is practised in a more
mobile, subtle and intricate way. Power moves, circulates and shifts (Bleiker,
2000: 134); it is ‘elaborated, transformed, organised’ (Foucault, 1982: 224). It is
thus not possible simply to reduce power to a named group, individual,
institutions or ‘actor’, as many of those seeking to identify the architects of
globalisation would wish to do. Agents and institutions are undoubtedly central
to the exercise of power, but they do not personify the source of power itself.
Thus, states, firms and international corporations, for example, may through
their actions define a field of possible future actions, but they do this as part of
a wider web of power relations. In this sense ‘one must analyse institutions
from the standpoint of power relations, rather than vice versa’ (Foucault,
1982: 222). Viewed in this way an apparent ‘project’ of the flexibilisation of
work is not controlled or exerted in any simple linear sense. The firm, the
policy agenda, the industrial relations institutions, become forums for webs of
power-knowledge relations that actually extend the ‘limits’ of the institution.
The conception of power and knowledge in a correlative, and not a causal
relationship (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 203), raises significant questions for
Strange’s (1988) distinction of the production and knowledge structures.14 If
we see power and knowledge as ‘tangled up in the knot of a “not without”’,
(Keenan, 1997), then their separation as a resource (power) versus a means of
power (production and knowledge) is problematised. In our terms, if we seek
to explore the knowledge and techniques that have defined and managed the
flexibility discourse, then we cannot observe these concretely without analysis
of the webs of power relations that suffuse the restructuring of work (and vice
versa). This brings us to the question of levels of analysis and ‘how’ and ‘where’
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such power relations should be studied. A sustained separation of an ‘outer
world’ of elite world politics from an ‘inner world’ of the localised politics of
struggle obscures the ‘transgression of these fine lines’ (Walker, 1994: 700). A
number of studies have identified ‘transversal struggles’15 or ‘infrapolitics’ as
the immediate struggles that characterise ‘globalised life’ (Campbell, 1996: 24;
Bleiker, 2000: 130; Scott, 1990: 183). Viewed in this way ‘people criticise
instances of power which are the closest to them … They do not look for the chief
enemy, but for the immediate enemy’ (Foucault, 1982: 211). In our terms,
whilst government policy statements, corporate strategies and indeed the ‘anti-
globalisation’ groups, may communicate globalisation as the ‘chief enemy’,
their actions within networks of power focus on their immediate environs,
effectively demonstrating the illusory separateness of an exogenous global level.
A conception of power as a network or chain of relations thus takes the
politics of global social change out of the sole domain of elite agents. Of course,
the strategies and actions of bankers, policymakers and corporate managers
are significant in global social change, but they cannot be adequately analysed
in the absence of the social power relations of which they are part. In this sense
‘contesting globalisation’ is not primarily about the outlining of a ‘counter-
hegemonic’ project to confront an identifiable neo-liberal restructuring agenda.
Rather, it is about exploring the web of power relations that apparently under-
pin the ‘project’, revealing the contradictions and tensions that are manifested
through everyday social practices.
Social practice, social space and the ‘everyday’
Amidst the clamour of voices seeking to understand globalisation, a small
group of scholars has drawn attention to the emerging social relations of global-
isation and the structured social practices that make these possible (Sklair,
1991; Germain, 2000; Jones, 2000). However, the existing work that comprises
this embryonic perspective has focused almost exclusively upon the social
practices of elite groups, thereby reinforcing the idea of a global project, albeit
one that has become entangled with social relations. By contrast, the perspec-
tive advanced here views global social change as experienced, given meaning,
reinforced and/or challenged in the everyday structured social practices of
individuals and groups, such that globalisation is marked by contestation over
the reality and representation of social change. Such a perspective rests upon a
conception of ‘everydayness’ and ‘everyday life’ that does not locate itself
primarily in supposed ‘ground level’ activity or the ‘local’ dynamics of global
change. Rather, the everyday is conceived as a ‘common denominator of
activities, locus and milieu of human functions … the uniform aspect of the
major sectors of social life: work, family, private life, leisure’ (Lefebvre, 1987:
10, see also Lefebvre, 1991a). The everyday is thus a ‘contested place’ (Davies
and Niemann, 2000: 3), a realm of tensions and contradictions, where the
banale and routine meet the potential for social transformation:
Amoore_Global_03_Ch2 6/19/02, 12:15 PM60
61IPE and global social change
The quotidian is on the one hand the realm of routine, repetition, reiter-
ation: the space/time where constraints and boredom are produced …
Even at its most degraded, however, the everyday harbors the possibility
of its own transformation; it gives rise to desires which cannot be
satisfied within a weekly cycle of production/consumption. The Political
is hidden in the everyday, exactly where it is most obvious: in the
contradictions of lived experience, in the most banal and repetitive
gestures of everyday life – the commute, the errand, the appointment.
(Kaplan and Ross, 1987: 3)
It is in the realm of the everyday that our understandings, experiences and
meanings of globalisation are made. To locate the political, as many IPE
scholars do, narrowly in the actions of states, firms, organisations or social
movements, is to miss this ‘commonplace world of everyday experience’, where
conflicts and contests take place, and ‘change is most widely felt’ (Sinclair,
1999: 158). Indeed, far from underestimating or denying the emergence of
globalised ways of life, a focus on the everyday reveals ‘the concrete produc-
tion of internationalised social relations in the daily practices of workers,
families or consumers’ (Davies and Niemann, 2000: 6). The everyday sphere
thus challenges the mode of thought that separates a ‘global’ sphere of
legitimate IPE inquiry from a ‘local’ sphere of empirical evidence to support
claims to globalisation, ‘constructing global capitalism as a more abstract
system than it really is’ (Thrift, 1995: 21). The idea that globalisation is ‘bigger
than us’ and, therefore that social change is always a result of external forces, is
thrown into question. As Bruno Latour depicts it:  ‘A giant in a story is not a
bigger character than a dwarf, it just does different things. The same two
metre-square print may represent a battlefield or an apple; no one will say that
the first is bigger and more encompassing than the second’ (Latour, 1988: 30).
IPE’s claims to be concerned with the spatial ‘bigger picture’ of the ‘whole
world’ rather than ‘particular parts of it’ (Strange, 1997b: 182) are thus chal-
lenged by the insights of Latour’s actor-network theory.16 Coupling these
insights with those of Lefebvre, globalisation becomes one conceptual means
of identifying and naming social change, but one that disguises the myriad of
conflicting and contingent meanings and experiences that are translated in
networks of everyday social life. If we conceive of ‘social space as a social
product’ (Lefebvre, 1991b: 26), then there cannot exist a global space that is
independent of the actions and contests of people engaged in social practices.
The spaces of states, firms and organisations conceived by IPE cannot simply
‘contain’ social relations and practices, nor do they exist prior to these relations
and practices. The restructuring of such spaces cannot, therefore, be predicted
or linear in nature. Lefebvre reveals multiple layers of space via three dia-
lectical ‘moments of space’ within and between which people may constantly
move: spatial practices, the realm of perceived daily reality and the interaction
with ‘material and physical flows’ (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 7); represen-
tations of space, the realm of space as conceived by ‘scientists, planners and
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social engineers’; and representational spaces, the realm of space as lived or
imagined (Lefebvre, 1991b: 39).
Workplaces can be seen as embodying all of these spatial moments, of
which the idea of an ‘imperative’ of flexibility captures only one particular
representation of space. Drawing on Lefebvre’s terms, the workplace as a con-
ceived space may be reinforced, contradicted or undermined by perceptions
and lived experiences. The restructuring of work does not simply confront a
material reality contained within unitary states and firms, but a set of human
and discursive representations (du Gay, 1997). As Kaplan and Ross have it:
‘institutions, codes and paradigms are not abstract constructs confronting us
in some official “out there”. Nor do we come to institutions alone. We live them
in historically specific ways … as collective or virtually collective subjects’
(1987: 4). We can see that the spaces that IPE terms ‘national political econo-
mies’ or ‘multinational corporations’ or ‘social movements’ embody an array
of social spaces and networks. We can never consider these spaces to be com-
plete or static, since they are continually made and remade:  ‘All networks of
social relations, whether we are talking about capitalism, or firms, or any other
institutions are incomplete, tentative, and approximate’ (Thrift, 1995: 33).
The workplace thus does not simply provide an institutional ‘context’ for
social change. It does more than ‘trace out the traces of spaces’ (Bingham and
Thrift, 2000: 299). It is shaped by the articulation of conflicts, tensions and
compromises that are played out in social practices. An IPE of social practice
challenges the unitary and abstract conception of states and markets inter-
acting to produce global social change. The ‘state’ and the ‘market’ are opened
up to reveal the webs of social relations that agitate their parameters. Work
(and by implication the restructuring of work) is conceived as everyday
structured social practice through which the emerging social relations of
globalisation may be enabled, contested or confounded.
Conclusion
While the previous chapter explored the linear and imperative construction of
social change that underlies the discourse of labour flexibility, the present
chapter mapped out the terrain of social change as conceived in contemporary
IPE. I have argued that the new IPE has positioned the understanding of
global social change centrally in its inquiry, a crucial departure from the
emphasis of orthodox IPE. The attempt to transcend state-centrism, to politi-
cise and historicise the study of globalisation, and to create an ‘open’ field – all
serve to disrupt teleological and deterministic representations of social
change. Though I seek to take some of the new IPE insights forward into the
chapters that follow, I do so critically and with caveats. Susan Strange’s con-
ceptualisation of structural power, and particularly the firm as a powerful
agent, has raised the profile of production in IPE inquiry. Yet, her states and
firms take on the status of ‘power wielders’, leaving the webs of power relations
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that surround and suffuse them less visible in analysis. To uncover the power-
knowledge webs that run through the restructuring of work, as I have argued,
requires further steps to be taken.
From Polanyian frameworks in the new IPE, this study embraces the
assertion that labour is a ‘fictitious commodity’, that labour markets are politi-
cally and socially produced and reproduced over time, and are made and defined
in particular ways in different places. However, I have argued that caution
should be exercised in the use by IPE of the concept of the ‘double movement’.
To argue that societal dissent and organised resistance will flow automatically
from the damaging forces of the market is, paradoxically, to remove the
politics from understandings of restructuring. It is,  by contrast, in the contra-
dictions highlighted by Polanyi that we find the politicisation of social change.
This book is concerned with revealing the contradictions and tensions that run
between markets for labour and experiences of work in human and social life.
Similarly, from neo-Gramscian analysis, the social forces that intersect
workplace, state-society and world order become key sources of contingency
and contestation in social transformation. This study, however, rejects the notion
that globalisation is a project driven by the interests of global elites, and
resisted by the actions of local groups. Where aspects of global restructuring
do become represented as ‘project-like’, as in the flexibility thesis, this project is
not simply ‘executed’ and absorbed by societies. Rather, it is translated, given
many different meanings and lived out in diverse ways. Again, these steps
require some further conceptual doors to be nudged open. If the promise of
openness and heterodoxy is to be fulfilled in IPE, then there is a need for some
conscious reflection on wider discussions of social change, and the avenues
they may open. In particular, this chapter has identified the need to challenge
IPE’s conceptions of power as ‘wielded’, and knowledge as a commodity or
resource that is simply possessed and traded. I have argued that if we can trans-
cend these conceptions we can challenge the hierarchy of issues in IPE that
says finance, technology and production ‘matter’ because they are sources of
power, whilst work and everyday life are only the ‘effects’ of wider transformations.
My central argument in this chapter has been that an IPE of social practice
can reveal the politics and contingency of globalisation as it is characterised by
contests over the reality and representation of social change. I have mapped
the terrain of an IPE of social practice, as I see it, through the intertwining of
three strands of thought on social change. Each has particular implications for
the study of the restructuring of work in the chapters that follow:
1 Historicity and contingency – Following a historical mode of thought, we
are uniquely placed to account for, and to understand global social change,
as our everyday lives are bound up with its rhythms. It is not separate
from us, nor is it greater than us or beyond apprehension by individuals
and social groups. Viewed in this way, the apparent ‘project’ of the
restructuring of work is simply one expression of how social change is
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ordered, and it is not the only one. The transformation of work is historic-
ally contingent. Thus, globalisation and flexibility become imbued with
different meanings in different places. Such meanings, though often
having the appearance of coherence, are contested within and across their
boundaries. In the chapters that follow I explore the diverse interpre-
tations and experiences of restructuring within and across state-societies,
often understood as ‘national capitalisms’; within and across firms, often
considered as ‘actors’ rather than sites of struggle; and by individual and
groups of workers.
2 Power and agency – In the analysis of global social change it is insufficient
to locate power primarily in the hands of the ‘architects’ of globalisation.
As I have argued, if we see power as shifting and circulating in webs or
networks, the making of globalisation becomes more complex than the
elite design of a global architecture. Sites of global restructuring become
part of a web of social power relations that transcend and defy the bound-
aries of states, firms and organisations. An apparent project of labour
flexibilisation is not controlled in a linear manner by holders of power,
but is riven with contradictions and tensions. Groups that we may define
as significant in shaping the restructuring of work – for example, policy-
makers, corporate managers and workers – do not always do so in predic-
table and instrumental ways. It will be clear from the chapters that follow
that not all managers promote globalisation and flexibility, and nor do all
workers resist. Indeed we can say that some worker relationships may, in
fact, enable globalisation. People cannot easily be assigned to roles of
‘promoting’ or ‘resisting’ globalisation and, therefore, an analysis of their
situations within webs of power relations is better equipped to reveal the
ambiguous and cross-cutting nature of affiliation and dissent.
3 Social practice and the ‘everyday’ – I have argued that it is in the realm of
everyday life that understandings, experiences, and meanings of global-
isation and global restructuring are produced and reproduced. IPE inquiry
has for too long assumed that the ‘everyday’ is a parochial realm, one
which holds only secondary importance for inquiry. But what is the
‘global economy’, ‘the market’, ‘the MNC’, if it is separate from the
experience and knowledge of living in a world we call global? IPE has
tended to assume that we examine ‘small scale’ empirical details in order
to explain the bigger picture. Drawing on conceptualisations of the every-
day, I have suggested that it is in this realm that meaningful global social
change takes place. From this standpoint, the ‘restructuring of the state’ or
the ‘strategy of the firm’ becomes concrete when viewed through the every-
day social practices that may constitute or contest it. Of course, past practice
becomes institutionalised and constrains present and future actions, but
these institutions are not prior to social relations. Work, conceived as
everyday social practice, is one means through which representations and
concrete realities of globalisation are enabled, contested or confounded.
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Notes
1 Strange (1984) emphasises the potential for ‘openness’ which is held out to the social
sciences by IPE. This ‘openness’ constitutes both a willingness to consider the insights
of a wide range of social groups, academics and practitioners, and an acceptance of the
significance of a diverse range of subject matter, issues and concerns.
2 Strange’s (1984) Paths to IPE represents a clear statement of the problematic of IPE
inquiry. The chapters by Tooze and Strange mark out early divergences in the con-
ception of the ontological and epistemological bases of the field.
3 The finance structure is defined as ‘the sum of all the arrangements governing the
availability of credit plus all the factors determining the terms on which currencies are
exchanged for one another’ (1988: 68). The security structure is the ‘framework of
power created by the provision of security by some human beings for others’ (Strange,
1988: 44). The production structure is defined as ‘the sum of all the arrangements
determining what is produced, by whom and for whom, by what method and on what
terms’ (1988: 62). Finally, the knowledge structure ‘comprehends what is believed …
what is known and perceived as understood; and the channels by which beliefs, ideas
and knowledge are communicated – including some people and excluding others’
(1988: 15). In each of the structures the emphasis is on ‘who benefits’ and who loses or
is excluded from the arrangements.
4 See, for example, Hettne (1995), Gill (1995a; 1997), Bienefeld (1991), Birchfield (1999),
Bernard (1997).
5 For discussions of the use of historical sociology in interdisciplinary and IPE inquiry,
see Leander (2000), Skocpol (1984).
6 Hettne has it that Polanyi offers a ‘historical’ but not a ‘historicist’ route into IPE
inquiry (1995: 5). The historical sociologists use of Polanyi similarly marshalls his-
torical material, but does not ‘historicise’ this material. See, for example, Goldthorpe’s
analysis of what he terms ‘grand historical sociology’ (1996: 112). For Goldthorpe, the
work of Skocpol and Hall, for example, engages with a debate about the use of history
in sociology without actually employing a historical mode of thought. Hence, the
historical sociologists rely upon comparative historical material on differences
between societies, for example, but do not emphasise the role of interpretation in
these cases.
7 See, for example Cox (1981; 1983; 1996), Gill (1990; 1993; 1995), Gill and Mittelman,
(1997), Harrod, (1987; 1997a), Murphy (1994).
8 The concept of ‘anti-globalisation strategies’ has become common parlance in the new
media. See, for example, Channel 4 (2001) ‘Politics Isn’t Working: The End Of Politics’,
13 May.
9 Cox (1992b) describes the shift in the relationships of states to the world political
economy in terms of a ‘post-Westphalian’ order.
10 Gill (1993) outlines a ‘post-hegemonic’ research agenda. Indeed, early IPE debates
were rather dominated by the issues surrounding the possible demise of the Pax
Americana and the shape of a future new world order (Gamble, 1995).
11 For Hettne: ‘Judging from the current debate in IPE and IR theory, we live in a period
of “transformation” or “transition”. In historical studies of transition from one system
to another, we have the record – that is, both the starting points and the end points are
known to us. In studies of contemporary “transitions” or processes of transformation,
we don’t know the end points’ (1995: 10).
12 I first raised these questions with others in the Newcastle IPE discussion group (Amoore
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et al., 2000). I thus owe many of these points to discussions and writing that took place
within the group.
13 Cox (1996: 27) explicitly outlines the ‘influences and commitments’ of his work.
Under the broad heading of historicism, Cox highlights the work of Georges Sorel , E.
H. Carr, E. P. Thompson, R. G. Collingwood, Giambattista Vico, Benedetto Croce,
Antonio Gramsci and Fernand Braudel.
14 Ronen Palan comments that Strange does not allude to the ‘authors of structural
power’, Poulantzas, Foucault and Mann (1999: 128).
15 Foucault outlines transversal struggles as ‘immediate’ struggles that are not limited to
one country (1982: 211). Campbell extends this to suggest that transversal struggles
‘not only transverse all boundaries; they are about these boundaries’ (1996: 23).
16 Latour’s (1991) stories of the use of weights to encourage the return of hotel keys, and
the development of the Kodak camera demonstrate the contingency and displacement
of apparently ‘designed’ strategies.
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
Producing hyperflexibility:
the restructuring of work in Britain

Change is opening up new horizons; but there is fear of what may lie
within them. Technology and global financial markets are transforming
our economies, our workplaces, our industrial structure. Economic change
is uprooting communities and families from established patterns of life.
The way we live, as well as the way we work, our culture, our shared
morality, everything, is under pressure from the intensity and pace of
change … It can be exhilarating. But it is certainly unsettling … Politics
is going global. All of us are seeking to make sense of, and manage, change.
The key to the management of change is reform. The pace of reform has
to match the pace of change. Societies that are open, flexible, able easily
to distinguish between fundamental values, which they must keep and
policies, which they must adapt, will prosper. Those that move too slowly
or are in hock to vested interests or what I have elsewhere called forces of
conservatism, reacting negatively to change, will fall behind. (Tony Blair,
2000a: 1, Speech at the World Economic Forum, Davos)
In his speech to the Davos meeting the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair,conjures a particular image of global change. On the one hand, he con-
stitutes the problem of globalisation and restructuring as an imperative that is
disciplined by ‘fear’, ‘uprooting’, ‘pressure’, ‘unsettling’ and ‘falling behind’. On
the other, he offers a best practice solution to the defined ‘problem’. The
message is that if the ‘right’ policy response is made to globalisation – one that
is ‘exhilarating’, ‘managed’, ‘open’ and ‘flexible’ – then there is no need to be
afraid. The speech goes on to state that Britain has made the ‘right’ and
‘flexible’ policy response at a pace that matches the speed of social change.
What we can see here is one face of the making of a particular kind of
global restructuring, one that for many commentators is captured by a ‘British
model’ of neo-liberal or hyperliberal capitalism. Yet, how can we make sense
of a ‘national capitalism’ given, for example, the prevalence of German banks
in the City of London, the Japanese multinationals on northern business parks
and the migrant workers providing much of the ‘flexible’ labour? This conun-
drum has been discussed at the heart of the globalisation debate, with those
who see globalisation as a process proclaiming the convergence of national
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capitalisms around a neo-liberal policy agenda (Strange, 1997b), and those
who see a nationally defined ‘project’ declaring globalisation to be a ‘myth’
(Weiss, 1998). Neither perspective, however, actually problematises the dicho-
tomous representation of a globalisation ‘outside’ and a national capitalism
‘inside’. As is clear from Blair’s speech, it can be highly politically expedient to
represent globalisation as ‘outside’ and beyond effective control by govern-
ments, and to position a national policy programme as a necessary response.
This chapter challenges the opposition of globalisation and ‘national
capitalisms’ by exploring the making and remaking of a ‘British model’ of
hyperflexibility.1 Through a reconceptualisation of ‘models of capitalism’ as
shifting and circulating webs of power, I question how it has been possible to
represent a flexible ‘model’, and why this representation has emerged as a best-
practice that is lauded by international agencies such as the OECD. A parti-
cular set of meanings of globalisation are produced through the discourse and
concrete interventions of a restructuring programme. Hence, globalisation
and restructuring are not separable as ‘outside’ cause and ‘inside’ effect. Nor is
the programme of restructuring ever complete, uncontested or without
contradictions. Flexible workers and a flexible labour market rest upon an
array of social practices that translate, enable or confound the policy pro-
gramme. Viewed in this way, the British model is not bounded, rational and
strategic, but the institutionalised face of ongoing contradictions, struggles
and contests in everyday practices. I argue that such a view serves to break
open the political usage of a ‘British model’ to discipline workers in Britain
and elsewhere. A particular kind of globalisation is thus made and remade,
and I argue that we should question how this has become possible, and why it
has taken the form of hyperflexibilisation. The first section explores how
national capitalisms have been understood within the globalisation debate
and outlines an alternative understanding that follows from the IPE of social
practice developed in chapter 2. I then go on to explore the making of
globalisation in the British discourse of hyperflexibility and the historical
representations of state, capital and labour that have made this possible.
Finally, I discuss the contemporary restructuring of working practices in
Britain, revealing the contests and contradictions that characterise the politics
of the flexibility programme.
Globalisation and the ‘national capitalisms’ debate
In the debates surrounding globalisation and social change, the idea that
national models of capitalism compete within a ‘larger’ global economy has
served a particular heuristic function. For those who represent globalisation as
an irresistible process, the argument that this bulldozer pushes previously
unique national capitalisms onto convergent policy lines serves to bolster their
globalist position. For a number of scholars, the denial of such convergence is
simply nostalgic for ‘times past’ and neglectful of greater ‘systemic trends’ (see
Amoore_Global_04_Ch3 6/19/02, 12:17 PM68
69Producing hyperflexibility: work in Britain
Strange, 1997b; Radice, 2000). However, for the comparative political econo-
mists and historical sociologists who focus on national models of capitalism,
the salience of ‘embedded’ institutions and practices call the process of
globalisation into question (see Berger and Dore, 1996; Weiss, 1998; Hirst and
Thompson, 1996; Zysman, 1996; Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Hollingsworth
and Boyer, 1997). Hence, as Held and Mcgrew have it, the telling of a story of
embedded national culture has become the ‘sceptic’s resource’ (2000: 4),
marshalled to show that ‘the impact of globalisation … is best approached
through a firm grounding in the detail of individual national cases’ (Coates,
2000: 20).
The polarisation of the ‘process’ versus ‘national project’ accounts of
globalisation, however, constructs a somewhat false dichotomy. The process
reading relies on an image of the global as a ‘larger’ system (Radice, 2000: 730),
and the state as ‘in retreat’ (Strange, 1996) – opposing the realms of global and
national. The national ‘project’ reading, by contrast, appeals to the ‘mythical’
construction of the ‘powerless state’ to call globalisation into question (Weiss,
1998; Hirst and Thompson, 1996) – essentially favouring internationalisation
as an explanatory device. What both positions overlook and obscure is the
representation and reproduction of globalisation, in large part through the
debates taking place within and across national capitalisms. A central source
of the diversity and contestedness of globalisation is the differentiated mean-
ings generated through the webs of power that constitute competing forms of
capitalism.
In chapter 2 I discussed the use of Polanyi’s concept of embeddedness by
IPE, and in particular, the need to shed light on the tensions and contra-
dictions present in the institutions of market societies. There is scope within
the national capitalisms literature for such contradictions to be captured.
Colin Crouch, in his review of David Coates’s ‘Models of Capitalism’, for
example, comments that there is a need for ‘accounts which take note of mixes,
incoherencies, contradictions within cases’ (2001: 134). Coates and Hay
similarly present the British Labour Government’s policy programmes as
‘constructed and contested wholes, whose contradictions, internal consist-
encies and conceptual limits are as vital to their trajectory as are their axioms,
theories and content’ (2000: 1). Yet, despite their critical contribution to the
national capitalisms debate, these studies fail to acknowledge the contingency
of representations of globalisation, almost as though all governments in all
state-societies were perceiving and interpreting the same external problem,
and only responding in different ways. Indeed, they declare their focus to be
‘the character and interaction of foreign and domestic economic policy’
(Coates and Hay, 2000: 2), delineating ‘foreign’ from ‘domestic’, and ‘politics’
from ‘economics’ in a fashion not dissimilar from orthodox approaches to
IPE. As a result, they do not probe the webs of power that make, enable and
contest globalisation in particular ways, and surround and suffuse the restruc-
turing agenda.
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Following the ‘IPE of social practice’, with its emphasis on historicity,
contingency, shifting webs of power and everyday life, I suggest that the so-
called models of capitalism are less coherent and more contradictory than
they are commonly depicted. They represent particular realities that have been
produced and reproduced over time, and which enable specific claims to be
made about the nature of globalisation. In this sense they are ‘imagined com-
munities’ (Anderson, 1983: 13), within which programmes of restructuring
are not bounded or discretely ‘national’ phenomena. Rather, the programmes
are fluid and historically contingent, and engage with transborder pro-
grammes across governments, firms, international organisations and social
groups. The image of a coherent ‘model’ of capitalism is reconceptualised as a
‘programme’ in a ‘world of programmes [that] is heterogeneous and rivalrous’,
and in which ‘the solutions for one programme tend to be the problems for
another’ (Miller and Rose, 1990: 10–11). Miller and Rose’s innovative use of
Foucault’s ‘governmentality’ allows us to see programmes of government as
produced through networks of power relations that cut across boundaries of
state/market, politics/economics and domestic/international:
The classical terminology of political philosophy and political sociology
– State v. Civil Society, public v. private, community v. market and so
forth – is of little use here … Operationalising government has entailed
the putting into place, both intentionally and unintentionally, of a
diversity of indirect relations of regulation and persuasion that do not
differentiate according to such boundaries. (Miller and Rose, 1990: 8)
Programmes of policy designed to restructure social practices can thus be
understood as incomplete, non-linear, and extending into and across the
realms of state-society2, workplace, family and community. Recalling the
insights of Lefebvre and Foucault, ‘we do not come to institutions alone. We
live them in historically specific ways’ (Kaplan and Ross, 1987: 4), and ‘one
must analyse institutions from the standpoint of power relations, rather than
vice versa’ (Foucault, 1982: 222). Following our ‘IPE of social practice’ per-
spective, then, viewing the restructuring of work as a programme is distinct
from a coherent elite project because it analyses the means by which globalisa-
tion is constituted as a problem, and the rendering of the problem as
manageable via interventions of flexibilisation. It problematises the reception
of a policy programme into everyday life, highlighting the negotiations,
contestations and translations that ensue. As Miller and Rose highlight:
‘Technologies produce unexpected problems, are utilised for their own ends
by those who are supposed to merely operate them, are hampered by
underfunding, professional rivalries, and the impossibility of producing the
technical conditions that would make them work’ (Miller and Rose, 1990: 11).
In the light of a conception of programmes of restructuring as problem-
atic, contested and unpredictable, the British programme of hyperflexibilisa-
tion begins to look less like a strategic ‘best practice’ project. The making of
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‘global Britain’ is simultaneously a particular rendering of globalisation and a
specific policy programme resolution of globalisation: the national and global
become fused. In the remainder of this chapter I will explore the British
programme of restructuring to reveal the historical practices that it rests
upon, and the contemporary practices that interpret and give meaning to,
enable or confound its existence.
Producing flexibility in ‘global Britain’
In the preceding chapters I have argued that the construction of a discourse of
labour flexibility rests upon the production of a particular mode of knowledge
about globalisation and social change. The discourse of restructuring for
labour flexibility in British state-society has depended upon a representation
of globalisation and restructuring which is now widely understood to
transcend individual governments and party politics (Hay, 1999; Smith and
Morton, 2001). As a number of studies of neo-liberal policy programmes have
demonstrated, drawing on Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’,3 govern-
ment both discursively constructs a problem to be addressed, and structures
specific forms of intervention to ‘solve’ the problem:
All government depends on a particular mode of “representation”: the
elaboration of a language for depicting the domain in question that
claims both to grasp the nature of that reality represented, and literally to
represent it in a form amenable to political deliberation, argument and
scheming. (Miller and Rose, 1990: 8)
This precisely captures the means by which successive British Govern-
ments have depicted a ‘global’ domain as a problem to be solved, claimed to
grasp the ‘imperative’ nature of this problem, and rendered it amenable to the
construction of particular programmes – among them the flexibilisation of
labour. The depiction of globalisation that is dominant in British state-society
has legitimated a programme of restructuring in work and labour. A central
problem for a study such as this that seeks to politicise restructuring is that the
representation of globalisation in Britain is ‘naturalised’ so that the politics of
restructuring are nullified. The problem is presented as technical and open to
rational solutions, rather than as contestable. Contrary to the conspicuous
efforts to remove the politics from discourses of globalisation and flexibility, it
can be shown that the programmatic attempts to transform working practices
are contradictory, contingent and contested.
There is little doubt that Britain has become the embodiment of all that is
presumed to be flexible in a ‘global era’. The British Government itself adver-
tises Britain as ‘the most lightly regulated labour market of any leading
economy in the world’ (Blair, 1998: 1). The British media claims that Britain
offers the most competitive location for inward investment (The Sunday
Times, 8 July 2001). International organisations and institutions seize upon
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the British case as their example of flexibility par excellence (World Bank,
1995; OECD, 1994). Indeed, even academic commentators who are critical of
the British neo-liberal engagement with globalisation concur that ‘while the
belief is that the UK is running to catch up, it has actually got far ahead of the
game’ (Hirst and Thompson, 2000: 336). The image that is created is one of a
clear winner in a FDI ‘beauty contest’, where the major attraction is a
deregulated and flexible location with ‘no strings attached’ that is ‘as easy to
exit as to enter’ (Observer, 2 August 1998: 14). The significant question here,
before we can even begin to consider the consequences of British hyper-
flexibility, is how this representation of a deregulated and FDI-attracting
‘model’ has been made possible. Within this question, the first step is to
consider the central dynamics of the meanings that have been attributed to
globalisation in governing British state-society. A unique and particular set of
stories about the ‘global’ arena are told and retold to enable a programme of
hyperflexibility to be perpetuated.
The first significant face of the making of a ‘global Britain’ is, perhaps
paradoxically, one in which government (in the sense of legislative and
regulatory functions) is distanced from the structural dynamics of the wider
world economy:
The balance of risk in the world economy is shifting – with the slowdown
in demand in a number of countries, especially Asia … These are prob-
lems that can only be addressed together … Since 1996 the world semi-
conductor market has slumped … As a result, companies in this sector
have been closing and cutting back around the world. Fujitsu and Siemens
were two casualties of this change in world conditions. As they made
clear, world conditions, and those alone, caused these closures. It would
be totally dishonest to pretend Government can prevent such decisions. I
do not intend to do so. (Tony Blair, 1998: 1, Speech at Doxford Park,
Sunderland)
In this speech given in the wake of two high profile FDI ‘exits’ from the
northeast of England, the forces of global markets are presented as ‘squeezing’
state authority and closing down the space for governments to exercise ‘com-
mand over outcomes’ (Strange, 1996: 3). It is just one example of a pervasive
representation of globalisation as having ‘inevitable consequences’ that are
beyond authority and control. Globalisation is clearly presented as a process
whose origins are ‘out there’ and ‘bigger than us’ and beyond the control of
mere governments. In effect, FDI capital has become the embodiment of
globalisation in the British debate. Such a representation is laced with political
expediency – the construction of an external threat enabling politicians to
‘present their policy preferences as the more or less unavoidable consequence
of forces over which they can have little or no control’ (Moran and Wood,
1996: 140). As a result, highly political questions, such as the ease with which
inward investor firms are able to exit Britain (Watson and Hay, 1998), become
depoliticised through the exercise of constructing distance between global
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economy and national state-society. In effect, the governmentality of an
environment to attract FDI is positioned as a legitimate realm of political
intervention, while the withdrawal and closure of plants is positioned in the
‘other’ realm of the global economy.
The second face of the dominant British representation of globalisation is
one in which global forces are embraced and harnessed through the ‘rational’
and ‘sensible’ policy measures of deregulation (see Department for Inter-
national Development, 2000; Blair, 1998). Having located globalisation at a
safe distance, the process then becomes something that must be ‘responded to’
in appropriate ways. Globalisation is thus constructed both as a problem that
is out of governmental reach, and as a conundrum that is amenable to political
intervention: ‘My view is that the global market, in the end, is a good thing for
us … and the way to handle its consequences is to prepare and equip ourselves
for the future. Not to try and resist it or ward it off or say it shouldn’t exist’
(Tony Blair in BBC interview, cited in Coates, 2000: 262).
The representation of the global market as an external and ambiguous
threat/opportunity that must be ‘handled’ serves to discipline the range of
political responses to be discussed. The implication is that ‘resisting’ or ‘ward-
ing off ’ the consequences of globalisation is a futile act that looks nostalgically
into the past rather than bravely into the future:
This Government is firmly committed to embracing the changing nature
of the international reality as a condition of domestic success. We do not
want to cling to a Little England. We want to build a Global Britain. A
country which accepts globalisation as an opportunity to be seized, not a
threat to be resisted. (Robin Cook, 2001, Speech at the International
Institute of Strategic Studies)
The image of ‘building a global Britain’ that is attractive to foreign industrial
and financial capital is contrasted with one of ‘clinging to little England’. The
‘international reality’ is not open to question in this representation, but is
established as incontrovertible fact. The inherently political questions that are
engendered by ‘seizing globalisation’ are effectively sealed off from discussion
and contestation by the framing of the problem. The statement of what
globalisation ‘is’ explicitly warns against any social or political negotiation that
may delay the necessary response.
Finally, the British production of a flexible and deregulated labour market
in response to globalisation is canonised and celebrated in the language of
international institutions and organisations. The OECD, in its evaluation of
member countries’ restructuring programmes in labour and work, commends
Britain for ‘prominent structural policy reforms’, including cutting unemploy-
ment benefit, reducing employment protection and liberalising industrial
relations (1997, 9-10). The report concludes that ‘improved labour market
outcomes in the countries that have gone the furthest in implementing the
Jobs Strategy, including the United Kingdom … and deteriorating conditions
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in those that have not, is an indication that the strategy works’ (1997: 15).
There is notably less attention given in the report to the high drop-out rates
from education that are exhibited by precisely those countries that are
commended for their flexibility (1997: 22). Put simply the problems of an
‘inflexible’ labour market are defined in such a way that the negative effects of
deregulation can be masked. The British ‘model’ of deregulation and flexibility
runs seamlessly alongside the discourse of flexibility that is communicated by
the World Bank (1995), OECD (1994; 1997), and CEC (1993), so that ‘market
friendly’ programmes of restructuring are replicated (see Cammack, 2000). In
this sense we can see the British representation of globalisation and hyper-
flexibility as in a dialectical relationship with other transborder ‘packages’ of
neo-liberal ideas. Yet, if we open up this ‘package’ we can see that hyper-
flexibilisation is made possible through webs of distinctive historical and
social practices through which power is exercised. The problematisation of
British hyperflexibility begins with the identification of the uniqueness and
peculiarity of the practices that tend to enable it. It is not that British state-
society fails to exhibit contest over ‘what ought to be’ in the global restructur-
ing debate, but rather that this contest is masked by the specific represen-
tations of state, capital and labour in global social change.
Historical representations of British capitalism
It is notable that over recent years, despite the ascendancy of governmental
appeals to the building of a ‘new’ and ‘global’ Britain, there has been a simul-
taneous revival of attention to the histories of British capitalism. The Tom
Nairn and Perry Andersen ‘exceptionalism’ debates in New Left Review4 have
been revisited in contemporary discussion of the historical tensions between
financial capital and industrial capital in Britain (see Cox et al., 1997; Ingham,
1984; Hutton, 1995). The suggestion that is made by these literatures is that
Britain has historically oriented its political and productive practices towards
‘external’ capital and investment, while maintaining an ambivalence to the
‘internal’ regulation of capital and labour. For many of the national capital-
isms school this dualism in the history of British capitalism is used to rebut
claims to globalisation in favour of a world where national political economies
remain key (see Hirst and Thompson, 2000). However, the historical
representations of state, capital and labour in British state-society can be
interpreted precisely to problematise the separation of a ‘global’ from a
‘national’ sphere. Representations of what the ‘global’ means are distinctively
fashioned through debates in British state-society, drawing on historical
practices and understandings, and reinvigorating past tensions and contra-
dictions.
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State and market
British programmes of governmental representation and intervention have
rested upon the depiction of distinct and opposed realms of state and market.
In accounts of British ‘early start’ industrialisation the process is described as
‘market driven’ so that ‘by the end of the eighteenth century, government
policy was firmly committed to the supremacy of business’ (Lee, 1997: 210;
Hobsbawm, 1975: 68). The state is described as ‘permissive’ in its role of
safeguarding ‘private interests and the liberation of private energies’ (Gamble,
1994: 72-3). The webs of power surrounding and suffusing industrialisation
are revealed to produce the ‘individual’ as the central actor in social change.
The cotton industry appeared to require little in the way of state co-
ordination, enabling small-scale private entrepreneurs to ‘launch themselves’
into an international marketplace (Gerschenkron, 1962; Hobsbawm, 1975).
The cotton industry was launched, like a glider, by the pull of the colonial
trade to which it was attached … In terms of sales, the Industrial
Revolution can be described except for a few initial years in the 1780s as
the triumph of the export market over the home: by 1814 Britain exported
about four yards of cotton cloth for every three used at home, by 1850
thirteen for every eight. (Hobsbawm, 1975: 50)
The central actors in social change, as described here, are essentially
individual entrepreneurs operating in an overseas market. The industrial
revolution did not in some automatic and ‘natural’ sense produce the primacy
of these realms, but it has created the possibility for the market to be depicted
as an external sphere within which individuals privately engage in business.
The state is thus legitimated as an actor that stands apart from the market and
intervenes in order to ‘harness’ private initiative to the ‘pull’ of the inter-
national market. As Polanyi has it: ‘economic liberals must and will unhesi-
tatingly call for the intervention of the state in order to establish it (the market
system), and once established, to maintain it’ (1957: 149). This nineteenth
century liberal construction of the market as simultaneously external and
‘larger’ than the state, and also an ‘opportunity’ to be seized, has been revived
by contemporary British appeals to globalisation.
Finance and industry
The relative isolation of British financial capital from the process of industrial-
isation, its historical international orientation, and the short-term conception
of time governing finance-industry relations, are all oft-cited and broadly
acknowledged features of a peculiarly British capitalism (see Hall, 1986;
Hutton, 1995; Cox, 1986; Woolcock, 1996; Hirst and Thompson, 2000). In the
context of early industrialisation, Britain’s manufacturing industries were
financed privately from non-bank sources and, in particular, from accumu-
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lated profits. Financial expansion itself developed through individual private
investors and foreign capital, leading to what Arrighi terms ‘cosmopolitan
finance capitalism’ (1994: 162). The organised and universal banking system
characteristic of Germany, for example, did not feature in the development of
British industrial or financial capitalism (Arrighi, 1994: 163). Indeed, the City
of London had established itself as the world’s centre for commodity trade by
the late eighteenth century, and was relatively decoupled from industrial pro-
duction. As a commercial centre the practices of the City of London were
reproduced to serve the short-term needs of commercial activity, rather than the
longer horizons of indigenous production (Ingham, 1984). On the one hand, it
became possible for industry and finance to be defined and managed as distinct
and separate realms. Meanwhile, on the other hand, tensions and contradic-
tions continued to surround the dual character of Britain as the first industrial
economy and the world’s major commercial entrepot (Ingham, 1984: 6).5
Ultimately, the contradictions of industrial and financial capital in Britain
remain central unresolved tensions in contemporary debates. The building of
‘global Britain’ is a fragile and precarious exercise precisely because it rests
upon the maintenance of the industry-finance tension. The attraction of
financial capital to the City of London relies upon the maintenance of percep-
tions of Britain as a deregulated and open social space. As the Chairman of
Citibank reminds us ‘the Eurodollar market exists in London because people
believe that the British Government is not about to close it down. That’s the
basic reason and it took you a thousand years of history’ (cited in Ingham,
1984: 41). Just as London’s status as an ‘offshore’ centre relies on historical
perceptions, so the British governmental predilection for ‘shareholder
capitalism’ (Seccombe, 1999) rests upon perceptions of the City’s ability to
secure high short-term returns on investment. Industries are thus locked into
raising capital on the stock market with its emphasis on immediacy and
flexibility. As a result, it is widely argued, British industry is preoccupied with
financial soundness to the detriment of longer-term investment in skills and
innovation (Woolcock, 1996). Contemporary claims that Britain’s competi-
tive advantage lies in its ability to attract FDI with a deregulatory environment
can thus be seen as one manifestation of the concealed tensions between
industrial and financial capital. Since 1979, outflows of industrial investment
from Britain have consistently exceeded inflows (Economist Intelligence Unit,
1998), and redundancies in British-owned multinationals have far exceeded
job creation in inward investor firms (Coates, 1999).
Labour
The distancing of state from market in British state-society is evident also in
the historical understandings and practices that have shaped the role of labour
in social transformation. In many senses it is difficult to conceive of a system
of industrial relations in the British context because a ‘system’ has historically
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been avoided and constrained. Industrial relations have tended to be consti-
tuted through the everyday practices of work, and have generally not been
subject to state intervention or legal constraint. A web of power in which
workers have negotiated or contested their own individual contracts has, in
effect, become part of a British ‘common sense’ understanding of industrial
relations. In terms of organised labour, the early craft unions actively sought
to admit only those workers within the same occupation, and to exclude less-
skilled workers or the ‘labouring poor’ (Hobsbawm, 1964; Middlemas, 1979;
Gospel and Palmer, 1983). The excluded workers organised their interests in
more politically oriented general unions, representing workers from across
different industries. This divisive and internally competitive system established
the organisation of workers’ interests at a subsector craft level, and at a
transsector general level, but mitigated against the emergence of industrial
unions such as those characteristic of continental Europe (Visser, 1995; Fulcher,
1991; Heise, 1997). The combined effects of the historical organisation of
labour around the Trades Union Congress (TUC), a ‘loose confederation with
few sanctions’ (Hall, 1986), the internal competition between unions them-
selves, and the lack of state co-ordination of industry-wide bargaining, have
been to construct the workplace as the social space of industrial relations, and
the individual worker as responsible for their own working terms and
conditions.
[A] common way of ensuring labour discipline, which reflected the small-
scale, piecemeal process of industrialization in this early phase, was sub-
contract or the practice of making skilled workers the actual employers
of their unskilled helpers. In the cotton industry, for instance, about two-
thirds of the boys and one-third of the girls were thus ‘in the direct
employ of operatives’ and hence more closely watched. (Hobsbawm,
1962: 66–67)
The devolution of responsibility through supply chains and contract
labour is evident in this depiction of labour discipline in early British indus-
trialisation. I am not suggesting that contemporary discourse of deregulation
and labour flexibility simply follows from historical practices in a linear or
path-dependent fashion. The role of labour in an industrial political economy
has of course been highly contested and constantly challenged and redefined.
However, the location of responsibility for restructuring away from the state,
and into the lives of individual workers within individual firms does recall
historical divisions and fault lines. From this perspective the British pro-
grammes of restructuring have drawn upon a logic of ‘pro-competitive disen-
gagement’ (Vogel, 1996: 263), whereby individual entrepreneurs and individual
workers carry the personal risks of restructuring. The dominant stance of the
‘externally oriented’ British hegemonic state (Overbeek, 1990: 35), thus pro-
vides the language and assumptions necessary for the reproduction of the
problem of globalisation: ‘Even now, many in the UK … hark back, sometimes
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unconsciously, to the “golden period” of the British Industrial Revolution and
the years that followed, carrying in their minds lessons from the efforts of a
few brilliant entrepreneurs’ (Graham, 1997: 119).
It is possible to view the major themes in contemporary British restruc-
turing debates as drawing upon historical understandings of capitalist
organisation, contesting and rearticulating these past understandings in the
light of contemporary questions. The contemporary debates that define the
British programme of the restructuring of work continue to raise questions of
the conceptions of state, market, finance, industry and labour that were un-
resolved in past practices. The tensions and contradictions of historical prac-
tices can serve to reveal the politics that is so often obscured by the technical
and rational treatment of ‘strategy’ in the contemporary flexibility discourse.
The contemporary restructuring of working practices
The contemporary British debates about the restructuring of work reinvigor-
ate some of the nineteenth century representations of state, market, finance,
industry and labour. This is not to say that Britain has produced a form of
labour flexibility that is ‘natural’ given its historical practices, but that the
themes of individualisation, self-responsibility, the ‘distancing’ of state from
industry and society, and faith in the entrepreneur have re-emerged in new
forms with new tensions and contradictions. The implications are that Britain
has a unique ‘semantics of flexibility’ (Lemke, 2001: 203) that is produced,
contested or enabled through social practices and, therefore, cannot be offered
as an unproblematic model of globalisation management. I am not claiming
here to offer an exhaustive account of all of the policy debates and restructur-
ing patterns in contemporary Britain. The purpose of this analysis is to
explore key dimensions of the British restructuring programme, and to reveal
the tensions and contradictions in its making. As a result, this should be seen
as an exercise in politicisation, since in each instance the emphasis is on the
contested and difficult nature of transforming the working practices of every-
day life. The disturbances and tensions within the programme may be seen as
potential gaps or spaces for alternative tactics, where Latour’s ‘translation’ and
‘displacement’ of intended strategy takes place (1991: 105), and where the
‘movement back and forth’ of Scott’s (1990: 191) ‘infrapolitics’ may be seen.
‘Functional flexibility’, training and skills
Representations of ‘global Britain’ have positioned so-called ‘functional flexi-
bility’ centrally in the strategy of rapid response to global competition. As
defined by the Employment Department, functional flexibility means ‘having
a labour force that is able to carry out a wide range of tasks’ so that firms may
possess ‘adaptability in allocating labour between different parts of the
production process’ (Beatson, 1995: 1, 51). It is argued that the demarcated
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‘jobs’ that make up a production process, for example mechanical, electrical,
quality monitoring, cleaning or maintenance tasks, could become ‘rigidities’
that prevent firms from responding to shifts in markets. In this representation
‘a premium seems to be placed on speed of reaction: on rapid product change
and an ability to cut costs fast’ (Crouch and Streeck, 1997: 6), so that the
adaptability of firms becomes a key strategy. A central feature of task restruc-
turing, for example, has been the debate on ‘teamworking’ within HRM circles
(see Sengenberger, 1993). Working practices are reorganised into teams or
‘cells’ that become akin to individuals responsible for multiple tasks, and
managers are able to redeploy teams ‘flexibly’ in the production process. At its
root functional flexibility carries a discipline of ‘replaceability’ that streng-
thens employers’ ability to dispense with particular production roles, and
instils a pattern of self-management on workers.
While the discussion of how to create ‘multi-tasking’, ‘multi-skilling’ or
‘upskilling’ working practices has taken place transnationally (OECD, 1994;
International Labour Organisation (ILO), 2000), state-societies have framed
these questions differently and in the light of their existing and past practices.
For countries with relatively protected and high-cost labour, the ‘replace-
ability’ discipline is constrained and the questions have tended to be about the
skills and training of workers, often at a co-ordinated sectoral level (Culpepper
and Finegold, 1999). The British questions, by contrast, have been about how
to create a business-friendly functional flexibility in which, as the Employ-
ment Department defines it, employers have ‘no constraints on how they
organise work’ within the firm (Beatson, 1995: 135), and also have access to an
external pool of relatively unregulated agency or contract labour. Indeed, it is
predominantly at the level of the firm that the defining and contesting of
functional flexibility takes place in Britain. The absence of state institutions or
societal interests mediating between the state and the firm on questions of
training and skills (Lane, 1994; Rubery, 1993), including the absence of trade
union consultation, has reinforced a web of power that enables employers to
define a hyperflexible agenda, yet also mitigates against firm-level incentives to
invest in training for fear of ‘poaching’ by competitors.6 The result is that a low
skills ‘low road’ of labour cheapening (Esping-Andersen, 1996: 17) has found
easy purchase in the British debate, and functional flexibility has come to mean
‘flows’ of workers in and out of contracts, and in and out of different tasks.
The programme of functional flexibility in Britain exhibits tensions both
in terms of its own logic and representations, and in terms of its wider
implications for society. First, in terms of its own market rationality, the
interventions that have structured functional flexibility have produced a
‘fallout’ effect that could be understood as uncompetitive and ‘inflexible’. The
dissolution of skills and training provision that accompanies the rapid flow of
workers in and out of jobs/tasks/contracts has been identified as a central
problem for British firms. In effect, the emphasis on individual access to a
wider labour market of contingent labour has limited the scope for flexibility
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within the firm and led to talk of skills shortages in Britain (Marsden, 1995;
Rubery, 1999). The ad-hoc and management-led character of the programme,
coupled with the division of workers along skilled/unskilled and core/contract
lines, has arguably stifled consultation and innovation in the workforce,
producing a ‘low trust’ environment (Lane, 1997; Rubery, 1993: 11–12).7 The
in-built paradox here, even viewed from a neo-liberal or business perspective,
is that skills flexibility within the firm requires investment in training, which
in turn necessitates some level of state regulation or co-ordination of the
labour market.
Finally, in terms of a wider and more critical picture of social inequality
and exclusion, the British programme of functional flexibility has contributed
to a shifting of responsibility and risk on to individuals. In the face of
diminished collective provision, the responsibility for education, training and
personal security is attributed to the individual. Skills become an individual
possession to be traded in an open market, rather than the shared resources of
a society. UNDP statistics show that the UK has among the highest levels of
functional illiteracy in the OECD countries. The UK level of functional illiter-
acy is calculated at 21.8 per cent of all 16–65 year-olds, a level that compares to
20.7 per cent in the US, 14.4 per cent in Germany, 7.5 per cent in Sweden and
29.5 per cent in the Russian Federation (UNDP, 2000: 172). The blurring of
the boundaries between secure and contingent work has also resulted in a
gendered ‘functional flexibility’ that finds women providing contract services
for cleaning, catering and domestic functions (Anderson, 2000). Inside the
claim that competitiveness can be achieved via rapid response and adaptive
functions, there are tensions and questions that will continue to resurface in
the restructuring debate.
Working time and ‘non-standard’ employment
The debate surrounding the reorganisation of working time reveals a great
deal about the negotiated and contested nature of social change in the sphere
of work. For many commentators, the ‘speeding’ up of social change and the
temporal rhythms of everyday life have transformed working practices beyond
all recognition (see Rifkin, 1995). However, conceptions and experiences of
working time are highly contingent and contested, and the restructuring of
working time is a profoundly political exercise, and not an automatic techno-
logical reality. The restructuring of working time for maximum flexibility is
programmatically highly ambiguous. Consider, for example, the contingency
of meaning applied to flexible working time: the possibilities range from the
complete ownership and abuse of temporal experience by an employer, as in
bonded or slave labour, to the ‘family friendly’ flexibility that may be a desire
of working parents (Hewitt, 1993). At one extreme the sense of time is
governed entirely by the slave-master, while at the other the sense of time is
expressed by the worker in terms of the demands of their own experiences and
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everyday workplace and household lives. In this ambiguity there lies consider-
able space for social tensions and political contestation.
The British governmental making of ‘hyperflexibility’ asserts a duality of
strategies for the managerial defining of working time flexibility: the manage-
ment prerogative to liberalise the regulation of working time within the firm
itself, coupled with the freedom to access an external labour market of part-
time, fixed contract or agency workers to extend the possibilities of time
organisation. On the axis of time within the existing practices of the firm, the
emphasis is on the ability of employers to vary the hours worked by
employees. Prior to the incorporation into UK law of the 1994 EC Directive on
working time, approximately four million people worked more than the 48
hours per week set down in the Directive, a figure that represented one-quarter
of the full-time British workforce (European Industrial Relations Review
(EIRR) 275, 1996: 12). Successive Employment Acts of the 1980s and 1990s
had enshrined in law the prerogative of individual firms to govern working
time, leading the ILO to report that Britain had ‘made a concerted effort to
substantially deregulate working time’ (ILO, 1995). The Labour Government’s
1999 Employment Act does not reverse the deregulation of working time and
represents an effort to reinforce a system that has ‘minimal effects on
managerial prerogatives’ (Smith and Morton, 2001: 124). The maximum use
of the exceptions and derogations in the EC Directive by the British Govern-
ment allows the working time of 48 hours per weak to be spread into longer
periods of average hours, and permits exemptions in many areas.
On the axis of temporal flexibility via the euphemistic ‘non-standard’
employment contracts (they are rapidly becoming ‘standard’), the British pro-
gramme has made a virtue of the ascendancy of contingent working practices:
The UK exhibits a good deal of flexibility on the extensive margin, both
in terms of the prevalence and use made of part-time and self-employed
workers, and in the degree to which employers face constraints on their
ability to change employment levels. While UK employers may face greater
constraints on their behaviour than in the USA, these constraints and
regulations are liberal compared to other EU countries. (Beatson, 1995: 134)
This excerpt from a report published by the Employment Department
explicitly frames access to contingent labour in terms of competitiveness and
the attraction of FDI. The virtues of the expansion of contingent labour are
also expounded by arguments that Britain’s low levels of unemployment are,
in part, due to deregulation and the expansion of alternative and ‘more
imaginative’ forms of work (OECD, 1997). Yet again here the emphasis is on
the self-discipline of individuals who will accept disruptions to daily life in the
form of unpredictable working time, in exchange for the relative security of a
job. Indeed, the flexible labour represented by homeworkers linked by inform-
ation and communication technologies is even presented as empowering and
emancipatory (see CEC, 1997; Negroponte, 1995).
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When the programme of flexibilisation of working time is opened up to
reveal political and social practices, the picture that emerges is one of contra-
dictions and contests. At one level successive British Governments have been
engaged in a series of contests with the EU over the state’s authority to deter-
mine the level of regulation of working time. The central provisions of the EU
Working Time Directive regulate the working week to 48 hours, stipulate
minimum rest periods and set a minimum level of annual paid holiday.8 The
British Conservative Government challenged the Directive on the grounds that
it was introduced through the back door of qualified majority voting in the
area of health and safety. Following the failure of their challenge to the legal
basis of the Directive in the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the British
Government issued a consultation document to the effect that ‘implementa-
tion needs to be carefully tailored to the circumstances of British business so
as to minimise disruption and avoid undue burdens’ (cited in EIRR 276, 1997:
14). Tensions thus surround the defining of working time flexibility and the
authority of the state to maintain a deregulated environment. In a further
example of such tensions and contests, in June 2000 the High Court referred
to the ECJ the case brought against the British Government by the TUC. This
case was brought claiming the failure of the Government to fully implement
the EU Parental Leave Directive. Again, in this instance the Government had
sought to tailor the Directive to the demands of the market by limiting the
entitlement of 13 weeks unpaid parental leave to parents of children born on
or after 15 December 1999. While this dispute remains unresolved at the time
of writing, it is illustrative of the contests that surround the making of a
particular British hyperflexibility.
The contested nature of the restructuring of working time is evident also
in the public debate in Britain on ‘who benefits’ from temporal flexibility.
Despite the rhetoric of empowerment espoused in Labour’s White Paper ‘Fair-
ness at Work’ (Department of Trade and Industry, 1998), and the representa-
tion of Britain as the most flexible European location for business, in terms of
everyday social practices Britain could be said to be the most inflexible
working location in Europe. European surveys of worker views indicate that
Britain is the least ‘family friendly’ state-society in the EU, and that the term
flexibility is employer-defined in Britain (EIRR, 323, 2000: 14). The meaning
of flexibility of working time is thus revealed to be highly contingent and
politically constructed.
In the governmental framing of the restructuring of work we see the
blurring of the boundaries between ‘work’ and ‘no work’, or as Deakin and
Reed have it, a ‘substantial churning between unemployment and low-paid,
irregular and short-term work’ (2000: 143). The question of whether Britain
has been successful in reducing levels of unemployment, a claim that features
prominently in transnational debates on work, is thus reopened. Historically
low levels of unemployment in Britain (6.3 per cent on the ILO count in
1999), conceal a concentration of unemployment in ‘workless’ households.9 A
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fundamental tension in the British restructuring of work is the simultaneous
intensification of work and the denial of ‘the right to work flexibly’ for
workers (The Guardian, 29 June 2001), while exclusion from work clusters in
marginalised households. Questions are also exposed as to the nature of work
that is generated in a ‘low wage strategy’ and a deregulated temporal context.
A report funded by the Department for Education and Employment
estimates job creation at 1.5 million over the next 10 years, with 50 per cent of
these thought to be in the part-time service sector (cited in EIRR, 276, 1997:
14). The astounding growth of call-centres across Britain looks likely to form
a key element of this jobs growth, currently accounting for 33 per cent of all
call-centre work in Europe (IRS, 2000). The tensions and struggles that
surround and suffuse this form of job creation tend to be concealed in the
discourse on hyperflexibility. Two-thirds of call-centre workers are women,
and 27.5 per cent are on part-time or agency contracts. Workers in British
Telecom call-centres staged a one-day strike in November 1999 in protest
against a ‘culture of harassment and bullying’ (EIRR, 312, 2000: 13). In order
to circumvent the strike, British Telecom recruited temporary workers from
an employment agency for one day only. The meanings of working time flex-
ibility are thus displaced and contested, and have unpredictable or unintended
consequences.
Wage determination and collective bargaining
A highly visible sphere of the debate surrounding the reorganisation of work
has been the relationship between wage levels and the competitiveness of
firms. Within this debate, the neo-liberal assumption has been that wages are
most flexible and competitive where their determination is decentralised.
Different national models of wage determination are commonly contrasted in
policy documentation, and a competitive ‘benchmark’ established: ‘In most
countries where relative wages have been flexible (the US, Canada, UK,
Australia), both the relative employment and unemployment rates of the
unskilled changed little during the 1980s. In comparatively inflexible Europe,
on the other hand, both relative employment and unemployment rates
deteriorated’ (OECD, 1994: 11–12).
In the discourse of hyperflexibility the benchmark is Anglo-Saxon poli-
tical economies that have deregulated pay bargaining to the level of individual
firms. The British programme of restructuring has embraced the logic that
‘wage determination is best left to those economic agents most closely affected
by market conditions’ (Beatson, 1995: 70), and has become a key benchmark
in international policy literature (OECD, 1997). Successive legislative inter-
ventions have deregulated wage determination, removing mechanisms such as
wage councils, arbitration procedures and enabling the use of individualised
contracts of employment (see Table 3.1). Recent legislation by the Labour
Government in the form of the 1999 Employment Relations Act, though
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Table 3.1 Key legislative reforms of industrial relations in Britain, 1980–99
1980 Employment Act
• Restriction of the closed shop, picketing and secondary picketing.
• Removal of provisions for compulsory arbitration for union recognition.
• Reduction of unfair dismissal provisions; and maternity rights to reinstatement.
1982 Employment Act
• Restriction of lawful union action; removal of immunity of trade unions
against claims for damages in the case of an unlawful strike; restriction of
definition of trade dispute to make solidarity action, sympathy strikes, and
inter-union disputes unlawful.
• Further restrictions on closed shop (ballot required on existing closed shop
and 85 per cent majority vote needed for its lawful continuation).
1984 Trade Union Act
• Members of principal executive bodies of trade unions must be elected by
secret ballot every five years; unions lose immunity unless a secret ballot is
conducted and won before strike action.
1988 Employment Act
• Post-entry closed shop is made illegal and unenforceable; no strike seeking to
enforce post-entry closed shop is lawful.
• During a lawful strike, union members who cross the picket-line cannot be
disciplined.
• Extension of secret balloting in union elections.
1989 Employment Act
• Various provisions which extend labour market regulation to the small firm
sector are withdrawn; repeal of discriminatory provisions restricting hours of
work for women and young people above school age; abolition of Training
Commission – previously Manpower Services Commission – its functions being
taken over by the Department of Employment; unions no longer represented
on industrial training boards, which are downgraded to non-statutory status.
introducing statutory recognition procedures for trade unions, reinforces
company-level bargaining.
The themes of individualisation, self-responsibility and freedoms for the
entrepreneur are strong throughout the British debate on pay flexibility. Data
from the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (WIRS) demonstrates that
the percentage of workplaces with arrangements for collective bargaining fell
by one-half over a 14 year period, from 60 per cent in 1984, to 42 per cent in
1990, and 29 per cent in 1998 (Millward et al., 2000: 186). Over the same
period, profit-related pay increased from 19 per cent of all workplaces in 1984,
to 44 per cent in 1990, and 46 per cent in 1998 (Millward et al., 2000: 214). The
overall trend is toward a detachment of individuals from collective ties that
Amoore_Global_04_Ch3 6/19/02, 12:20 PM84
85Producing hyperflexibility: work in Britain
1990 Employment Act
• Abolition of all legal protection for the pre-entry closed shop; refusal of em-
ployment to non-union members made unlawful.
• Employers given greater freedom to dismiss workers taking part in unlawful
strike action; immunity removed for union officials, including shop stewards,
who organise support for persons dismissed for taking part in an unlawful
strike; all remaining forms of secondary action made unlawful.
1993 Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act
• Workers given right to join union of their choice; employers allowed to offer
workers financial inducements to leave the union.
• Employer must be given seven days warning in advance before official
industrial action; all pre-strike ballots must be postal and subject to
independent scrutiny; users of public services have right to seek an injunction
against unlawful strike action.
• Withdrawal of support for collective bargaining (removal of requirement for
Arbitration Commission to encourage collective bargaining).
• Removal of all remaining minimum wage fixing (abolition of Wage Councils).
• Requirement for employers to give written statement of terms and conditions
to full-time employees under regular contract; extension of jurisdiction of
industrial tribunals to cover breaches of employment contract; extension of
maternity leave for women and protection of pregnant women against unfair
dismissal; protection of workers victimised over health and safety at work
issues.
1999 Employment Relations Act
• Introduction of statutory trade union recognition and derecognition procedure.
• Clarification of existing legislation on industrial action and ballot procedures.
• Tribunal protection for workers dismissed due to lawful industrial action.
• Right to representation in disciplinary and grievance procedures.
• Parental leave and maternity provision amended.
Source: Compiled from Visser and Van Ruysseveldt (1996); Smith and Morton
(2001); Deakin and Reed (2000).
might inflate wages beyond market values, and a simultaneous attachment of
individuals expectations to the performance of the company. The focus of the
wage determination debate has been the terrain of the workplace itself and has
taken place in abstraction from discussion of working conditions. The
flexibility of pay in Britain has been positioned at the heart of the ‘competitive
labour market’ and is disciplined by the threat of job losses if demands
become unreasonable or inflationary.
The British representation of the problematic of pay flexibility, and the
interventions that are made in the light of the problem, harbour a number of
distinctive tensions and contradictions. In common with other aspects of the
restructuring of work debate, the inculcation of a culture of wage flexibility is
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contradictory both in its own market-centred terms, and in terms of tensions
within everyday social practices. First, the business-friendly logic of wage
hyperflexibility assumes that the ‘low-road’ of flexible and low-cost labour is
attractive to firms and likely to increase investment in Britain. The assumption
is that firms will be attracted by cheap labour and by an environment that
enables them to structure incentives and disincentives through pay and
rewards. Yet, the high-profile exit of inward investor firms from Britain, and
their continued presence in perceived ‘high-cost’ locations raises questions of
this assumption. In the wake of the announcement of closures by Ford in May
2000, and Motorola in April 2001, for example, trade unions have contested
the British ‘low cost’ route to competitiveness. In both instances production
from the British plants is to be transferred to German plants with higher
labour costs. The pay flexibility programme that is manifested in Britain is
highly controversial and contested and does not in any sense ‘resolve’ the
conundrum of managing globalisation.
Finally, the fetishisation of flexible pay arrangements in the British pro-
gramme of restructuring masks the divisions and inequalities that exist between
different workers and their experiences of pay and collective bargaining. While
the 1998 Minimum Wage Act and the ‘New Deal’ policy are presented in terms
of ‘tackling social exclusion’ (Blair, 2000b), they embody an individualised
discipline that reinforces social divisions (Gray, 1998). The minimum wage,
established in April 1999 at a rate of £3.60 an hour, is differentiated for
younger workers, with workers aged between 18 and 21 entitled to a minimum
of £3, while workers younger than 18 are exempt. The level set also includes
gratuities, affecting the wage levels of part-time and service-sector workers in
particular. Early analyses of the effects of the minimum wage suggest that many
employers continue to flout minimum wage legislation, while workers in
precarious employment remain silent for fear of dismissal (TUC, 2001). The
business-friendly exemptions that are built into the minimum wage tend to
intensify divisions between workers along the lines of age, sector and gender.
The New Deal programme has similar disciplinary features that, for example,
remove entitlement to benefits where an individual fails to satisfy their ‘welfare
to work’ contract (Krieger, 1999: 26). In sustaining the hyperflexibility pro-
gramme in wage determination, British state-society is creating a social fallout
that is simply shifted to other areas of welfare and social policy. At the time of
writing, the OECD’s most recent economic survey of the UK, while generally
looking favourably at the UK’s restructuring strategies, states that ‘employ-
ability remains wanting, as do work incentives for some at the fringes of the
labour market. Against this background, poverty, including among children, is
unacceptably high’ (OECD, 2000: 17). A subtext of the British programme of
restructuring sees the number of people on very low incomes, and the number
of children living in poverty increasing (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1999).
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Industrial relations
Within the hyperflexibility discourse, organised systems of industrial relations
are represented as ‘rigidities’ that impinge on the competitiveness of state-
societies and firms. In particular, organised trade unions are viewed as impedi-
ments to the flexible firm’s responsiveness to global markets – limiting the
scope for new working practices, driving up labour costs, disrupting pro-
duction with industrial action and restricting access to contingent and
contract labour. Thus, the neo-liberal assault on embedded systems of
industrial relations taking place through the 1980s and 1990s is often explained
as a necessary ‘outcome’ of the economic selectivity of globalisation (see
Freeman, 1994; Blank, 1994). While some commentators remind us that
transformations in industrial relations are highly political, exhibiting a strong
national institutional character (Boyer, 1995; Abraham and Houseman, 1993),
and representing an ongoing social creativity through contest and reaffirmation
(Crouch, 1993), the hyperflexibility programme seeks precisely to depoliticise.
Deunionisation is presented as a necessary process of depoliticisation and the
workplace is reconstructed as a site of economic efficiency and individual
responsibility.
The British programme of industrial relations restructuring has revived
historical understandings of the relationship between state, industry and
workers. British industrial relations institutions and practices historically
developed out of an unregulated, decentralised and individualised process of
social struggle at the workplace (see Lane, 1994). The regulation of bargaining,
employment rights and worker organisation emerged out of norms, tacit
understandings, customs and everyday workplace practices. Mechanisms of
consultation, co-operation and negotiation have been weak, built on conflict
lines and divisions that orientate to adversariality, both between management
and workers, and between worker groups themselves. Contemporary restruc-
turing has relied upon historical representations of voluntarist industrial
relations so that ‘a decade and a half of Thatcherism has only served to
reinforce the voluntary nature of British industrial relations. The company,
more so than before, now occupies centre stage’ (Visser and Van Ruysseveldt,
1996: 78). The right to strike, for example, has existed in Britain only in the
limited sense of immunity from damages claims, and this negative right has
been removed in subsequent legislation that abolishes immunity and sees a
‘return to private law’ (Brown et al., 1997).
Trends in the governmentality of industrial relations in Britain between
1979 and 1999 demonstrate that, with the exception of the implementation of
EU Directives, the emphasis has been on restricting the influence of trade
unions and devolving industrial relations to the level of the individual –
recasting industrial relations as ‘employee relations’ (see Table 3.1). The trans-
formation of rules governing industrial relations practices, and the use of
complex disciplinary interventions on industrial action procedure, has been
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understood as the ‘end of institutional industrial relations’ in Britain (Purcell,
1993; Bassett, 1986), and the rise of ‘new’ workplace employment relations
(Ackers et al., 1996). The series data derived from the WIRS reveals that trade
union recognition in British workplaces has fallen from 64 per cent of all
workplaces in 1980 to 42 per cent in 1998 (Millward et al., 2000: 96). In the
private sector the last available figures (1998) are 29 per cent of all workplaces
in manufacturing and extraction, and 23 per cent of all workplaces in private
services. Alongside the process of union derecognition, the growth of single-
union and no-union deals in new ‘greenfield’ production sites has exacerbated
the trend to decentralised representation (Millward, 1992). There has been
little evidence of a co-ordinated trade union response to the individualisation
of industrial relations; indeed the debate has tended to occupy space that is
managerially defined and fused with human resources discourse.
A central question for contemporary analysis of the restructuring of
industrial relations in Britain is whether the election of a Labour Government
in 1997 has reversed the trend towards the individualisation of industrial
relations. The overwhelming finding seems to be that the Labour Government
has reinscribed the individualisation dynamic with ‘global’ overtones (see Hay,
1999; Coates and Hay, 2000), and that given their ‘enthusiastic adoption’ it is
‘inappropriate to continue to attach the label of “Conservative” to this legisa-
tion’ (Smith and Morton, 2001: 121). In terms of assessing the means by which
the programme of restructuring is exercised, however, it is perhaps misleading
to focus wholly on who is wielding the power to promote change. The
legislative offensive on industrial relations in Britain cannot be viewed simply
as the wielding of power by government and capital, and the disempowering
of unions. Following a Foucauldian perspective on the productive capacity of
power, it is important to recognise that the proclaimed ‘death of industrial
relations’ is actually a reconstitution of industrial relations, with new tensions
and contradictions produced and reproduced. In later chapters I will explore
the dynamics of contest and collaboration that continue to make the workplace
a political site: here I will confine myself to a brief comment on patterns of
tension and contradiction in the British programme of restructuring itself.
The British programmatic interventions in industrial relations have relied
on the representation of politics as the ‘problem’ that gets in the way of global
competitiveness. Yet the manifest diminution of union influence has not
squeezed out the political space for contest and dissent. There is little evidence
to support the deregulationists’ assumption that deunionisation creates a
more peaceful and stable mode of industrial relations (see Table 3.2).
In terms of institutionalised industrial relations the numbers of workers
involved in industrial action have declined at similar rates in neo-liberal and
corporatist state-societies, with the Anglo-Saxon countries demonstrating no
particular tendency to a benign industrial relations climate. If we look to less
formalised modes of industrial dispute and dissent, British restructuring
appears to be accompanied by ad-hoc expressions of discontent, with the
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Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service receiving record levels of
enquiries in 1998 (EIRR 305, 1999), and a TUC ‘hotline’ receiving devastating
numbers of calls from call-centre workers with grievances (EIRR 328, 2000).
The decentralisation of industrial relations to the level of the workplace has
enabled firms to restructure rapidly and without consultation with workers.
As the general secretary of the TUC, John Monks, stated in response to the
Labour Government’s 1999 Employment Relations Act: ‘there is going to be a
lot of fencing going on between unions and employers at the moment’ (The
Financial Times, 6 June 2000: 14). Meanwhile, there is scope for employers to
contest statutory union recognition, and it has been suggested that this will
spawn a new breed of consultants advising on anti-union corporate strategy
(Smith and Morton, 2001: 133).
In sum, the British programme of hyperflexibility has structured a ‘fast
but fragile’ approach to restructuring. Transformations in working practices
are represented as inevitable responses to outside pressures, and the interven-
tions made are not negotiated in any formal sense. Paradoxically, the reliance
on legislative power and the failure to discuss or debate restructuring in a
wider social forum has made the programme fragile in the sense that it is
brittle and ‘inelastic’ (ILO, 1999a). Indeed, in response to a perceived lack of
communication channels, some German companies with plants in Britain
have developed employee representation arrangements to enable consultation
with worker groups.10 The current vogue for ‘corporate social responsibility’,
fuelled in part by the publicity surrounding the anti-globalisation protests,
reveals that firms are aware that they take social (or more accurately
shareholder) risks in publicly excluding workers from restructuring decisions.
While the corporate social responsibility debate may be a ‘smokescreen to
avoid statutory legislation’ (David Coats of TUC, cited in The Observer, 8 July
2001), it is intriguing to reflect on why firms may consider this smokescreen
necessary. The high public profile of issues such as the use of child labour in
the supply chains of MNCs has led firms to consider the management of social
Table 3.2 Workers involved in strikes and lockouts (thousands)
1980 1990 1995
Australia 1173 730 344
Canada 1441 270 124
Germany 8451 257 183
New Zealand 1128 144 131
Sweden 1747 173 125
United Kingdom 1834 298 174
United States 1795 185 192
Source: Compiled from ILO World Labour Report, 1997–98.
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and ethical risks, and trade unions to organise to expose such practices.11 The
decentralisation of industrial relations to the level of firms has paradoxically
blurred the boundaries between industrial relations and wider social debates
about work and labour, and raised some opportunities for organised labour to
engage with these wider debates (Hyman, 1999b).
Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that the British programme of restructuring has
drawn upon distinctive representations of the roles of state, industry, em-
ployer, manager, worker and labour organisation, in order to normalise and
depoliticise hyperflexibility. In a unique framing of the problem, globalisation
is represented as dwelling above and beyond the realms of politics and society,
safely lodged in a space that is removed from discussion and debate. At the
same time, a discourse of ‘harnessing’ globalisation is constructed, on the basis
of which interventions are made to individualise the risks and responsibilities
of work and working life. Far from being a universal global ‘benchmark’ of
neo-liberalism, the British programme rests upon past practices and per-
ceptions of ‘what ought to be’ that are contested through complex webs of
power. At the level of national debates the restructuring of work is politically
and socially contingent. It cannot be understood as driven in a linear direction
by exogenous forces, nor as a project defined by a coherent and identifiable
global elite. In the archetypal neo-liberal setting of what is often described as
Anglo-Saxon capitalism, the flexibility discourse is enabled by social power
relations that are unique, shifting and contingent. We thus see a distinctive
‘making’ of flexibility along three central dimensions.
First, the terms that are used to define the problematic are distinctive –
giving rise to a particular set of questions that remain essentially open to
contest and dispute. The terms of debate in Britain have tended to surround
the making of a location that is attractive to external financial and industrial
capital. Within these terms, labour is represented as a contingent commodity,
disciplined into the restructuring of working practices under the threat of
failure to attract and maintain the FDI firms that provide employment. It is
not simply the case that institutionalised forms of industrial relations are
removed from the equation, but rather that a particular form of individualised
relationship between employer and employee is enabled and reproduced over
time. In essence, it is not that globalisation automatically depoliticises and
codifies the workplace through restructuring imperatives, but that the global-
isation debate is given a particular meaning, and that meaning legitimates
deregulatory interventions.
Second, the programme of restructuring occupies a distinctive social
arena in British state-society – with the workplace constituted as the central
terrain of change. The risks and responsibilities of individuals are defined in
the workplace, a domain that is carefully constructed as ‘non-state’, depoliticising
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the restructuring of working practices, making them ‘corporate’ and, there-
fore, ‘essential’ to competitiveness. The paradox is that the exercise of power in
the workplace, expressed as creating a ‘benign’ industrial relations climate, has
structured the kind of insecurity that makes the workplace a space of
‘footdragging’ resistance and infrapolitics, something that will be explored
more fully in chapters 5 and 6.
Finally, the conception of time underlying the British debate is distinctive
and reveals the making of a particular representation of globalisation. The
hyperflexibility discourse is overwhelmingly constructed in terms of speed
and flexibility of response to changes in global markets, and to the demands of
consumers. In the opening paragraph of this chapter I cited Tony Blair’s Davos
speech in which he states that ‘the key to the management of change is reform.
The pace of reform has to match the pace of change’. The way that global
change is constructed thus legitimates a particular style of reform, disciplined
by the caveat that ‘those that move too slowly will fall behind’. The making of a
particular set of meanings of globalisation has enabled a programme of inter-
ventions to create an ‘optimally flexible’ labour market and concomitant
‘optimally flexible’ working practices. The economic expediency and rationality
that is imputed to such interventions effectively attempts to close off restruc-
turing from wider social discussion or debate, or to manage this through
exercises in corporate social responsibility. It is this ‘closing off ’ that paradoxi-
cally renders hyperflexibility fragile, and offers space for the framing of
resistance or the consideration of alternatives. The vulnerability of the ‘fast but
fragile’ programme has been manifested, for example, in a skills shortage and
productivity problem (OECD, 2000), and in the high-profile exit of inward
investor firms. These questions have been debated publicly, with attention
drawn to the slippery nature of a deregulated and low-cost location from
which firms can make a rapid exit. The creation of a shareholder society in
Britain has served to legitimate much of the ‘fast’ discipline because it is
perceived to be necessary to ensure returns on investment. Yet, the exclusion of
the vast majority of people from this society, and their subjection to the
dictates of shareholder short-termism, exposes a fragility that does contain
spaces for struggle, and the politics of dissent and disaffection.
Notes
1 Hyperflexibility implies a discourse of flexibility that embodies a sense of rapidity and
immediacy of response in social practices. In effect, this is the sense implied by most
international economic institutions and by those state-societies that have embarked
on a programme of what Cox has termed ‘hyperliberalism’ (1991/1996: 199).
2 Robert Cox argues that: ‘Today, state and civil society are so interpentrated that the
concepts have become almost purely analytical (referring to difficult-to-define aspects
of a complex reality) and are only vaguely and imprecisely indicative of distinct
spheres of activity’ (1981/1996: 86). His use of ‘state-society complex’ captures this
interpenetration and suggests that analyses of differences and contradictions in state-
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societies can serve to open up the ‘actions’ that are so often ascribed to unitary states.
3 Examples of the use of ‘governmentality’ to understand neo-liberal policy programmes
are abundant. Among the most prominent, see Lemke (2001), and Miller and Rose
(1990). See also Foucault (1982) and Simons (1995).
4 For contemporary discussion of the British exceptionalism debate, see Nairn (1993)
and Anderson (1991).
5 Interventions designed to reconcile the interests of industrial and financial capital have
been made throughout the history of British capitalism (see Langley, 2002).
6 From 1964, the establishment of industrial training boards in Britain structured a
clear framework of institutionalised incentives and disincentives within which the
firm made its training investment decisions. State involvement in the form of levies
raised as a percentage of payroll saw penalties put in place for firms who failed to
develop effective training programmes, and structured rewards and incentives for
firms who undertook quality training in the workplace. In the 1989 Employment Act,
the demise of the industrial training boards was accelerated through the abolition of
union representation on the boards, and the downgrading to non-statutory status.
7 The practice of teamworking, for example, while a long-established method of maxi-
mising skills utilisation and ‘humanising’ work in Germany, has become a management-
defined method of weakening the boundaries between occupations in Britain (Ackers
et al., 1996).
8 It has been suggested that European labour law reflects, and is inspired by, national
experiences of labour legislation. The EU Directive clearly follows a continental
European approach to the regulation of working time and is in conflict with Anglo-
Saxon liberal flexibility (Bercusson, 1997).
9 Deakin and Reed (2000) report that in 1998, 18 per cent of working-age households
had no adult in work, a total of 3.15 million households. This figure compares with 8.3
per cent or 1.2 million households in 1979.
10 Insights gained from interviews with British components plants owned by German
multinationals, July 1998 and October 1998.
11 Insights from interview with union officials from the AEEU, March 2001.
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
Producing flexi-corporatism:
the restructuring of work in Germany

We support a market economy, not a market society …
Modern social democrats want to transform the safety net of entitlements
into a springboard to personal responsibility…
Part-time work and low-paid work are better than no work…
(Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder, 1999: 1–7)
The positioning of German state-society within the globalisation andrestructuring debates is, in itself, highly contested between competing
voices and claims. In a neo-liberal reading, evident across international econ-
omic institutions, academic analysis and media commentary, the ‘low cost –
low regulation’ Anglo-Saxon programme is positioned as ‘outcompeting’ the
‘high cost – high regulation’ German social market (see OECD, 2001; Giersch
et al., 1992; The Economist, 8 July 2000). Some more critical social science
commentaries have, perhaps inadvertently, reinforced the image of neo-liberal
triumph by observing the dominance of a UK–US nexus of hyperliberal
restructuring (Gill, 1995a; Van der Pijl, 1984), or by arguing that globalisation
demands reforms from social democratic state-societies (Giddens, 1998).
Gerhard Schröder’s apparent embracing of the individualism and ‘workfare’
(Jessop, 1994) strategy of Blair’s ‘Third Way’ in his ‘Neue Mitte’ concept may
be read as indicative of an acceptance of the necessary restructuring
imperatives of a global economy.
Yet, when we explore the debate taking place within and outside German
state-society it becomes clear that the representation of Germany as a rigid
and inflexible political economy in need of radical restructuring is by no
means uncontested. An effective counter to neo-liberal claims is presented by
those who emphasise the ‘beneficial constraints’ of close relationships between
state, industry, finance and labour in ‘Rhineland Capitalism’ (see Albert, 1993;
Streeck, 1992a; Soskice, 1996; Coates, 2000; Hutton, 1995). In this represen-
tation of Germany in a global era, the ‘inflexibilities’ and ‘inefficiencies’ of
German capitalism are read as the resources of high innovation and high
quality-based competitiveness. Put simply, perceptions of Germany in relation
to globalisation, both inside and outside the state-society, are contradictory
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and contested. The media, for example, simultaneously proclaim that ‘Tomorrow
belongs to Germany’, and that ‘Germany is stalling’ (The Sunday Times and
Evening Standard, cited in Marsh, 2000: 76). Indeed, the images of Germany as
inflexible ‘laggard’ and innovative ‘leader’ have even shared the same headline:
‘The Sick Man of Europe Dances a Jig’ (The Guardian, 12 August 1998: 15).
What are we to make of the competing images of ‘Modell Deutschland’1
within the globalisation debate?
In this chapter I argue that ‘Modell Deutschland’ is being made and remade
in contemporary times, constrained and informed by a range of historical
institutions and practices, and exhibiting significant tensions and contra-
dictions. As in the previous chapter on the making of a British programme of
hyperflexibility, the emphasis here is on how it has been possible to represent
Germany in particular ways within a debate on globalisation. The first section
explores the multiple facets of ‘Modell Deutschland’ to reveal the competing
meanings of globalisation that are constituted. The argument problematises
the dominant modes of thought that see Germany either as ‘squeezed’ by
global forces on to convergent neo-liberal lines, or as directly opposing neo-
liberal restructuring, hence always either neo-liberal or non-neo-liberal. I
then go on to explore the historical institutions and practices of state, capital
and labour in Germany that have made possible particular contemporary
programmes of restructuring. Finally, I discuss the contemporary restructur-
ing of working practices in Germany, demonstrating the negotiated and
mediated nature of reforms.
‘Modell Deutschland’ in the globalisation debate
In chapter 3 I argued that so-called ‘models’ of national capitalism are less
coherent and more contradictory than they are commonly presented. In short,
a ‘model’ of capitalism is imagined, produced and reproduced over time,
enabling certain claims to be made about the nature of social reality, while
impeding others. Drawing on a number of studies using Foucault’s concept of
‘governmentality’, it was argued that governmental interventions (in our
terms, programmes of restructuring) rely and rest upon the making of specific
representations of a social problematic.2 The representation of a ‘Modell
Deutschland’, or a German model of capitalism, has been a particularly
significant feature of the debates, both within Germany and from without, on
what interventions are necessary in an era of globalisation. What is interesting
about the ‘Modell’ is that it is not a singular, unitary or coherent entity at all,
but a contingent metaphor that is made in different ways, drawing on a range
of historical sources and points of reference. Given the competing repre-
sentations of the Germany-globalisation relationship, the interventions that
are discussed, proposed and implemented do not follow the deterministic
logic of a global imperative of flexibility. Rather, they are paradoxical, convo-
luted and highly contradictory, displaying some affinity with hyperflexibility,
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yet also much that is anathema to that deregulatory and individualist schema.
In the contemporary remaking of Modell Deutschland, a central role has
been played by the neo-liberal discourse that calls the institutions and prac-
tices of German capitalism into question. At the heart of the neo-liberal
challenge is an appeal to the flexibility and speed of response required by
globalisation, and to the rigidity and sluggishness of state-societies that seek to
protect their welfare and labour market institutions. In the realms of produc-
tion and work, embedded social institutions and practices become synonymous
with structural rigidities that undermine the potential competitiveness of the
labour market through disincentives to work and constraints on business
management: ‘Policies and systems have made economies rigid and stalled the
ability and even willingness to adapt. To realise the new potential gains, societies
and economies must respond rapidly to new imperatives and move towards
the future opportunities. To many, the change is wrenching’ (OECD, 1996).
The German strategy of ‘diversified quality production’ (Streeck, 1992a),
lauded for its success in the 1980s and early 1990s, has had its sustainability
questioned in the light of globalisation (see Streeck, 1997a; Zumwinkle, 1995).
Commentators point to a number of factors to illustrate the incompatability
of German capitalism with what they see as the ‘global reality’. The lynchpin of
the claims is that an inflexible labour market, combined with high production
and labour costs, has made Germany uncompetitive. Commentators cite the
high costs of German labour as the key explanation for the loss of the attrac-
tiveness of ‘Standort Deutschland’ (Germany as economic location).3 A kind
of ‘Lexus effect’4 is depicted, whereby German firms are under pressure to
sustain their high-quality manufacturing in a context where they are making
high cost social contributions in wages and taxes, and their competitors are
closing the gap. In this context, much of the ‘Standort’ debate has focused on
the exit of German companies to overseas production sites, with concern that
high value-added manufacturing, such as the production of the BMW Z3 and
Mercedes four-wheel drive vehicles, is moving to lower cost sites (Hancké,
1997; Gesamtmetall, 1997). With the unemployment rate at 8.3 per cent in
1999 (OECD, 2001), the neo-liberal case is bolstered by the argument that
restructuring is required to loosen labour market constraints, reduce the
employer cost burden and increase rates of employment.
Looking at the German programme of restructuring it is possible to find
evidence that the neo-liberal logic of flexibility, drawing on the representation
of the global conundrum I have outlined above, has taken hold. Following the
election victory in September 1998, Gerhard Schröder appeared to embrace
the market-friendly discourse of Tony Blair’s ‘Third Way’. Blair and Schröder’s
joint-authored statement appears as a direct manifesto for deregulatory
reforms, in which globalisation is cast as an ‘inescapable process’ (Felhölter
and Noppe, 2000: 241). Much of the text can be read as a direct challenge to
prevailing German institutions and practices, pledging to ‘accommodate the
growing demands for flexibility’ and to ‘encourage employers to offer “entry”
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jobs to the labour market by lowering the burden of tax and social security
contributions on low-paid jobs’ (Blair and Schröder, 1999: 7). The ‘Zukunfts-
programm 2000’ (Programme for the Future, 2000), and the ‘Steuerreform
2000’ (Tax reform 2000), do indeed appear to grasp some of the neo-liberal
nettles, including a lowering of corporate and income tax rates from 2001 and
a reform of ‘pay as you go’ pensions. Yet, the restructuring programme has
been labelled ‘disappointing’ by the OECD (2001), ‘insufficient’ by the IMF
(1999) and ‘still too rigid and expensive’ by The Economist (2000: 17). Presum-
ably this lukewarm reception by the advocates of hyperflexibility indicates that
we should exercise caution in claiming that Germany has embraced the deregu-
latory agenda. There is another story to be told in the Germany-globalisation
problematic, one that suggests that ‘Neue Mitte’ and ‘Third Way’ take on
particular institutional forms and meanings in their different contexts.
It is possible, however, to shed a different light on both the representations
of German competitiveness, and the interventions made on the basis of these
representations. In contrast to figures on unemployment and labour costs
marshalled to urge neo-liberal interventions, figures can indicate that the
German economy grew by 3 per cent in 2000, the strongest rate since 1992
(OECD, 2001); unemployment rates are falling (OECD, 2001); inflation is low
(Harding and Paterson, 2000); Germany has become a role model in venture
capital (Harding and Paterson, 2000); and the high pound has seen unit
labour costs per unit of output fall to around 16 per cent  below the level of
those in the UK (Marsh, 2000). The merger of Daimler and Chrysler, the
prominence of Deutsche Bank in the City of London, and the acquisitions of
Bentley, Rolls Royce and Rover cast some doubt on the representations of lost
German competitiveness on which hyperflexible interventions rely. In terms
of the apparent ‘Third Way’ discourse adopted by Schröder, this has sub-
sequently been put at a distance, not least because it was contested by organised
labour, a group that have effectively been ‘integrated’ into the restructuring
process (Ryner and Schulten, 2002: 1). ‘Schröder is no Tony Blair, no third
way-ist, and he almost certainly regrets bringing out with Blair the policy
document on Social Democrat party modernisation’ (Marsh, 2000: 75).
Not only has the German political programme sought to distance itself
from UK-US-style hyperflexibility, but it has also debated the social effects of
radical restructuring. The hostile takeover of Mannesman by Vodafone
AirTouch provoked what was described as ‘a heated debate about globalisation
and Anglo-Saxon corporate aggression’ (Die Zeit, 19 November 1999: 3). These
alternative depictions of the German debate of globalisation and restructuring
suggest that we are not witnessing the linear history of a convergence around
principles of hyperflexibility. As Ryner and Schulten have it, ‘the “hard neo-
liberal line” could not prevail in any West-European country, except the
United Kingdom’ (2002: 12). While it is clear that Germany is engaged in a
programme of restructuring, the conundrum of transforming the labour
market and working practices takes on a unique form. In the context of social
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institutions and practices that have precisely sought to ‘embed’ the economy
in society, the making of a neo-liberal discourse that ‘renders the social
domain economic’ (Lemke, 2001: 203) is problematic. A central distinction
between the British programme of hyperflexibility and the German restruc-
turing programme is that a debate is actually taking place in Germany, among
competing groups across state, finance, industry and labour, leading some to
conclude that we are seeing the emergence of a ‘competitive corporatism’
(Rhodes, 1997) or a ‘regulated flexibility’ (Fuchs and Schettkat, 2000: 211).
Thus, we see a number of competing meanings attributed to globalisation,
and a negotiation and contestation of these meanings across state-society in a
kind of ‘flexi-corporatism’. A caveat to this apparent negotiation of globalisa-
tion and restructuring is that this debate is inclusive only in the sense that it
includes core workers in a highly protected labour market. For the increasing
numbers of people excluded from the core labour market in Germany, this is a
debate that is closed to them and is unlikely to reflect their experiences.
Historical representations of the social market
Both the proponents and the critics of the so-called German ‘model’ of capital-
ism tend to make appeals to the historical development of the institutions and
practices of the German ‘social market’ political economy. For the proponents,
the embedded structures of concerted investment and co-determination make
for a ‘social infrastructure highly supportive of industry’ (Lane, 1994: 174).
Viewed in this light, Polanyi’s ‘fictitious commodities’ of land, labour and
money are actively embedded in a range of social institutions that ameliorate
the effects of commodification (see Glasman, 1996). For the critics, the
historical legacy of German social institutions has made the economy sclerotic
and inflexible (see Giersch, 1985). In this neo-liberal reading restructuring is
designed precisely to transform past institutions and practices and to render
them more compatible with the needs of an increasingly competitive global
market. Thus, whether proponent or critic, social democrat or neo-liberal, the
historical representations of social order, and their reflection in prevailing
institutions, have framed the terms of contemporary debate in Germany.
Global restructuring has been debated in terms that are drawn from Ordo-
liberal conceptions of a social market economy, so that even neo-liberal-style
deregulatory strategies have been pursued in a manner that seeks to reconcile
them with prevailing practices.
State and market
Much of the contemporary German programme of restructuring has rested
upon a discourse of reconciliation between the pressures of globalisation and
state-societal visions of a stable and negotiated order. Such a discursive
management of the potential antagonisms of restructuring, in turn, draws on
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a framing of the state-market relationship that, in contrast to the British dis-
tancing of the state realm from a market realm of self-responsible individuals,
sees a mutually constitutive relationship between state and market. The
intellectual tradition of Ordo-liberalism that is credited with the building of a
post-war ‘Soziale Marktwirtschaft’ (social market economy), provides a set of
concepts and understandings that can be invoked to bring the market into the
realm of political intervention and social dialogue.5 Writing from the time of
the crises of the 1930s, the Ordo-liberals sought to critique laissez-faire
liberalism, arguing that a social market economy required protective social
institutions to be created and sustained through state intervention (see Röpke,
1942; Eucken, 1949):
Unlike this negative conception of the state typical of liberal theory in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in the Ordo-liberal view, the
market mechanism and the impact of competition can arise only if they
are produced by the practice of government. The Ordo-liberals believe
that the state and the market economy are not juxtaposed but that the
one mutually presumes the existence of the other. (Lemke, 2001: 193)
This conception of a state-market relation that reconciles social needs and
values to the dictates of the market is a recurring theme throughout German
social history, and is reinvigorated in contemporary debates on the possibili-
ties and limits of restructuring. The Christian Democratic Catholic philoso-
phies pervading the German experience of late nineteenth-century ‘catch-up’
industrialisation provided a defence of the principles of subsidiarity and co-
ordination governing the relations between state, capital, industry, labour and
family (Gerschenkron, 1962; Weiss, 1998). As Maurice Glasman has it:
… a set of institutional practices embedded in daily working and reli-
gious life provided the ethical orientation which organised West German
reconstruction. These were carried within the labour movement, Church
and locality. No-one ‘designed’ post-war Germany, it was hewn out of
more durable and sophisticated moral and ethical materials than those
provided by economic theory or any other social science methodology.
(Glasman, 1996: 55)
The durability of the social market economy conception lies in its
capacity to be reinvented and reinscribed with new meanings in particular
historical periods. In contemporary representations of the state and the global
market, the social market is inscribed with a capacity to buffer the damaging
features of globalisation. By way of example, in a BBC interview with the
President of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, and German Development
Minister, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, the question of the relationship
between society and globalisation was discussed and debated (BBC, 2000).
Wieczorek-Zeul disagrees with the interviewer’s suggestion that societies
should be advised that ‘globalisation is happening, here, get used to it’:
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Globalisation should not become a situation in which the market
economy decides everything in democracy, and social and ecological
roles go down the river … within globalisation you have rules, you have
social rules … we have a globalisation of markets, we have a globalisation
of economy, of trade and what we also have, to a certain extent but have
to develop further, is a globalisation of solidarity, a globalisation of
values. (Wieczorek-Zeul, cited in BBC News, 2000: 2)
This debate depicted the tensions between neo-liberal conceptions of
globalisation as an exogenous force that is ‘larger than us’, dictating terms to
states and societies, and conceptions that render globalisation amenable to
reconciliation with social values. I am not suggesting that the German concep-
tions of state and market are necessarily preferable to, or ‘friendlier’ than
British conceptions, but that the differences are significant in that they reveal
the political and social making of globalisation.
Finance and industry
The assertion of a close interrelationship between financial and industrial
capital lies at the heart of explanations of the durability of German capitalism
(see Hall, 1986; Hutton, 1994; Albert, 1993). Germany’s rapid and late indus-
trialisation is cited as the central driving force of bank-based ‘state (monopoly)
capitalism’ (Gerschenkron, 1962; Arrighi, 1994: 163). While Britain’s early
industrialisation through textiles required relatively limited injections of
capital, feeding a culture of individual entrepreneurship, and resulting in an
‘industry-finance gap’ (Coates, 2000: 67), Germany’s industrialisation through
heavy industries required the concerted harnessing of capital, framing an
‘enabling’ role for the state in structuring bank-industry relations. The capital
requirements of indigenous industries – investments in production and
materials, technologies, education and training – were legitimated as domains
for state intervention (Hobsbawm, 1975: 41-45). During the period of post-
war reconstruction, the tripartite relationships between state, banks and indus-
tries were revisited, with banks reinforced as the key providers of capital for
industry and, indeed, given a function in the everyday decision-making of firms.
In contrast to the British making of the stock market as the legitimate
source of industrial finance, the German financial system is historically
founded on the principle of debt finance by banks (Woolcock, 1996: 183). It is
through the lens provided by bank-oriented finance that contemporary
questions of global finance are interpreted and framed. German banks have
historically had a position on the supervisory boards of the firms in which
they hold shares, also exercising proxy votes for shareholders who lodge their
shares with the bank. As a result, it is often argued that German banks have
competencies in industrial matters, playing legitimate roles in distributing
regional development funds to firms, and holding knowledge resources for the
benefit of clients (see Hutton, 1994; Albert, 1993), fostering a medium to long-
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term horizon in corporate strategies. When this industry-finance link is
broken, as in Deutsche Bank’s decision to sell its large stake in Deutsche
Telekom in August 2001, the result is often fierce criticism and debate over the
traditional role of German banks in holding shares and ‘talking up’ their
corporate partners. The tensions between the short-term decisions fostered by
the principle of shareholder value, and the consultative and longer-term
dynamics of bank-based capital, have thus become central to German debates
on the restructuring of bank-industry relations. As Michel Albert has it: ‘… in
the Rhine model, the “golden boys” and their breathless exploits on the floor
of the Stock Exchange are conspicuously absent. Banks, not stock markets, are
the principal guardians of the capitalist flame in Germany’ (1993: 106).
The primacy of bank-based finance, and the absence of the ‘golden boys’
has been challenged in contemporary debates surrounding ‘Finanzplatz Deut-
schland’ (Germany as financial centre) (see Story, 1997). The institutionalised
relationships between banks and firms are brought into question by the ability
of firms to move their production and their financial holdings between
countries and to ‘off-shore’ sites. The large German banks have shifted their
focus from credit to equities, reducing their stakes in firms and establishing a
significant presence in the world’s major financial centres. The shares in large
German firms are increasingly in the hands of global institutional investors,
and German society itself has doubled its individual share ownership from 10
per cent to 21 per cent over the 3 years to 2000 (The Economist, 8 July 2000:
28). Thus, on the one hand, we cannot say that there is no reform taking place
in Germany, or that the deregulatory bias of neo-liberal restructuring has been
entirely ‘resisted’. Yet, on the other hand, we see that restructuring has taken on
a particular form, with apparent concessions to neo-liberal flexibility matched
by a shoring-up of prevailing institutions and practices – a defining feature of
‘Finanzplatz Deutschland’ (Story, 1997). For example, though major German
MNCs have restructured in favour of equity financing and shareholder value,
the vital small/medium size enterprise (SME) sector continues to be dominated
by close relationships with the regional banks. Indeed, the OECD expresses its
concern that the spirit of deregulated finance has not quite been grasped in the
German programme, arguing that the state-owned banks should be privatised
(OECD, 2001: 11). Far from abandoning past institutions and practices in
favour of radical deregulation, the German debate revives past scepticism of
shareholder value and renegotiates within a distinctive industry-finance frame
of reference (see Schröder, 1996; Jackson, 1997; Moran, 1992).
Labour
IPE’s engagement with labour in the global restructuring debate has tended to
assume that, while capital ‘promotes’ globalisation, labour essentially repre-
sents a social force with the potential to ‘resist’ global dictates and to define
alternatives. And, of course, labour has been a primary source of resistance
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and contestation to globalisation (see O’Brien, 2000; Stevis and Boswell,
1997). However, the role of labour in defining globalisation is somewhat more
contradictory than a simple resistance strategy. While in the Anglo-Saxon
‘hyperflexible’ state-societies it may be more clear that labour is excluded from
the defining of a programme of restructuring, the German programme is, at
least in part, articulated through the institutions of organised labour.
Historical attempts to co-ordinate and mediate the capital-labour relation
are revisited in contemporary German debates on the reorganisation of work.
The German labour market has been constituted historically as a sphere that is
delineated from markets in finance, goods and services, represented as a
distinctly ‘social’ sphere, so that ‘integration into the world economy was not
accompanied by deregulated markets in labour and land’ (Glasman, 1996: 51).
Pre-war practices such as centralised wage bargaining and the institutionalisa-
tion of works councils, together with post-war practices such as the sectoral
organisation of trade unions, have reproduced a co-ordinated system of
labour organisation that positions core workers within decisions about
production and changes in production (see Koch, 1992; Lane, 1994; Visser and
van Ruysseveldt, 1996). The principle of ‘Mitbestimmung’ (co-determination)
represents a legal intervention that establishes the right of organised labour to
representation on advisory boards, and confers negotiative rights on works
councils in corporate decision-making.
There is no doubt that Germany’s system of labour organisation has been
among the institutional aspects most criticised by neo-liberal commentators
(see OECD, 1994, 2001). The centralised organisation of labour, the trade
unions’ ability to sustain a ‘family wage’ and job security, and the blocks on the
development of a casualised work sector, have all been cited as responsible for
uncompetitive wage levels, an inflexible labour market and high levels of
unemployment. The OECD Jobs Strategy compares Germany, and other
continental European state-societies, unfavourably with the UK, US, Australia,
Canada and New Zealand, on the basis of its incremental restructuring pro-
gramme ‘at the margins’: ‘Instead of relaxing general employment protection
provisions, some governments have preferred to introduce short-term con-
tracts and liberalise employment protection for part-time workers in small
firms (e.g. Germany, France, Belgium)’ (OECD, 1997: 8). Despite some apparent
concessions to the discourse of flexibility, seen for example in greater
devolution of bargaining to the workplace and wage restraint since 1999, the
German programme has continued to integrate core labour into the defining
of programmes of change in the organisation of labour and work. Thus,
restraint in wage bargaining has been secured via negotiations that effectively
trade job security and employment creation in return for lower wage claims.
The perceptions and realities of a historical interweaving of the institutions
and practices of co-determination with German productivity and competi-
tiveness have given rise to ‘piecemeal’ reforms (Vogel, 1996) that do not
resemble UK-US-style hyperflexibility.
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The contemporary restructuring of working practices
The contemporary German debates about the restructuring of work draw
upon historical understandings of the relationships between state, market,
finance, industry and labour. This is not to say that Germany has not felt the
heat of neo-liberal exhortations to restructure its social institutions and
practices, or that it has not engaged in a debate on the restructuring of work
and labour. German state-society has negotiated the implications of globalisa-
tion and intensified competition through the frameworks of corporatist
bargaining. This has not been an unproblematic or consensual exercise, and in
most instances it is conflict and contestation that have limited or enabled
particular restructuring interventions. Though I do not seek to offer an exhaus-
tive account of the German programme, I am concerned to direct attention to
the unique patterns of compromise and conflict that give shape to debates on
restructuring work and labour. At the heart of German representations of the
restructuring problematic there lies a fundamental tension with the neo-
liberal image of hyperflexibility. Where Anglo-Saxon programmes have placed
their emphasis on speed of response to global markets, and the self-discipline
of individuals in an insecure working environment, the German programme
has re-emphasised a protracted process of negotiation through national
corporatist structures designed precisely to ensure security and stability for
the social partners. I am not offering up the German model as a ‘nicer’ alter-
native to British hyperflexibility, or as a path-dependent system that cannot be
transformed. Rather, I see the first step in a politicisation of global restruc-
turing to be an exercise in identifying the distinctive webs of power that define
the parameters of particular programmes. It is only through an understanding
of these webs of power, of how they function and where their weaknesses lie,
that we may open up potential spaces for critique, opposition and resistance.
‘Functional flexibility’, training and skills
The lean production discourse that has dominated much of the drive for
flexibility, asserts the need for individual workers to ‘multi-task’, applying
general skills across production, maintenance and quality functions. The
rationale for this position is that globalisation accelerates the rate of change in
market conditions, making it imperative that firms are able to respond rapidly
and flexibly, changing the organisation of work through the reshuffling of
production tasks. Despite an apparent thirst for the insights of lean produc-
tion management models (the lean production ‘bible’, The Machine that
Changed the World, made record sales in Germany), lean production and the
functional flexibility it prescribes, has taken on a particular German form that
is at odds with neo-liberal meanings (Benders and van Bijsterveld, 2000;
Streeck, 1996). While UK-US-style prescriptions for functional flexibility
emphasise a business-friendly environment in which employers define the
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necessary and useful skills within the firm, the German system of vocational
training is concerned with occupations rather than discrete ‘jobs’. The ‘dual’
system of training in public training institutes and in the workplace distri-
butes the cost and responsibility for training among firms, governments and
individuals (Culpepper, 1999). In contrast to the neo-liberal representation of
skills and training as task- and firm-specific, German representations position
skills as social resources. This has constrained the range of possible interven-
tions so that, in short, nothing is restructured unless it can be agreed among a
range of stakeholders – including local chambers of commerce, trade unions,
works councils, employers’ organisations and the Länder governments.
In terms of the everyday practices of training and skills deployment, there
are fundamental tensions between the hyperflexible mantra of multi-skilling,
multi-tasking and teamworking, and the negotiated occupational ‘status
maintenance’ of the prevailing German institutions (Esping-Andersen, 1996:
67). Within existing arrangements there are constraints on the devolution of
responsibility for skills and training to the level of individual firms, and on the
blurring of demarcations between defined occupations. Rather than revising
or deregulating existing legal frameworks and institutions, as in the British
programme, in the German debate ‘new’ frameworks are added to existing
regulations, negotiated with the social partners, often appearing to extend
rather than limit the influence of organised labour – the antithesis of hyper-
flexibility. This ‘restructuring by consensus’ is characterised by the ‘trading’ of
concessions between employers and organised labour. By way of example,
during the 1980s the German metalworkers union ‘IG Metall’ conceded a
reduction in the number of demarcated sectoral occupations from 48 to 6,
conditional upon the demarcation of a new occupation of ‘Anlagenführer’
(equipment monitor) with overlapping competencies. It is precisely this general
working function of quality monitoring and maintenance that the lean
production thesis seeks to integrate into all working practices.
In contrast to the British skills flexibility debate, which has focused on the
ability of an employer to access a flexible external pool of skills via sub-
contracting and outsourcing, the German debate has focused predominantly
on the flexibility of the ‘internal’ labour market, arguably supporting a ‘high-
cost, high-quality’ strategy (see Turner and Auer, 1994; Streeck 1992a, 1992b;
Jürgens, 1991; Mahnkopf, 1999). The restrictions on ‘hire and fire’ practices,
the embedded system of vocational training and the co-determination pro-
cedures that involve organised labour in the negotiation of change – all have
combined to produce a distinctive web of power in the reorganisation of work.
The German debate on teamworking (Gruppenarbeit), for example, has not
inculcated the disciplinary individualisation of the British debate. Though
teamworking is increasingly used in German firms, in practice it does not
resemble the Toyota model, or the US management prescriptions for blurred
boundaries between tasks founded on that model. The concept of team-
working was first defined in the German debate in the 1970s  by trade union-
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led research into the ‘Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens’ (humanisation of
working life). Though revisited and translated since then, the German trade
unions have brought the issue of teamworking to the negotiating table of annual
bargaining rounds, so that teams constitute semi-autonomous working
groups with concrete involvement in the reorganisation of work.
The German debate on skills and training not only stands in tension with
the hyperflexible dictates of the OECD’s Jobs Strategy, but also exhibits
unresolved tensions in its own terms. The negotiation of skills and training
provision through corporatist channels does not result in a societal consensus
around the programme. First, the mutual constitution of training arrange-
ments between employers and core workers requires continuous reinscription
and intervention. The influential trade union, IG Metall, for example, staged
warning strikes in Baden-Württemberg in protest at what they saw as threats
to their rights to consultation on training matters. At the time of writing the
disputes had been resolved by an agreement between the union and the
employers’ organisation ‘Gesamtmetall’ that entitles all workers to represent
their training needs, backed by a joint commission to resolve disagreement
(EIRR 330, 2001: 7). The institutions and practices of occupational training
do not simply remain static or natural features of German state-society – they
are continually brought into question and rebuilt, and this is intensifying as
the global discourse on flexibility gains ground.
Second, the greatest challenge to the prevailing programme of occupa-
tional status maintenance comes from the growing sector of German society
that is excluded from the provision. The costs of the dual system intensify the
exiting disincentives for German firms to employ new apprentices, exerting
pressure on youth employment rates and giving rise to the possibility of a
future skills shortage (Mahnkopf, 1999: 165). The training system itself was
built on the tradition of a manufacturing-based ‘male breadwinner’ society.
Unionised men who have experienced the dual system continue to exert their
influence in sustaining it. Meanwhile, outside of this diminishing circle,
women, unskilled and semi-skilled workers and migrant workers provide a
buffer of dispensable labour within a web of power that excludes them. If
Germany follows OECD (2001) exhortations to ‘liberalise opening hours’,
removing some of the blocks on a private service sector, the tensions between
insider, high-cost, high-skill manufacturing man, and outsider, low-cost,
semi-skilled ‘servicing’ woman will be further intensified.
Working time and ‘non-standard’ employment
In a neo-liberal reading of flexibilised working time the emphasis is placed on
the room for manoeuvre that an employer has to adjust working time within
the firm, and to access a pool of contingent labour to stretch the temporal
possibilities. For governmental programmes of restructuring this implies that
the best practice is the deregulation of working time and employment
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protection to maximise employer freedoms. The temporal dimension of
working practices, in this sense, is ‘owned’ and controlled by capital and not by
the state, or by labour groups, or by workers seeking flexible hours to fit with
family life. In the German debate, the statutory right to co-determination of
working terms and conditions renders the deregulatory interpretation of
working time highly problematic. Up until the 1994 Working Time Act, work-
ing time in Germany was regulated by legislation dating from 1938 (Fuchs and
Schettkat, 2000: 235). The 1994 Act, reflecting consultation with the social
partners, regulates working time to 48 hours per week, but allows flexibility in
the calculation of hours so that up to 60 hours per week is permitted for a
period up to 6 months. German firms are increasingly introducing ‘working
time accounts’ that allow for flexible working within the statutory parameters,
and German workers report increased use of flexibilised working time
arrangements (ILO, cited in EIRR 274, 1996). Overall, what we can say is that a
working time debate is taking place in Germany; what we cannot say, however,
is that it converges on a neo-liberal reading of the imperatives of globalisation.
A central feature of the German debate on working time is its tendency
toward a bargaining or ‘trading’ of firm-friendly temporal flexibility in
exchange for job security for individual workers, and employment generation
measures favoured by the unions. Within the parameters of prevailing institu-
tions and practices that limit employers’ access to external contingent labour,
the practice of trading concessions has become a significant trend. A unique
agreement at Volkswagen in 1993 established the terms of reference for flexibi-
lising working time. Faced with a choice between large-scale redundancies,
costly to both the firm and the workers, or a shortening of the working week, it
was agreed that working time would be reduced from 36 to 28 hours, with a
corresponding 12 per cent pay cut. The deal was extended to other firms in the
engineering sector by IG Metall’s 1994 bargaining round, arguably beginning
a debate that has now been institutionalised in the ‘Alliance for Jobs’ pro-
gramme:
In a climate of high unemployment, threatened job losses and feared
economic stagnation, the priority for trade unions has increasingly
become the securing of job guarantees, usually as a trade-off against
lower wage settlements and shorter working time with no or partial wage
compensation. For employers, the main concern has been to increase
working time flexibility in order to be able to respond to fluctuations in
demand at minimal cost. (EIRR 268, 1996: 27)
Eight years on from the Volkswagen deal, the question of whether the
firm’s corporatist arrangements represent a ‘vice or a virtue’ in contemporary
global capitalism remains a matter of much debate and controversy. The use
of corporatist channels to negotiate ‘flexibility deals’ arguably has its own
competitive benefits, though the same channels also ‘break every taboo in the
neoliberal code’ (The Guardian, 19 June 2001: 12).
Amoore_Global_05_Ch4 6/19/02, 12:24 PM105
106 Globalisation contested
Where the German restructuring programme has engaged with the neo-
liberal debate on the use of ‘non-standard’ forms of employment – part-time,
contract or contingent work – it has done so through elaborate reregulation
rather than direct deregulation. The regulations governing part-time working,
for example, were redefined in 2001, extending the rights of part-time workers
and giving full-time workers the right to move to part-time work. The legis-
lation also codifies an ongoing controversy surrounding the use of fixed-term
contracts of employment. The 1985 Employment Promotion Act relaxed the
regulations governing fixed-term contracts, allowing their use for a period of
up to 18 months. The controversies and contests that surrounded the reforms
in effect put the brakes on restructuring. The regulation was revisited in 1996
when the permitted period for use of fixed-term contracts was extended to 2
years, and again in 2000 when the practice of concluding successive fixed-term
contracts was curbed. The question of whether ‘non-standard’ employment
should be limited in this way continues to be debated and contested – the
German employers’ organisations argue that the term of use should be
extended to 5 years, while the trade unions oppose the use of fixed-term
contracts in any circumstances. The OECD are uncompromising in their
verdict that ‘constraints on the renewability of fixed-term contracts reduces
working time flexibility’ (OECD, 2001: 9).
The German debate is in tension with much of the neo-liberal discourse
on flexibility, with observers lamenting the government’s ‘cautious’ approach
to labour market reform, and Schröder’s reversal of previous deregulatory
strategies (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2001: 8; OECD Economic Outlook,
2000: 223). Aside from these ongoing tensions, the working time debate
generates its own contradictions, and tends to conceal the experiences of
marginalised worker groups. It is not at all clear that the working time deals
that are made on the basis of job security and employment creation are
actually having an impact on unemployment levels. Indeed, there is some
evidence to suggest that the securing of working time deals by core labour
groups could be further entrenching outsider groups in uncertainty and
insecurity. For the approximately 6.5 million German workers in SMEs, and
particularly for workers in the former East, the deals between the trade unions
and employers’ organisations are often inaccessible and do not shape the
realities of everyday life in the workplace. Similarly, the working experiences
of women tend not to be expressed in the working time debate. In a state-
society where resources are channelled to social insurance and assistance rather
than welfare services, the persistently low levels of women’s participation in
the labour market indicate that work in the home and caring roles provide an
invisible temporal flexibility (see Anderson, 2000). The German debate on the
restructuring of working time focuses exclusively on the corporate culture of
manufacturing industries, concealing the work of women and migrant
workers who provide much of the time flexibility, and excluding them from
the debate on restructuring.6
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Labour costs and collective bargaining
It is a central claim of the neo-liberal restructuring discourse that collective
bargaining structures ‘artificially’ inflate labour costs, rendering a state-society
uncompetitive in an era of footloose global capital. In essence, the devolved
and deregulated bargaining structures of Anglo-Saxon state-societies are
represented as more cost competitive than the dense regulatory constraints of
German state-society. In a recent survey of the German economy, the OECD
observe that ‘labour market institutions are adjusting, but not yet sufficiently
to cope with the substantial labour market imbalances persisting in Germany’.
On the basis of this representation of the problem, they advocate deregulatory
interventions, arguing that ‘the authorities should support the process of intro-
ducing greater flexibility into the wage bargaining system’ (OECD, 2001: 9).
The debate over whether Germany can sustain its collective bargaining
practices, and provide an attractive location for investment, the ‘Standort-
debatte’, has replaced the ‘Modell Deutschland’ debate, drawing social demo-
cratic and neo-liberal commentators onto the common ground of ‘location
competitiveness’.7
When the terms of the Standortdebatte are explored, however, we find
competing and contradictory discourses. On the one hand, we find the repre-
sentation of Germany’s collective bargaining structures as rigid, inflexible and
uncompetitive:
Now the emphasis is on the costs of regulation, bureaucratic red tape,
high labour standards, short and inflexible working hours and high non-
wage costs. Will Germany remain an attractive production location for
global firms that can find highly skilled computer experts in India, hard
working engineers in Scotland and low wages just across its borders in
Poland, the Czech lands, or further east?’ (Visser, 1995: 40)
In this reading total labour costs are argued to be uncompetitively high as a
result of collective bargaining practices (see Table 4.1).
The German debate has certainly raised the question of whether any
individual state-society can afford to sustain high-cost institutions and practices
Table 4.1 Average hourly labour costs in manufacturing industry, 1999 (DM)
Wage costs Non-wage costs Total
Germany (W) 27.11 22.12 49.23
Germany (E) 18.70 12.50 31.20
USA 25.53 9.75 35.27
France 17.50 16.27 33.77
UK 23.21 9.56 32.77
Source: Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft (2000).
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in a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ world of regulatory competition. The German
media has fed a strong discourse on the ability of German firms to ‘shop’ for
cheaper labour and reduced regulation in Eastern European countries:
Altogether, since 1990, German industry has invested around DM 216
Billion abroad, and created over half a million jobs – at the same time, in
this country, around 2 million jobs were lost. For example, at the end of
January, Porsche announced the future production of 5000 cars in Fin-
land, resulting in 500 new jobs there. The lack of new jobs in Germany is
caused by the unwillingness of everybody to accept flexibility. (Stern
(1997) 7 April, own translation)
However, within the Standortdebatte a different set of representations can
be made that legitimate more cautious interventions in the collective bargain-
ing arena. Due in part to the weak Euro, 2000 saw German trade reach record
levels, inward investment increase and outward investment by German com-
panies decline (EIU, 2001). When productivity is taken into account and unit
labour costs are calculated, Germany appears cheaper than either Britain or
Norway, and only 10 per cent more expensive than the US (IDW, 2000). This
‘performance paradox’ casts some doubt on the confident claims that Ger-
many is rendered uncompetitive by ‘high cost’ collective bargaining structures.
Indeed, it is misleading to assess Germany against the hyperflexible criteria of
Britain or the US, since the kinds of flexibility that are produced through
corporatist structures are at odds with Anglo-Saxon practices. The Bündnis
für Arbeit (Alliance for Jobs) initiative, discussed in greater detail in the section
on industrial relations practices, has seen bargaining rounds since 1996
characterised by moderate pay increases, reflecting the trade unions’ interests
in bargains that extend beyond issues of pay, to include job security and
employment creation.
Where programmes of restructuring in collective bargaining arrange-
ments have been initiated in Germany, these have been negotiated and con-
tested. The question of devolution of wage negotiations to the level of individual
firms, a central feature of neo-liberal programmes, is not so straightforward in
the German case. The German Government has adapted regulations so that
firm-specific derogations from sectoral bargains can be made, though this has
not been taken up in the way that the hyperflexibility thesis might assume.
There are employers who resist firm-level negotiations because they fear that
this will provoke wage competition between firms, manifesting in costs
elsewhere (Fuchs and Schettkat, 2000: 224). Equally, there are works councils,
particularly in the former East, who support firm-level bargains that allow
them to secure the future of struggling firms.
Examples of what, according to a hyperflexibility logic, may seem
unexpected twists in deregulation, abound in the German debate on collective
bargaining. Regulations governing the provision of sick pay, for example, have
vacillated back and forth as the social partners contest the programme. The
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Köhl Government initially reregulated sick pay provision in 1995, reducing
entitlement from 100 per cent to 80 per cent of net income. This was then
subject to contest between IG Metall and Gesamtmetall, who finally agreed to
restore the 100 per cent level in their sector. Viewed through neo-liberal eyes
this is a bizarre example of firms agreeing to reject freedoms conferred on
them by the government, ending finally in the Schröder Government’s restor-
ation of the 100 per cent level. The proposed reforms to the 1972 Works
Constitution Act provide a further example of the non-conformation of
German restructuring to a neo-liberal deregulatory model. Amid disputes
with employers’ organisations, the labour minister Walter Riester has proposed
an extension of the powers of works councils, giving them a mandate beyond
terms and conditions, to include consultation in the use of homeworking,
subcontracting and outsourcing. The proposed Bill has provoked widespread
criticism from neo-liberal commentators who see it as extending already
‘protracted’ decision-making structures (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2001: 17).
The maintenance (or even strengthening) of collective bargaining struc-
tures through the German programme has not merely provoked criticism
from proponents of deregulation. The exclusivity of the ‘bargaining club’, as I
have highlighted in the skills and working time debates, means that the image
of a society-wide debate on the terms of restructuring is rather misleading.
The trade unions have been anxious to extend collective bargaining across the
whole of unified Germany, preventing the low wage ‘undercutting’ effect of
the former East, but arguably also removing any chance of competitive advan-
tage for these industries. As one commentator asked ‘how would NAFTA have
worked out for Northern Mexico if the US auto workers union had taken over
the collective bargaining south of the Rio Grande?’ (The Guardian, 19 June
2001: 12). The de facto reality for East German workers is that two-thirds of
them are not receiving the wage increases agreed through sectoral bargaining,
their employers having removed themselves from the agreement by leaving
the employers’ organisations (VSME, 2000).
The inequalities of access to the bargaining debate, though most acute in
the divisions between East and West, are evident throughout German society.
For the ‘insiders’, employed in traditional sectors with secure contracts and
generous social insurance provision, the bargains struck in the course of
restructuring reproduce an order that reflects their interests.8  The overall trend
is for secure and highly-paid workers to gain greater increases in bargaining
rounds than their less secure and less well-paid colleagues. An increasing
number of outsiders, excluded by virtue of their unemployment, their work in
the informal economy or their fixed-term contracts, tend to be excluded from
the German programme of ‘restructuring within limits’. Birgit Mahnkopf
identifies divisions between the interests and experiences of a nationally-
rooted ‘Arbeitsgesellschaft’ (working society), and those of a globally-mobile
‘Gesellschaft der Geldvermögenbesitzer’ (wealth-owning society) (1999: 159–
160). Yet, even within the working society, not to mention the extensive non-
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working society, there are tensions and inequalities that are not resolved by the
current restructuring programme. Ultimately, these divisions raise the question
of whether, facing persistently high rates of unemployment, future govern-
ment interventions in the rules governing the bargaining rounds will allow
greater use of derogation. If the flood gates are opened on a feminised service
sector, this is likely to create new inequalities based on insecurity, to replace
the old inequalities based on unemployment.
Industrial relations and the ‘alliance for jobs’
The German debate on the restructuring of industrial relations practices is
tightly interwoven with the questions surrounding collective bargaining.
However, I consider industrial relations here specifically in terms of organised
labour’s engagement with the programme of restructuring, and the debate on
unemployment levels (see Table 4.2). In a neo-liberal reading, consensus-
oriented industrial relations practices are held to inhibit competitiveness,
growth and job creation. In a series of international reports Germany’s high
levels of unemployment have been linked to the bargaining power of the trade
unions and the associated disincentives for employers to recruit new workers
(OECD, 1994, 1997). Thus, for critics of the social market economy, prevailing
institutions of industrial relations and collective bargaining inhibit job
creation. In this sense, ‘the crisis of the “German model” is, at its core, a crisis
of the established system of industrial relations’ (Mahnkopf, 1999: 161).
However, the industrial relations debate in Germany has not taken the
form of Anglo-Saxon hyperflexibility in which trade unions are constrained in
their activities and removed from many workplaces. In contrast to this
Table 4.2 Standardised rates of unemployment (as % of civilian labour
force)
1997 1998 1999 2000
Canada 19.1 18.3 17.6 16.8
France 12.3 11.8 11.2 19.5
Germany 19.9 19.3 18.6 17.9
Netherlands 15.2 14.1 13.3 12.7
New Zealand 16.6 17.5 16.8 16.0
Sweden 19.9 18.3 17.2 15.9
UK 17.0 16.3 16.1 15.5
US 14.9 14.5 14.2 14.0
OECD 17.2 17.1 16.8 16.4
EU 10.6 19.9 19.2 18.2
Source: OECD Economic Outlook (2001), compiled according to International
Labour Office guidelines.
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restructuring of industrial relations, the German debate has seen a restruc-
turing through the corporatist channels provided by the social partners. The
flexibilisation of labour and work is negotiated in a way that acknowledges the
problems of global competitiveness and job creation, but seeks to reconcile
these with societal corporatist (Rhodes, 1997). There is a notable absence of a
clear-cut neo-liberal agenda of deunionisation, with employers unwilling to
disrupt a system of industrial relations that imposes uniform constraints on
themselves and their competitors, limits wage competition and promotes high
value-added production (Tüselmann and Heise, 2000; Upchurch, 2000).
The Bündnis für Arbeit (Alliance for Jobs) initiative has provided a
central terrain for the debate on consensus-led restructuring. First proposed
in 1995 by Klaus Zwickel, leader of IG Metall, the programme began as a
union initiative designed to promote job creation and apprenticeships and to
limit practices such as overtime. The government, employers’ organisations
and trade unions engaged in a discussion of proposals designed to halve the
rate of unemployment by the end of 2000. In effect the Alliance represents an
attempt to achieve restructuring through compromise and accommodation –
with the unions agreeing to wage restraint, the employers opening discussions
on unfreezing recruitment and limiting overtime, and the government debat-
ing initiatives such as state-sponsored early retirement to take the pressure off
the youth labour market. However, the Alliance is itself illustrative of the fric-
tions and tensions that pervade a programme of restructuring (see Timmins,
2000; Fuchs and Schettkat, 2000). Though it has survived by adapting the
agenda to lowest common-denominator agreement, it has stalled on several
occasions when either the unions or the employers threaten to leave the table.
The unions have contested what they see as a failure to match their wage
concessions with job-creation initiatives. At the time of writing the unions are
seeking 250,000 new jobs for 2001, and IG Metall warn that they will cease to
exercise wage restraint in 2002 ‘unless there is evidence that pay moderation
has been translated into new jobs’ (cited in EIRR 327, 2001: 9). For their part,
the employers’ organisations threatened to leave the talks in 1999 in response
to the unions refusal to define ‘wage moderation’.
Overall, the German restructuring debate, conducted through industrial
relations channels, is a highly contested and contradictory affair. On the one
hand, for example, trade union membership has been in decline at around 4
per cent per year since reunification. This could support claims that organised
labour has a diminishing role in the global political economy. On the other
hand we find the launch of the new service sector mega-union ‘Ver.di’ in
March 2001, suggesting that old style industrial relations practices are being
revitalised for new sectors. The general secretary of the new union announced
his intention to ensure that Ver.di adopted a ‘fighting tradition’, beginning
with a series of warning strikes at Lufthansa to force a 3.5 per cent backdated
pay settlement (EIRR 325, 2001; EIU, 2001). Though the unions have seized
the opportunity, at least in their rhetoric, to reach out to workers who do not
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fit the archetypal industrial model, it is likely that tensions will continue to
surface around excluded workers. The low-wage service sector continues to be
neglected in the Alliance talks, raising the question of whether the restruc-
turing agenda is simply ‘co-opting’ the unions and reproducing a ‘Modell
Deutschland’ of working men in the manufacturing sectors of the West.
Conclusion
The discussion of Germany’s programme of restructuring amidst global-
isation has tended to offer two competing explanations. In the economistic
readings of globalisation as inexorable ‘process’, the competitive flexibility of
the Anglo-American models exerts a pressure that causes ‘Modell Deut-
schland’ to collapse, or at least to converge on neo-liberal interventions. For
those who emphasise the national political ‘projects’ that shape responses to
international pressures, by contrast, existing institutions frame somewhat
path-dependent responses. Yet, despite their competing emphases, neither
approach enables us to reflect upon how the notion of a ‘German model’
emerges over time, or on how this apparent model is negotiated, enabled or
contested in the light of discourses of global restructuring. In neglecting the
contingent historical making of the ‘national’ and ‘global’, the existing modes
of understanding obscure the complex intertwining of these terrains of
political life.
In this chapter I have used an IPE of social practice to shed light on the
question of Germany’s distinctive making of globalisation through pro-
grammes of restructuring. With regard to agency and the exercise of power in
restructuring, I have argued that German state-society is not simply rendered
powerless in the grip of global forces, as in the process reading. Nor is it the
case that the social partners simply wield power in the political process in
order to resist globalisation. Rather, a reading of the webs of power through
which restructuring is exercised reveals a distinctive framing of globalisation,
and a particular set of interventions made on the basis of this framing. In
British representations of globalisation, there is a manifest ‘distancing’ of state
from market, with the dominant restructuring question being ‘in what ways
can the state deregulate to allow greater market freedoms and attract inward
investment?’. By contrast, the German programme represents markets as
reconcilable with state and society, asking the question ‘in what ways can the
state-society restructure in order to enable German industries to compete
more effectively?’ Thus, it is not simply that national pathways of restructur-
ing diverge, but that the representations on which programmes are based tend
to reflect webs of power that are unique to particular social spaces.
In terms of the historicity that is highlighted by an IPE of social practice,
the meanings that are attributed to globalisation and restructuring are framed
by existing modes of understanding, prevailing institutions and practices. The
historical framing of the relationships between state, finance, industry and
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labour, for example, have provided the parameters for a negotiated pro-
gramme of restructuring. In contrast to the ‘fast but fragile’ time-frame of
British hyperflexibility, the German programme is ‘slow but sticky’, pursued
through the webs of power of the social partners rather than conducted as an
assault on their known practices. This is not to say that the German political
economy is ‘ignoring’ or ‘resisting’ globalisation, nor that it offers a ‘friendlier’
face of neo-liberalism. Instead, the pressures of globalisation are given a
distinctive set of social and political meanings in the German debate, and as
with the British programme, understanding how these have become domin-
ant, and what their contradictions may be, is an important first step in the
politicisation of global restructuring. It is important that the ‘automatic’ logic
of restructuring is challenged and replaced by an acknowledgement of the
making and the contestation of particular programmes.
Finally, the IPE of social practice unpacks the ‘German model’ to reveal
the everyday practices that enable and confound its existence. Where the
British debate has actively sought to depoliticise restructuring by confining
the terrain almost exclusively to the level of individual workplaces and firms,
the German debate has been more difficult for political players to constrain
and limit. The German programme has relied upon the involvement and
participation of the social partners in a kind of flexi-corporatism of traded
bargains in order to embed restructuring within regulatory frameworks.
Where we see the formulation of apparently hyperflexible deregulatory
policies, these are subject to the tumult of industrial relations practices, and
are frequently abandoned or moderated beyond recognition. This regulated
and formal contestation within the parameters of collective bargaining
institutions forms one aspect of the contestation of restructuring in everyday
life in Germany. Arguably the most significant tensions of the German
programme, however, lie not in the practices of those who are included in the
debate, but in those of the excluded:
The number of ‘losers’ is increasing. Now the working members of
society sit in different boats, one of which quickly sinks, another sinks
more slowly, while a third stays afloat. (Stern (1997), own translation)
This media comment on the fragmentary effects of global restructuring
foretells something of the future challenges of the German programme. For
the invisible and obscured workers in the informal economy, care and
domestic services, the former East, and other vulnerable groups, the terms,
time-frame and terrain of the restructuring debate are anathema. The terms
of the ‘Standortdebatte’ apply only to those who are directly engaged in core
financial and manufacturing businesses, the time-frame is much faster and
less secure for unprotected workers and the corporatist terrain is familiar only
to those interests who historically defined it. The working practices of the
unprotected groups are increasingly fundamental to the securing of the core
groups, in childcare and domestic work, for example, yet these practices
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remain unacknowledged in the debate. The continued reconciliation of state
and market will face the significant challenge of addressing the dynamics of
the informal, tacit and unregulated markets that trade on the flexibility denied
in the formal economy.
Notes
1 ‘Modell Deutschland’, or the ‘German model’ was a Social Democrat election slogan
from the 1970s. According to Mahnkopf, over time the slogan became a ‘synonym for
the consensual incorporation of corporatist interest groups into a … “national economy
modernisation” strategy’ (1999: 153).
2 For some insightful examples of the use of Foucault’s ‘governmentality’ to understand
neo-liberal policy programmes, see Lemke (2001), Miller and Rose (1990) and Barry,
Osborne and Rose (1996).
3 A number of agencies have marshalled comparisons of labour costs to caution against
the maintenance of institutions and practices that may inflate labour costs. The Bank
of International Settlements calculate costs in the UK manufacturing sector for 1995
at 45 per cent of costs in the same sector in Germany (cited in The Independent, 13
June 1996). The Financial Times focuses on labour costs in British and German plants
of the same firm, Osram, a subsidiary of Siemens. Labour costs (including wages, taxes
and related non-wage costs) are calculated at 66 per cent lower in Manchester, UK
than in Augsburg, Germany (Financial Times, 21 March 1997).
4 In the year the Lexus car was launched, one model alone sold more vehicles in the US
than the entire range of Mercedes models (Hancké, 1997).
5 The Ordo-liberal theory of the social market is broadly derived from the works of two
groups of theorists: the Ordo-liberal economists and lawyers of the Freiburg school,
notably Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm and the more sociological approaches of Alfred
Müller-Armack, Wilhelm Röpke and Alexander Rüstow. The central contribution of
these schools of thought is the notion that, far from representing a spontaneous and
naturally efficient allocative device, the market requires state direction to encourage a
decentralisation of decisions relating to social and economic life.
6 Brigitte Young argues that there is a ‘flourishing black market’ for domestic labour in
Germany, predominantly provided by women and migrants from Yugoslavia, Turkey
and Eastern Europe, for families with high income and little time (2001: 320). The
unprotected and unregulated labour of domestic workers provides an informal work-
ing time flexibility that is not addressed by the dominant German debate, though it
undoubtedly plays a role in enabling the debate to take place.
7 This shift arguably follows Porter’s (1990) influential work on the transformation
from comparative to competitive advantage. IPE scholars have long argued that the
nature of interstate competition has shifted from an emphasis on resources held –
territory, raw materials etc. – to an emphasis on market share and the climate for
business (Strange, 1988, 1996).
8 The 1999 agreement between IG Metall and Volkswagen, for example, secured 3.2 per
cent pay increases, but failed to establish permanent status for the 6000 workers on
fixed-term contracts.
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no involuntary changes have ever spontaneously restructured or reorgan-
ised a mode of production; … changes in productive relationships are
experienced in social and cultural life, refracted in men’s ideas and their
values, and argued through in their actions, their choices and their
beliefs. (Thompson, 1976/1994: 222)
The desire to comprehend, order and manage the dual dynamics of globali-sation and restructuring has led to much attention being paid to the
actions and activities of MNCs. Academic commentaries in IPE, economics,
sociology and business studies have commonly singled out the MNC as the
central site of production and work for the global economy and, therefore, as a
leading agent of globalisation. As the primary vehicles for global forces, firms
are represented as acting to intensify competition, reacting to technological
imperatives and transmitting knowledge and practices of restructuring across
national boundaries. Media commentaries variously depict the multinationals
as ‘a powerful force for good’ (The Economist, 4 February 2000: 21), or as the
embodiment of globalisation with ‘the whole world in their hands’ (The
Sunday Times, 17 May 1998: 11). Meanwhile, for those who oppose or resist
globalisation, the logos of the MNCs – the Nike ‘swoosh’, the McDonald’s
golden arches, the Shell emblem – have become the archetypal symbols of
global capitalism and the epitome of all that is wrong with globalisation. The
dominant understanding of firms in the GPE represents the MNC as a unitary,
coherent and bounded agent, pursuing global restructuring in a rational and
linear fashion. Paradoxically, both ‘pro-globalisation’ neo-liberal accounts,
and so-called ‘anti-globalisation’ accounts reinforce the image of firms as
abstract entities, thereby obscuring the webs of power and practice that
constitute sites of production – and limiting the potential for a politicisation
of the restructuring of work and production.
It is the contention of this chapter that dominant representations of the
firm within globalisation have underplayed the contested nature of the re-
structuring of work. Indeed, it has become the vogue to present globalisation
as actively decoupling the firm from its relationships with state and society,
rendering it ‘footloose’ and infinitely mobile. If we are to advance our
5
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understanding of the webs of power that define global restructuring, and the
implications for labour and social groups, then we must critically reconsider
the assumed agency of the firm. How is it possible to delineate the agency of
the MNC from, for example, the networks of shareholders, employers’ and
industry organisations or suppliers and contractors, within which it is
situated? Defined in terms of a matrix of relationships that transcend ascribed
boundaries – corporate managers, financiers, shareholders, suppliers and a
diverse range of labour groups – the firm becomes a site of contest in the
ascription of meanings and realities of globalisation.
The notion of contestation is furthered here at two interrelated levels.
First, firms themselves are explored in the context of the competing social
forces of which, and within which, they are constituted. Drawing on the
restructuring experiences of British and German home-based multinational
firms, the chapter suggests that the activities of globally-operating firms are
less the outcome of unitary and unified actions than they are the result of a
series of contests. If we understand the firm in this way, as a primary site of the
experience of global change, then we are led to advance understandings of the
contested nature of the restructuring of productive and working practices. We
thus direct less attention to the firm as a vehicle of globalisation and become
more attuned to the social experiences of global change that are played out
within and around the firm. In this way, space is opened up for examination of
the role of labour groups in the contestation and shaping of restructuring.
Second, the chapter seeks to emphasise the contested nature of our knowledge
of the firm within IPE. Capturing the potential position of the firm in the
contestation of globalisation is thus posed as a challenge for the field of IPE,
both in terms of its ‘field of inquiry’ and its ‘set of assumptions’ (Tooze, 1984).
In short, it is argued that there is a need to emphasise contest both in terms of
the social relations and practices within and surrounding the firm itself, and
in terms of the contested nature of our knowledge of the nature and sources of
globalisation.
The firm as a ‘global agent’
The understanding of global social change that has dominated IPE has tended
to reproduce particular conceptions of the relationship between states and
markets. As I argued in chapter 2, the delineation and opposition of bounded
states and markets has obscured the porous and interrelated nature of these
domains. In accounts of globalisation as an ‘inexorable process’, the domain of
the market is represented as encroaching on the domain of the state. For many,
the ‘footloose MNC’ has become the visible face of global markets, wielding its
power over national governments and changing the balance of political
authority in the GPE. As a result, firms have come to be understood as essen-
tially rational actors whose actions have created and sustained an intensifi-
cation of competition in global markets. For IPE, a specific type of firm, the
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MNC, has been cast as the key non-state actor in an increasingly inter-
dependent world.1 In this way, from the 1970s, the firm has come to represent
the primary vehicle of globalisation as it creates restructuring imperatives for
states and societies alike (Stopford and Strange, 1991; Porter, 1990; Ohmae,
1990; Sklair, 2001).
For many academics, policy-makers, business people, journalists and
indeed workers, there is a sense in which understanding globalisation has
become synonymous with understanding the actions of MNCs as they, in
turn, react to productive and technological transformations. For Stopford and
Strange: ‘What is loosely termed “global competition” is the outcome of how
individual firms have reacted over time to the changing balance of opportunity
and threat’ (1991: 65). The firm thus becomes understood as both absorbing
and contributing to globalising forces so that it becomes decoupled from the
institutions and practices of state-societies. It is understood as an agent of
transformation in the global economy (see Sklair, 1998), whose authority
challenges that of national governments. Where state-firm relationships do
enter analyses, these tend to be defined as a kind of interdependent diplomacy
(see Walter, 1998), particularly in terms of the state’s attraction of FDI.
Attention to firm-society relations is similarly confined to a focus on the imper-
atives of restructuring for lean and flexible productive and working practices.
What are the limitations of this mode of knowledge about the firm? The
idea that the firm has become a new unit of analysis in the study of the world
political economy invokes, paradoxically, similar criticisms to those levelled at
traditional international relations frameworks in their understandings of the
state. The view of the firm as a coherent and identifiable actor in world politics
has many parallels with the neo-realist view of the state as atomised, unitary
and essentially rational. Susan Strange, for example, ascribes to MNCs some
of the masculine qualities or a ‘statesman’ of diplomat with self-seeking
expansionary ambitions. Firms are understood to be ‘having to become more
statesmanlike as they seek corporate alliances … to enhance their combined
capacities to compete with others for world market share’ (Stopford and
Strange, 1991: 2). The state and corporate actors Strange positions in relation-
ships of ‘triangular diplomacy’ are presented as ‘managers’ of globalisation,
resonant with Charlotte Hooper’s ‘frontier masculinity’ in which business
solutions are sought for global dilemmas (Hooper, 2000: 67; see also Hooper,
2001). Diplomatic practices, espionage and the activities of statesmen have
defined what Hooper terms ‘hegemonic masculinities’ that now merge with
business discourses to create images such as that of James Bond and Henry
Kissinger ‘sitting next to an Economist reading businessman on a plane’
(Hooper, 1999: 485). Many IPE accounts of the firm reinforce such con-
structions of atomised agency in which expertise, calculated strategy and
rational action are at the cutting edge of globalisation.
The abstracted isolation of individual firms or businessmen as managers
of globalisation assumes that these actors have a common voice and a single
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set of objectives. Yet, the social groups and interests within and around the
firm itself are rarely cohesive. Restructuring is commonly characterised by
conflict between, for example, managers and production workers, financial
and technical roles at the corporate level, or between permanent and con-
tingent workers at shop-floor level.2 To present the firm as a unitary global
‘power wielder’ is to neglect to account for the webs of power of which, and
through which, the firm is constituted. It is these webs of power that must be
understood if global restructuring is to be repositioned as a social and political
programme requiring particular representations and interventions, rather
than as an automatic economic imperative.
Though the relationships between states and firms are explored and
problematised to an extent in mainstream IPE literature, the contests within,
across and around the firm itself tend to be neglected. In this way, globalising
forces are treated as though they exist exogenously and are rarely considered as
integral elements of a wider set of social practices. So, for example, much of
the analysis of the relationship between technology and the firm adheres to
some variant of the imperatives of lean production.3 Womack et al. (1990) The
Machine that Changed the World, for example, equated the loss of compe-
titiveness in the European and North American automobile industries with
the superior technologies and production processes of the Toyotist Japanese
model. As critical approaches to the restructuring of production and work
have demonstrated,4 this simplistic construction of the interrelationships
between states, firms, societies and social groups suffers from an ‘unhealthy
mix of analysis, description and prescription’ (Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1995:
6). The firm becomes a disembedded entity to be studied outside of the realm
of state and society, except insofar as it impacts on these levels through
prescribed restructuring imperatives. Put simply, orthodox understandings of
the firm in IPE tend neither to open up the firm to examine the social power
relations within, nor to look at their extension into wider social contests.
Politicising the firm in IPE
As scholars have more actively explored interdisciplinary approaches to
understanding global change, recent debates have begun to offer politicised
alternatives to the study of atomised states and firms. In particular, the work of
Karl Polanyi has been used to demonstrate the historical and contextual
contingency of social action. From Polanyi’s rich and diverse writings, con-
temporary IPE has drawn out the notion of the embeddedness of economic
transactions in a web of social relations and institutions:
… man’s economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships …
Neither the process of production not that of distribution is linked to
specific economic interests attached to the possession of goods; but every
single step in that process is geared to a number of social interests which
eventually ensure that the required steps be taken. (Polanyi, 1957: 46)
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Contemporary interpretations of Polanyi’s work have, of course, im-
ported his ideas into a new context. The problematic of The Great Trans-
formation was to explore the historical transformation of nineteenth-century
liberalism and to explain the social effects of an imposed self-regulating
market economy. However, Polanyi’s ontological position has become
increasingly useful in the development of critical positions on global social
change. In essence, his work places society firmly at the centre of analysis,
reminding us that ‘… normally, the economic order is merely a function of the
social, in which it is contained’ (1957: 71). For Polanyi, economic activities
require social institutions to protect human beings and the environment and,
indeed, to provide the skills and technologies necessary for production. To
more fully understand the political economy of the firm, these insights suggest
that there is a need to develop knowledge of the social institutions in which
economic production is embedded.
Drawing on the Polanyian thesis, scholars have critiqued the notion of the
firm as an abstracted global actor, and have sought to contextualise it within a
set of political and social institutions. Pauly and Reich, for example, emphasise
the enduring nationality of the firm, arguing that this reflects ‘durable
national institutions and distinctive ideological traditions’ (1997: 1). Razeen
Sally’s (1994) institutional approach to the multinational enterprise, similarly
explores the embeddedness of multinationals in broader networks of social
institutions. From a different perspective, the ‘societal systems’ approach,
applied widely to studies of industrial or firm-level change in the form of ‘social
systems of production’, characterises the firm as a social arena (Maurice, Sorge
and Warner, 1980). At the root of these analyses is some notion that the GPE is
made up of an array of distinctive national capitalisms. Following, for
example Albert (1993), Crouch and Streeck (1997) and Berger and Dore
(1996), national models of capitalism arise out of a web of distinctive insti-
tutions and practices. For those whose focus is national models of industrial
relations, it is these institutions and practices that condition and reflect the
organisation of firms (Lane, 1996a; Rubery, 1996). The value of the ‘national
models’ literature lies in their ‘embedding’ of the activities of the firm in the
context of political and social institutions. In contrast to much of the
economistic emphases on the corporate imperatives of globalisation, the firm
is analysed in its concrete relationships with the institutions and practices of a
particular state-society.
There are, however, a series of interrelated problems with the uncritical
adoption of a societal embeddedness approach to the firm. First, there is a
clear privileging of the notion of firms existing within sets of social institu-
tions, to the neglect of the idea of firms as constituted of competing social
relations, so that the most basic and fundamental everyday social contests are
neglected. Many of the ‘external’ actors identified by this literature – for
example trade unions, financial institutions and research institutions – cannot
simply be considered to form the environment within which the firm is
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embedded. Rather, as we saw in the analyses of British and German restruc-
turing programmes, they are an integral part of the social contests which
extend into and across firms. Second, there is a tendency to overemphasise the
coherence of the national system of production within which the firm is
situated, and to neglect its historical making, and the contests which may
potentially reinforce or undermine it. Finally, and a related point, the scholars
who seek to raise the profile of the embeddedness of firms tend to do this
through an emphasis on the institutions of the nation-state. It should perhaps
be considered that the contests that characterise the restructuring of pro-
duction and work may be simultaneously national and transnational (see
Mizruchi and Schwartz, 1987). In sum, the embeddedness approaches to the
study of the firm, though situating the firm within a political and social
context, tend to present an image of static national path-dependency. If we
understand the firm simply to be embedded within an array of fixed national
institutions, then it becomes difficult to conceive either of how processes of
change may occur, or indeed how transnational social forces may penetrate
these institutions.
Taken together, and in a critical spirit, the broad thrust of the embed-
dedness approach is illustrative of a gap in the IPE literature on the firm and
restructuring. In short, we are led to consider that the firm does not simply act
and react to exogenous imperatives, but rather forms an integral part of a
historical social environment within which globalisation and restructuring are
perceived and experienced. The problematic at this point is to reinterpret
these insights to characterise these meanings as socially bargained, negotiated
and contested. Advancing an understanding of the firm as a site of contest
serves to highlight the potential for individuals and social groups either to
contest and transform embedded working and productive practices, or to
challenge such a process of restructuring.
A reading of neo-Gramscian work on global transformation takes us
some way towards viewing the firm as a contested site that extends into the
domains of state, finance, society and labour. Though Gramsci’s ideas have
been interpreted in many different ways to explain diverse contemporary
social change, we can identify a core of ideas that specifically illuminate the
dynamics of production and work within the firm. First, society and social
relations are positioned at the heart of understandings of processes of trans-
formation. In this way, historical change is understood to be the product of
competing social forces acting within the parameters of social structures (Gill,
1997: 17). In essence, such perspectives serve to counter economistic and
teleological readings of globalisation and change, reminding us of the human
and social roots of transformation. For those who seek to raise the profile of
civil society, and labour in particular, in contesting and shaping global change,
these insights have considerable utility. Globalisation and restructuring cease
to appear as ‘bulldozers’ that destroy all potential alliances and resistances and,
instead, become open to social contestation and redefinition.
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Second, this range of approaches to IR/IPE has a strong and specific focus
on the social relations surrounding production and work. Cox’s (1987) and
Harrod’s (1987) seminal twin volumes explicitly explore the patterns of power
relations within and around production. Both volumes contribute to a
framework for understanding the social relations of production in a broad
sense, acknowledging that societies may be constituted of several intercon-
nected kinds of production within, for example, the firm, the household, the
formal and informal economies. Production is conceived as ubiquitous in the
experiences, perceptions and lives of human beings (Harrod, 1997a: 109). In
terms of our focus on restructuring, attention is thus directed to the firm as a
constitutive element of a broader and more complex web of social power
relations5 which are produced, reproduced or transformed over time.6
Finally, the neo-Gramscian analyses render visible the contested nature of
social orders. Murphy interprets Gramsci’s ‘historical bloc’ as a unified social
order ‘… linked by both coercive institutions of the state proper and con-
sensual institutions of civil society’ (1994: 10). This approach directs our
attention beyond institutional analysis which deals only with static, formal-
ised public and private institutions, to expose the roles of informal and tacit
social ideas, practices and institutions within, beyond and across states and
firms. These ideas, practices and institutions will both reflect and inform the
‘shape’ of the historical bloc or how society should be organised or reorgan-
ised. Viewed in this way, restructuring becomes a process of contested
definition and redefinition of social order. This has led some scholars to open
up neo-liberal globalisation to the contests of ‘labour and other subordinate
social forces’ (Stevis and Boswell, 1997: 93).
Despite the considerable critical contribution made by neo-Gramscian
scholars to questions of power and production, transnational class, neo-
liberal politics and social and resistance movements, the opportunity to
expose the webs of power surrounding global restructuring has not yet been
fully taken up. Caught up in explanations of the power held by elite trans-
national actors in the global economy, neo-Gramscians tend not to apply their
analysis of political power to everyday realms.7 Where ordinary and common-
place sites of struggle are identified, these are designated ‘sites of resistance’,
and their relationship to programmes of restructuring (often highly contra-
dictory), is taken for granted. The problematic becomes how to account for
the commonplace contestation that gives meaning to the restructuring of
production and work. The IPE of social practice perspective, developed in
chapter 2, sheds light on the historicity, power relations and ‘everydayness’ of
the restructuring of work.
An IPE of social practice draws our attention to the historicity and con-
tingency of the restructuring of work. In contrast to essentialist accounts of
the production structure automatically transforming in line with global
dictates, a historical mode of inquiry highlights the capacity of human beings
to apprehend their circumstances. Viewed in this way, the reorganisation of
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work within firms does not simply ‘happen to’ people, it is experienced and
interpreted in the thoughts and actions of those within the production
structure. The translation of techniques such as lean production into concrete
transformations in working practices not only confronts a range of material
constraints, but also structured social practices, shared understandings and
frameworks of thought. Despite the managerial discourses that construct
workplace relations as commodities, or ‘human resources’ that can be ‘re-
engineered’ in the manner of material entities (du Gay, 1997), the restruc-
turing of work is conducted through a web of social power relations that
extends within and across the firm. Much of the discourse of hyperflexibility,
together with the interventions of lean production and TQM, relies upon a
construction of the firm as a bounded entity that can be abstracted from wider
social relations. Viewing the firm as a web of power relations and social
practices effectively problematises the assumptions that underpin hyper-
flexible programmes of restructuring.
In order to explore the webs of power that surround the restructuring of
work, it is useful to conceptually ‘freeze’ a set of workplace practices so that the
patterns and points of tension become visible:
Ideal types ‘stop’ the movement of history, conceptually fixing a parti-
cular social practice (such as a way of organising production …) so that
it can be compared with and contrasted to other social practices. To
conceptually arrest movement in this way also facilitates examination of
the points of stress and conflict that exist within any social practice
represented by a type. Thus there is no incompatibility between the use
of ideal types and a dialectical view of history. Ideal types are a part of the
tool kit of historical explanation. (Cox, 1987: 4)
Research that seeks to interrogate the webs of power that draw elite and
ordinary practices into the processes of restructuring, can usefully draw on
this conceptual ‘tool kit’, effectively allowing us to ‘crystallize a social practice’
(Harrod, 1987: 13). Taken together with Foucault-inspired insights into the
‘governmentality’ of firms as matrices of power-knowledge, such a perspective
challenges the conception of firms as bounded and rational agents. It becomes
possible to explore ‘work’ as an everyday social practice through which the
emerging social relations of globalisation are enabled or contested. The ‘ideal
types’ of working practices in the British and German commercial automotive
sectors, though in a sense artificially ‘frozen’, offer insights into the points of
contradiction that may lead to transformation. The analysis that follows here
is focused on three questions that probe the webs of power of programmes of
restructuring.
1 The state, the firm and social power relations. How is the firm situated
within a matrix of state-societal institutions and practices? In what ways
does this matrix support and limit particular programmes of restructuring?
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2 Social power relations across the firm. What is the nature and form of the
power relations that characterise interfirm relationships, such as those
between suppliers and contractors, and interinstitutional relationships,
such as those between firms and banks?
3 Social power relations within the firm. What are the patterns of compromise
and conflict between groups within the firm?
The state, the firm and social power relations
In explaining the distinctiveness of particular firms’ strategies of restruc-
turing, many commentators have appealed to ‘national capitalisms’ – con-
ceived as rival forms of capitalist organisation, providing particular contexts
for firms’ decisions (see Albert, 1993; Hart, 1992; Crouch and Streeck, 1997).
According to these institutionalist approaches, firms behave according to the
embedded institutions and practices of a nation-state, and restructure in
accordance with their contextual limits. Though, of course, in many senses the
firm is bound up simultaneously with social power relations that extend
beyond and across states, into world orders, and the everyday practices of
production and work (Cox, 1987). What is most significant in the restructur-
ing of work within firms is the perceptions, mindsets and experiences that
participants have of their relationship to governmental institutions and inter-
ventions, and to debates about world markets and global competitiveness.
Thus, it is not that a national model of capitalism automatically dictates a
particular set of restructuring strategies, but that it provides one frame of
reference, among many that shape the contours of the reorganisation of work.
The ‘social context of production’ (Cox, 1987: 12), or for our purposes the social
institutions and practices within which, and of which, the firm is constituted,
condition what is produced how it is produced and who is engaged in
production via their work. British and German manufacturing firms are
differently inserted into state-societal debates surrounding competitiveness in
a global era, and the social groups within these firms are connected to the
social spaces of the workplace, state-society and ‘global markets’ simultaneously.
Focusing on German firms broadly as ideal types, we are able to
conceptually fix a distinctive set of social practices to view their underlying
relationships and tensions. In the German case, historically the dominant
social practices tend to produce and reproduce a high value-added set of
answers to the ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions of production, transforming the
high cost of labour into a ‘competitive factor’ through a focus on quality
products (Wever, 1995: 69):
Employers who find themselves permanently prevented by rigid high
labor standards from being competitive low-wage mass producers may
discover that what they really want to be is producers of quality-
competitive, customised products, oriented towards markets in which
the expensive social system of production that they have to live with may
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not just be competitive, but may in fact be a source of competitive
advantage. (Streeck, 1997c: 203)
The ‘high value’ production practices characteristic of German industries
continue to represent the central terrain of dispute in the restructuring debate.
The maintenance of the high cost ‘quality factor’ remains central to established
firms: ‘I cannot emphasise enough the importance of stability, continuity and
strategic soundness. The idea that the customer is king is ridiculous. Some-
times what is good for the customer is not good for us’ (Finance Director,
German multinational).8
However, such views are contested by many of the smaller supplier firms
in the chain, and indeed by the trade unions. The social power relations that
sustain the dominant value-added production practices simultaneously give
rise to the contradictions which may ultimately undermine them. Sustaining a
set of high-cost production practices in a competitive global market places
constraints on the creation of jobs in the dominant sectors, a key concern of
the unions. The social relations in German firms, in a state-societal context
where welfare services are relatively underdeveloped, are more likely to be part
and parcel of the wider reproduction of the institutions of a ‘family wage’
society, paying relatively high wages and providing relative job security
(Esping-Andersen, 1996: 75). In contrast to societies which have high social
welfare service costs but which provide employment in these services,
Germany’s cost burden is in transfer payments which must be found by the
social groups within the industrial firm, through employers’ and employees’
contributions. Given the relatively underdeveloped service and leisure sectors
in Germany, the question of job creation on the one hand, and employers’ cost
burdens on the other, will continue to be the hotly debated and contested
issues of contemporary restructuring.
In the British case, by contrast, the dominant social practices tend to
produce and reproduce a low cost set of answers to the ‘what’ and ‘how’
questions of production, focusing on low-tech and service industry growth.
The flexibilisation of work in the multinational manufacturing industries has
not occurred in isolation from transformations in the SME supply chain, or
indeed from the growth of a hyperflexible service sector. The growth of a
casualised service sector has had a disciplinary effect on the demands of
workers, and the SME sector is increasingly drawn into the restructuring of
the MNCs through JIT production. Amidst a British programme that appears
‘content to compete for jobs and for trade on the basis of low wage levels’
(Rubery, 1993: 27), manufacturing firms are able to externalise their costs, and
displace risks, through access to temporary and contingent labour. Firms pursue
individual competitiveness via restructuring strategies that seek to ‘bench-
mark’ the competition, and transform working practices and ‘cultural attitudes’:
To understand what needed to be done, we started back in the mid 1980s
by benchmarking ourselves against similar firms with comparable
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processes. Initially we looked at Japanese firms – they were our major
competition. The benchmarking helped to identify some of the process
and cultural changes necessary to close the gap. (Human resources
manager, Anglo-American multinational)9
The state-firm relationship in British restructuring has effectively inten-
sified the individualisation that is attributed to neo-liberal globalisation.
Working practices are constructed as inherently malleable and open to com-
petitive emulation, and firms are legitimated as the autonomous and efficient
agents of restructuring. The costs and risks of restructuring are passed like a
hot potato between different agencies, and risk-sharing, whether between
firms for technological development, or between banks and firms for invest-
ment, or between groups of employees in consultation practices, is inhibited.
Indeed, even in the context of a single management team, the process of
individualisation results in a number of competing interpretations of global
competition. During the East Asian crisis, for example, purchasing managers
reported a competitive advantage in the low cost of imported components,
while their counterparts in production and exports lamented the strength of
sterling and the saturation of electronics markets. In the context of
performance-related pay, targets and stock options, such tensions become a
significant feature of restructuring. The perceptions and experiences of
British and German participants in corporate restructuring indicate that they
find themselves in a whirlpool of debates within which governmental regula-
tion and deregulation, ‘global’ managerial debates, and day-to-day organisa-
tional questions represent currents that may tug in opposing directions.
Social power relations across the firm
An exploration of the restructuring debates in which firms are engaged
demonstrates the interconnectedness of production and work within the firm,
and social institutions, practices and ideas across the firm – extending into
supplier and contractor firms (Lane, 1996a, 1996b). Contests and compro-
mises in the reorganisation of work within a firm cannot be meaningfully
abstracted from prevailing practices that are crystallised in institutions and
agencies assumed to be external to the firm. Neo-liberal discourses of hyper-
flexibility advocate the individualisation of the firm and the devolution of
responsibility and autonomy to the level of immediate managerial production
decisions. Indeed, it could be said that such discourses rely upon the abstraction
of the firm from its wider relationship with state-society. The restructuring
activities and debates within German and British manufacturing firms reflect
and inform a web of power that extends seamlessly into banks, education
institutions and civil society.
The webs of power that pull together the interests of German firms, banks
and shareholders have historically reproduced credit-based finance, cross-
shareholding and overlapping directorships. German banks held 10.3 per cent
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of total shares in 1997, a figure that compares with 2.3 per cent in the British
case, where institutional investors are dominant (Deutsche Bundesbank,
1997). The resultant close ties between the finance, management, and
ownership of firms, coupled with a high incidence of family-owned firms and
state shareholdings have become the subject of much debate in the
restructuring of German industries (Vitols and Woolcock, 1997). On the one
hand, studies of management perceptions of restructuring indicate that the
shared long-term time horizons reap benefits in terms of investment in
training and innovation (Culpepper, 1999; Harding and Soskice, 2000). As one
finance director put it ‘we do not mind spending money in the short-term and
we are prepared to wait three years or more to see the gains. We don’t share the
gambling mindset of the “casino” UK or US’. Social practices of education and
training of engineers and technicians requires such investment, together with
the maintenance of ‘cooperation between companies, universities and research
institutes’ (Soskice, 1996: 17). Restructuring debates take place in clusters of
agencies, with large export-oriented MNCs and supply SMEs, for example,
sharing training programmes and product development costs. The full or part
purchase of a supply firm by a MNC is much in evidence, the rationale
explained in terms of control over quality and information flow.
The maintenance of close interfirm and firm-agency ties is not without
controversy, however. The debate as to the virtues of shareholders versus
stakeholders that rages within German state-society, for example, is evident in
corporate debates, with divisions even within firms as to the appropriate
relationship between financiers and managers. The emerging dualism
between large equity-financed MNCs and the ‘Mittlestand’ of bank-based
credit is reflected in divergent attitudes to the role of equities in the compe-
titiveness of German firms (Deeg, 1997). So too, the restructuring of interfirm
relationships has been subject to contestation, particularly where suppliers
offer cheaper labour. An instance of subcontracting to a Hungarian supplier
provides a case in point. The German MNC bought a majority share in a
Hungarian firm which became a key supplier. Assembly functions have incre-
mentally been moved to Hungary, meeting with resistance from the works
councils. In an attempt to ameliorate the problem, the MNC began a series of
6-month long ‘exchanges’ between the plants, designed to inculcate a sense of
‘shared identity’. Given the context of union concern over the creation of
German jobs and apprenticeships, there has been little reconciliation. This is
an illustrative example of the contested boundaries of German firms’
restructuring programmes. Corporate managers are faced with a delicate
balancing act between pushing the parameters of flexibility, while maintaining
the cohesion necessary to sustain value-added production.
Turning our attention to the restructuring of work within British firms,
the dominant relationships between manufacturing firms, banks and share-
holders tend to be arms-length and fragmented, reflecting the centrality of the
equity-financing and shareholder value. The concentration of shareholdings
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in the hands of institutional investors tends to produce and reproduce a
separation of ownership from control, and a concomitant decoupling of firms
from their sources of financial capital. Thus the dominant web of power
characterising the relationships between a firm and its sources of finance tend
to be profit-focused, privileging the short-term and, therefore, the support of
entrepreneurial ‘start-ups’ and venture capital, while simultaneously reinfor-
cing an environment of instability, insecurity and individual risk. As Jill
Rubery has it ‘British firms do not see themselves as producers but as asset
managers’ (1993: 10). Managers of production plants communicate a sense of
‘distance’ between their everyday production decisions (described as ‘the real
world’), and what they see as the arcane movements of the stock market
(described as ‘a cartoon world’). In response to this environment of short-
termism, managers charged with restructuring plants paradoxically intensify
the immediacy of responses. They shift the short-termism on to the relation-
ships with suppliers, seeking out multiple sources of supply that can be
changed at will, avoiding partnerships and alliances that ‘tie in’ particular
orders. The effects of such displacement are explained vividly by the manager
of an SME who described his relationship to the client MNC as ‘like the
milkman’, where the placing or cancellation of an order could be as immediate
as a ‘note left on the doorstep’. The overwhelming insight coming out of the
restructuring experiences of British managers is that they are making their
own kind of global ‘uncertainties’, and passing these down the supply chain.
The tensions of ‘arms-length’ relationships are also evident in the skills
debate within British management discourses. In the context of an unregu-
lated and individualised training environment, where ‘staff poaching’ is
feared, skills development is seen ‘not as a productive investment … but as an
operating expense that depresses returns in the present’ (Lazonick and
O’Sullivan, 1996: 33). The competitive individualism that leads firms to rely
on the labour market to provide skilled workers is further exacerbated by the
growth in the use of temporary labour and the adoption of ‘hire and fire’
practices. The editorial of an engineering management magazine illustrates
the problem to good effect: ‘Some of industry has taken a careless approach to
its skills base, seeming to believe it can discard and rehire people at whim, as if
skills can be switched on and off like a light bulb. They can’t, and the corollary
is that skill shortages don’t just occur at times when companies are recruiting:
they are long-term too’ (Professional Engineering, 11 February, 1998: 3). The
debate was continued in the magazine the following month, with a former
Land Rover worker contributing a letter:
I asked my managing director why he had reduced the apprentice intake
from 80 a year to zero. He replied that he could get all the skilled
engineers he needed from other firms … He would not accept that, by
taking youngsters from school and sponsoring training he would sustain
a core of staff both skilled in the company’s requirements and possibly
with that rare commodity, company loyalty. He was, at that time, the
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managing director of Land Rover. (Letter, Professional Engineering, 11
March, 1998: 33)
In 1998, by this time owned by German BMW, the British-based car company
announced it may recruit abroad, following 20 applications for 150 advertised
skilled engineering posts. With Honda in Swindon reporting problems with
skills shortages, it would seem that the British location is the most significant
factor in enabling or constraining restructuring decisions. Now owned by
Ford, Land Rover continues to exhibit the short-term relationships that are at
the nub of contests surrounding British restructuring.
Social power relations within the firm
It is perhaps the social relations within the firm itself which are most self-
evidently engaged in a process of bargaining and contest. Indeed, studies of
industrial relations begin precisely from the point of observing such contests
in their distinctive social settings.10 However, within IPE debates there has
been a neglect of labour relations, and where labour has been studied it has
been viewed through the lens of changes in industrial relations practices. So,
for example, Cox’s (1971) early work on labour and transnational relations
directly equates labour with national trade union organisations. More
recently, organised labour has become a focus for the analysis of potential
strategies of resistance to neo-liberal restructuring and globalisation (see
Stevis and Boswell, 1997; O’Brien, 1997; IILS, 1999a).
There is little doubt that a focus on labour groups can go some way to
counterbalance the preoccupation with finance and MNC power that
globalisation has precipitated. A focus on organised labour clearly makes
some contribution to a humanising of our knowledge of global change.
However, it is important also to consider some of the problematics raised by a
focus on organised labour. As emphasised by Hyman ‘to be representative is to
share the main characteristics of a broader population; but trade union and
other employee representatives are never representative in this sense’ (1997:
311). A focus on the changing shape of trade unions, for example, may not
closely reflect the diversity of experiences of change in the workplace. In
chapter 6 I will more fully explore the transformations in the meaning of
work, and the implications for unprotected workers. However, here I am
concerned with the webs of power that characterise the relationships between
organised labour and the restructuring programmes of MNCs.
A starting point in the exploration of these webs of social power relations
is to focus on the firm as a primary site of production and work. This leads us
to ask critical questions about the relationships between different social
groups within the firm, and about how these relationships inform processes of
restructuring. How do the social relations within our ideal-type firms produce
and reproduce specific social practices, and how might these practices be
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contested and transformed? For Cox, distinctive ‘orientations to action’
provide social groups with different ways of thinking about a problem:
‘Specific social groups tend to evolve a collective mentality, that is, a typical
way of perceiving and interpreting the world that provides orientations to
action for members of the group’ (Cox, 1987: 25).
The experiences different social groups have of embedded practices
within the firm will be imprinted on the world view that informs their under-
standings, actions and contests. For Pauly and Reich such ideas provide ‘broad
orienting frameworks or belief systems that, when combined with national
institutions, define “collective understandings” of roles, beliefs, expectations,
and purposes’ (1997: 6). The social practices which rise to the top and become
dominant in a process of contest between social actors are likely to reflect the
relative power of social groups to engage with the debates surrounding
restructuring, and to shape these debates in a way which reflects their interests
and understandings.
The dual German model of trade union/works council industrial relations,
with the unions sustaining two-thirds of works council seats, has led to a
negotiated restructuring agenda, as discussed in chapter 4. Power within the
firm is effectively diffused through formalised and institutionalised industrial
relations practices, described by Maurice Glasman as ‘the negotiated distri-
bution of power’ (1997: 22), and by Alain Lipietz as ‘negotiated involvement’
(1997: 4). Despite challenges from employers seeking greater regulatory
freedoms, there is a broad acknowledgement that consensus has a value that is
difficult to quantify, and risky to disrupt:
If you believe that you can quantify labour costs and savings, this is
nonsense. How do you calculate for skills developed over a lifetime? An
example of this is our sickness pay issue, how do you quantify that? You
may know that you reduce labour costs by 3%, but how do you know that
the morale of your workers has not cost you 10%? You cannot know this,
I doubt it very much. (Works Councillor, German multinational)11
There is a sense in which German employers insulate themselves from politically-
sensitive negotiations, conducting these through formal channels. For example,
in the introduction of new production technologies that reduce labour input,
the works councils have played a role in negotiating the terms of the reorgan-
isation of work and the retirement packages of redundant workers. In another
case, a firm sought greater functional flexibility through an ‘outsourcing’
arrangement with an external supplier. Following negotiations with the works
councils, a satellite ‘job shop’ was established, staffed by existing skilled workers,
and designed to supply particular components on a ‘client’ basis, subsidised by
business with other companies.
However, the shifting focus of the employer-employee relationship, in
particular increased decentralisation to the individual firm, has been subject
to considerable contestation. Employers organisations have experienced
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‘association flight’ as firms have sought to define their own bargaining
arrangements. As Werner Stumpfe, President of the leading engineering em-
ployers organisation ‘Gesamtmetall’ reports ‘companies feel straightjacketed
by the present agreements and want room to manoeuvre’. The question of the
vulnerability of ‘bargain bound’ German firms to international competition
from ‘footloose’ Anglo-American businesses remains a significant feature of
the debate within German firms.
Focusing on the restructuring of work in British firms, the relationships
between employer and employee are bound up with an intensified emphasis
on the individual in society more generally (Williams, 1997: 498). In terms of
production and work, the historical voluntarism of industrial relations
implies a dual fragmentation, of the firm from its external social relationships,
and within the firm between competing social groups. This decoupling of the
experiences of work and production from a broader set of shared social
understandings, has implications for the ways in which social groups seek to
organise their interests. We can see several key mutually-reinforcing strands to
the individualisation of the interests of social groups within British firms.
First, the lines of communication between employer and employee,
historically represented by a ‘single channel’ of trade union-centred collective
bargaining, are increasingly ‘dominated by the employer, with no independent
representation of workers interests’ (Hyman, 1997: 314). There is a ‘repre-
sentation gap’ (Towers, 1997) in hyperflexible state-societies that leaves six out
of seven US workers, and two out of three British workers, without effective
forms of representation at work. As a result, concerted negotiation has been
rejected in favour of social practices that privilege ad-hoc concession
bargaining and fragmented and individualised ‘deals’. This process of decollect-
ivisation has been paralleled by an increased emphasis on individual
mechanisms of control and monitoring such as those inherent to systems of
HRM, TQM and indeed many systems of ‘employee involvement’ (see Rubery,
1993; Moody, 1997). For example, a slide from a management presentation to
production workers, entitled The Process of Improvement, positions the
individual at the heart of the ‘quality circle’: ‘a total quality approach must
underly all business processes; especially management of change’. This
requires quality to be built into every process and quality output expected
from ‘every individual in the company’. The language of the relationship
between manager and worker is defined in terms of the imperatives of JIT,
kaizen (continuous improvement), kanban (literally ‘ticket’, attached to product
as moved though production process).
Where contestation arises in the individualisation of the employment
relationship this tends to be presented by managers as an attitudinal problem,
or a failure to grasp the imperatives of restructuring. As a human resources
manager put it to me: ‘One of the problems we have had here has been
changing the mindsets and attitudes of older workers. This used to be a
mining area and tinplate works. As those industries faded, people changed
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their jobs but not their attitudes, which were still strong unions and anti-
management’ (Anglo-American multinational).12 The problem is thus asso-
ciated with a collective mindset of shared past practices that is resistant to
individualisation.
Second, the individualised nature of the employee-employer relationship
has contributed to the fragmentation of the interests of employees within the
firm. Corporate managers tend to divide workers into categories of wage
structures and terms and conditions, fragmenting social groups into various
degrees of ‘contingent’ labour using part-time and temporary contracts.
Crouch has equated this recurring pattern with the dissolution of the concept
of employment, ‘replacing it by a series of contracts between a customer firm
and a mass of small labour-contracting firms, temporary agencies or, in
extreme cases, individual providers of labour services’ (1997: 375). This effec-
tively both externalises and individualises the social relations of production,
with employers sustaining and reproducing a longer-term set of relations with
a core of employee groups who are ‘inculcated into a culture’ and a larger
group of contract workers who are ‘outside that circle’ (Crouch, 1997: 375).
Indeed, this division of interests can be used to discipline core workers, with
contract staff maintained at approximately 50 per cent of the workforce and
distributed around the plant. As Herrigel describes it ‘the old style firm
disintegrates entirely into an infinitely recombinable set of roles and relations
that the participants themselves reflect upon and restructure’ (1994: 6). The
governmentality of the hyperflexible British firm produces a form of self-
management, within which workers pre-empt managerial intervention by
restructuring themselves.13
Finally, this fragmentation has distinctive implications for the bargaining
terrain of trade unions. The social relations within which trade unions
organise are likely to reinforce their links with the ‘insider’ fragments of the
workforce. British trade unions have sought to respond to this environment
by becoming individual ‘service providers’, for their ‘consumers’ (Williams,
1997: 498), representing employees as individuals in disputes with employers.
This process has, of course, further strengthened the role of certain social
groups within the firm and placed significant constraints on the inter-
mediation of contested interests. As a union official explains, in one sense the
‘new workers’ are lost to the collective focus of the union, and yet their
interests and experiences remain common:
It’s a whole new ball game for the new generation of workers. They are
expected to plan a life, a family, manage a pension, insurance schemes,
while working on a temporary contract. Eventually something will
capture the imagination of this group – which is, after all, likely to
become the largest group of interests. (AEEU official)14
The patterns of social relations within British firms tend to be fragmented
and individualised, providing the employer with unlimited access to ad-hoc
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contract relations with the ‘external’ labour market, while significantly
limiting the potential for workers to organise their interests:
… the demands for increased labour market flexibility grow more
strident by the day while assorted management gurus tell our young
people that regular, life-time employment is a luxury they cannot expect
to enjoy in this brave new world … Paradoxically these demands are
increasingly based on threats rather than promises. Wage reductions, the
intensification of labour, the elimination of trade union influence, are all
now said to be necessary in order to avert disaster and decline, rather
than to attain greater prosperity. This shift is highly significant because
the threat of decline constitutes a more compelling argument for change
… There are no gains to be distributed, only losses to be averted. The
stick has replaced the carrot. (Bienefeld, 1991: 4)
In the case of British firms, the reorganisation of work has circumscribed
the interests of workers in many sectors, and with varying skills and specialisms.
Indeed, it has presented greater risks and insecurities across the spectrum of
managers and workers:
Some firms are seeking to discover how far they can proceed with a policy
of ‘eating one’s cake and having it’: seeking strong but unreciprocated
commitment and loyalty from staff. Anxieties about the constant pressure
to demonstrate to shareholders adequate achievements in down-sizing
and delayering lead managers to do this, these managers themselves being
vulnerable to redundancy through these processes. (Crouch, 1997: 375)
Current debates in the British management literature about the potential
costs of disaffected labour would suggest that the ‘loss of legitimacy’ factor is
recognised by those who seek to manage change. It is noted, for example, that
‘employee-centred innovation’ is limited in a low-trust atmosphere (Indepen-
dent on Sunday, 19 October 1997: 6). The restructuring of work in British
firms, with its nod to empowerment and employee involvement, and the
concrete experience of disaffection and insecurity, is witnessing the emergence
of a form of ‘infra-politics’ (Scott, 1990). Workers engage in footdragging and
passive resistance in order to avoid the ‘quality schemes’ that, designed to
reduce costs, ultimately are seen as leading to redundancies.
Taken together, the experiences and perceptions of restructuring within
German and British firms demonstrate distinctive dynamics of contestation.
Dominant social practices within German firms tend to favour the provision
of legitimate ‘vents’ through the mandated channels of the trade unions and
works councils, negotiating ‘outcomes that are both mutually and socially
acceptable’ (Wever, 1995: 63). Hence, the diminishing sector of society in em-
ployment within core manufacturing find shared channels of communication
for their interests. The pressures on these channels paradoxically come from
employers seeking greater decentralisation, and from social groups who are
excluded from such work. The dominant webs of power in British firms, by
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contrast, tend to reproduce managerial autonomy, dividing and excluding
social groups within the workplace and externalising the employment
relationship to outsourcing plants and external employment agencies.
In sum, viewing the firm as a key site of the contestation of global
restructuring makes visible distinctive webs of social power relations. We are
led to acknowledge that these social power relations may produce, sustain and
potentially transform institutionalised social practices in ways that are
distinctive and unique. Our comparative analysis of British and German firms
demonstrates the contingency of social understandings of, and responses to,
globalisation and restructuring. For those who seek to raise the profile of
labour groups in the understanding and shaping of global change, these
insights have considerable utility. It becomes clear that individuals and social
groups do not simply accept globalisation and respond to its dictates with the
restructuring of their working practices. Indeed, we may even question the
notion of one clear and common process of globalisation in the sense that ‘my
globalisation is not your globalisation’ since people interpret and experience
the processes in diverse ways. Viewed in this way, strategies of hyperflexibility
are not unproblematic or ubiquitous, but open to contestation and challenge.
Conclusion
The study of the firm in IPE has come to be closely bound up with under-
standings of globalisation. In many senses the firm has a rightful place at the
heart of understandings of global transformations. It is, after all, through
production and work that most people directly experience and interpret
processes of globalisation in their everyday lives. In short, for academics,
policy-makers, business people and non-elite social groups, the site of the firm
has become a primary site of restructuring and change. While supporting the
renewed emphasis on the firm in contemporary IPE for these reasons, this
chapter has noted a lack of critical engagement with the political economy of
the firm in orthodox accounts.15 The chapter has taken a series of steps towards
such a critical engagement by highlighting the webs of power and social
practices that constitute and contest the firm as a site of work and production.
The first step has been to reflect upon and problematise our received under-
standings of the firm in the IPE. Much of the mainstream agenda in con-
temporary IPE has been dominated by studies of the relative and structural
power of states vis-à-vis markets. For ‘markets’ much of the literature has
substituted ‘firms’, drawing on models advanced by economics and business
studies to develop a ‘rational actor’ view of the behaviour of firms. I have
raised questions of this conception of the firm on the grounds that it ascribes
the restructuring activities of the firm with a natural and automatic logic. In
the opening citation, E. P. Thompson critiques the economic determinism of
some historical accounts of social change, arguing that the thoughts, ideas,
experiences and struggles of human beings in productive relationships are as
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significant as material factors. ‘The restructuring of relations of power’, he
reminds us, ‘has always been the outcome of struggle’ (1976/1994: 222).
Following such insights, representations of the firm as a unitary agent of
globalisation, acting automatically to intensify globalisation, are subjected to
challenge. The firm is opened up to reveal the contests and tensions that
characterise changes in working practices, and their extension into the
institutions and practices of state and civil society.
The second step has been to apply an IPE of social practice to the firm,
with the aim of disclosing its political and social character. I have argued that
programmes of restructuring within firms are context specific and historically
contingent. Individual corporate groups, workers and unions do not simply
respond to the imperatives of lean production and TQM. Rather, they
experience, interpret and translate the meanings of restructuring programmes,
and reflect on their implications in the light of immediate problematics and
past practices. As a complex web of power-knowledge, the firm exhibits
multiple restructuring discourses in its relationship with institutions, suppliers,
contractors and worker groups. The power exercised by corporate managers is
never simply a negative power of withdrawing influence from particular
groups, but produces and reproduces particular relationships and disciplines,
such as the individualism of the employment relation in Britain, and the
formal channels of industrial relations in Germany. The contests and
compromises that characterise restructuring in British and German firms
serve to demonstrate that the reorganisation of work cannot, and should not,
be presented as unproblematic or inevitable. Put simply, if firms are
understood to have inevitable roles in intensifying globalisation, then the
potential for states and social groups to regulate, challenge or transform these
roles is restricted.
Finally, the paper has elucidated some of the implications of bringing
contestedness to our understandings of the firm in knowledge terms. The
political economy of the firm is itself constituted of contested knowledge: of
what we know about the world, how we know it and how we might seek to
change it. Dominant understandings of the firm within globalisation have
tended to produce an image of the MNC as a market domain within which
‘experts’ direct strategy to maximise profits. The management programmes of
labour flexibilisation are thus lent an air of legitimacy and rationality. The
realm of everyday working practices is thus constructed as a realm of
‘response’ to ‘higher’ initiatives. By bringing the everyday into our analysis of
the activities of MNCs we become more attuned to the making of global
restructuring in and through social practices. While in some instances the
threats and insecurities of contingent work discipline workers so that they
‘restructure themselves’ and monitor their own practices, in others the
breaking up of past alliances clears space for new tactics. In broad terms, the
concept of a ‘contested firm’ enables us to move beyond a focus on abstracted,
exogenous economic transformations, to consider the ways in which
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globalisation becomes manifested in, and contested through, diverse social
practices. In the chapter that follows, the relationships between workers
within patterns of global restructuring will be explored.
Notes
1 The neo-realist and liberal debates surrounding ‘non-state actors’ tend to seek out new
units of analysis or ‘new things to look at’, and new ‘levels’ of analysis or new places to
find historical material (see Krasner, 1994; Keohane, 1984). From a different per-
spective, world-systems theorists tend to look at institutions and actors in addition to
the state in order to understand capital accumulation, their basic ‘level’. What these
approaches do not do, however, is stand back from their assumptions to consider new
ways of understanding the units or levels or, indeed, reflect upon how they have
conventionally understood them.
2 For Ruigrok and van Tulder ‘… it is false to suggest that a firm or government has one
strategy since it was top management that came to this decision, after an internal and
external bargaining process. One should also consider whether it was a unanimous
decision, which interests or departments or persons prepared the decision and which
opposed it’ (1995: 65).
3 The concept of lean production essentially combines the technological and productive
labour elements of kaizen (continuous improvement), kanban and JIT, multi-skilling
and teamworking, TQM, numerical and functional flexibility and outsourcing and
supply-chain innovations. The key emphasis lies in the reduction of ‘slack’ in both
materials and labour to reduce costs and increase management control.
4 For critical analysis of the use of the concept ‘lean production’, see Moody (1997), ch. 5.
5 An example of the inextricable relationships between the social power relations within
the firm, and the broader social forces of society, is Harrod’s insight into the ability of
the firm to ‘externalise’ its costs on to society through, for example, the use of contin-
gent labour. The actions of the firm, in this way, both reflect and contribute to wider
social power relations (Comments made in discussion following paper presented at
BISA 22nd Annual Conference, 15–17 December 1997).
6 Rupert, for example, in his study of the post-war hegemony of American Fordist mass
production effectively raises the issue of power, critiquing approaches which neglect
the ‘crucial processes through which power has been produced, and the conflicting
social relations which at once underlie and make possible that production, and which
also make problematic its long-term reproduction’ (Rupert, 1995: 1).
7 See Sinclair’s (1999) work on the ‘IPE of the commonplace’ for a notable exception to
this neglect of the ordinary features of power in the GPE.
8 Confidential interview with board members of key automotive components
multinational, 3 September 1997.
9 Confidential interview with human resources department, electronic component multi-
national, 23 February 1998.
10 For Harrod the study of Industrial Relations as ‘a field in which the focus was work
and its relationship to production’ has had much to offer the scholar of IPE through its
focus on social forces as ‘the identifiable social energy precipitated by production’
(1997a: 109).
11 Confidential focus group with works councillors, Cologne, 27 August 1997.
12 Confidential interview with human resources department, electronic component
multinational, 23 February 1998.
Amoore_Global_06_Ch5 6/19/02, 2:08 PM135
136 Globalisation contested
13 In one assembly plant visited, prominent posters showing the productivity and costs
of Mexican workers producing similar components for the parent MNC, were
displayed on the walls. In another plant, the cafeteria walls had been replaced with
glass screens to enable workers who had returned to the line to clearly see those who
had extended their break.
14 Confidential interview, 19 March 1998.
15 The renewed emphasis on the firm in IPE has led some scholars to make inroads into
more critical accounts of the firm as both concept and social arena. See, for example,
Eden (1991) and Tétreault (1999).
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
Globalisation at work:
unheard voices and invisible agency

The contemporary problematic of globalisation has encouraged a parti-cular mode of knowledge to dominate explanations of social change.
Academic and popular discussion of all matters ‘global’ have predominantly
asked ‘what is happening’ type questions. It has become almost common sense
to seek to explain the nature of the beast itself, making reference to techno-
logical and market structures as the driving forces of change. In this formu-
lation the everyday lives of people are positioned passively outside the process,
receiving the imperatives of global restructuring. For workers this implies that
transformations in their everyday lives will follow essentially, necessarily and
automatically from new production technologies, the competitive impulses of
global markets and the demands of shareholder capitalism. Where agency-
centred questions have been raised in the globalisation debate, these have
tended to focus upon the decisions and actions of powerful transnational,
state or corporate elites. Here the actions, experiences and articulations of
workers are simply contained within corporations, transnational trade unions
and state formations as sites of global restructuring. Taken as a whole, the
globalisation debate has tended to reproduce an implicitly ‘problem-solving’
mode of knowledge, one that emphasises the explanation of, as opposed to the
understanding of, global social change (Cox, 1996: 88; Hollis and Smith, 1990: 1).
This chapter argues that the dominant representations of global restruc-
turing have rendered the voices, experiences and practices of workers, and
particularly unprotected or unrepresented workers, unheard and invisible.1
Not only does this invisibility produce a serious deficit in our understandings
of the dynamics of global change, but it also causes us to avert our eyes from
the very sites where work and political contestation is taking place in the
global political economy. As MNCs increasingly outsource their production
and services, they become fractured into loosely connected sites, many of
them employing unprotected and precarious workers. The programmes of
restructuring in the advanced industrialised countries (AICs), whether
‘hyperflexible’ or ‘flexi-corporatist’, run in a seamless web of power with the
practices of unprotected workers in the less developed countries (LDCs) of
the ‘South’, and with the ‘invisible’ work undertaken in the informal sectors of
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the ‘North’. For a contract worker in a British production plant, the everyday
practices of Mexican workers producing the same component for the client
corporation may be far more proximate than geography would dictate, and
may be expressed ambiguously in terms of competition and insecurity, or in
terms of identification and solidarity. For a Bolivian live-in domestic worker
in Berlin, the practices of her globally mobile management consultant em-
ployer constitute yet another ambiguous and contradictory global working
relationship. On the surface they could be depicted as women working flexibly
in a global economy, yet their experiences are in tension and their relationship
is fundamentally unequal.
As a consequence, if we are to understand work in the GPE, we need to
look beyond ‘states and firms’ to consider the political, geographical and social
relationships that workers have with one another, and to the GPE, and how
these relationships are historically and discursively constituted. In line with an
IPE of social practice, this chapter explores the everyday practices of work that
variously enable, contest or confound the emerging social relations of
globalisation. The chapter is organised in three parts. The first explores the
representation of transformations in work and work organisation within the
dominant expositions of globalisation. In what ways are workers rendered
invisible by the globalisation discourse? In the section that follows, the treat-
ment of production and work within IPE is discussed. Where workers are
made visible in analysis, which workers feature and which remain excluded?
Finally, a social practice approach to work is outlined and insights are drawn
for the repoliticisation of work in IPE. It is argued that in order to restore and
capture the social conflicts, tensions and compromises of the restructuring of
work, it is necessary to address the concrete experiences of workers who are
differentially positioned in the IPE of work. Given the explosion of working
practices into multiple domains, it is increasingly problematic to delineate
those practices that are contemporaneous with particular state-societies.
Throughout this chapter, I draw on illustrations of working practices that con-
nect to, yet extend beyond, the flexibilisation of work in Britain and Germany.
Global restructuring and the invisibility of work
The concept of globalisation has been variously described as ‘vague’, ‘ambigu-
ous’, ‘the cliché of our times’ and ‘wishful’ (Jones, 1995: 3; Held et al., 1999: 1;
Scholte, 2000: 1). It is perhaps the empty and mythical nature of the concept
that has endowed globalisation with such seductive power, inviting people to
fill the void with distinctive meanings. The dominant representations of
globalisation celebrate a process of change that is the inevitable outcome of
the expansionary ambitions of a global economy and transborder technology,
and deplore the politicisation of the process: ‘Lately, technology has been the
main driver of globalisation … It would be naïve to think that governments
could let integration proceed mainly under its own steam, trusting to
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technological progress and economic freedom, desirable as that would be.
Politics could never be like that’ (The Economist, 23 September 2000: 19). In
this reading states, societies and political activities ‘get in the way’ of an
economic and technological process of transformation. A kind of ‘no alterna-
tive’ logic prevails, whereby it is assumed that practices will be restructured to
conform to a hyperflexible Anglo-Saxon model. Political and social aspects of
change are abstracted from the economic and technological imperatives so
that particular governments, trade unions and welfare institutions, for
example, are cast as obstructions to successful transformation. The social costs
of global restructuring are commonly perceived as temporary by-products of
adjustment to the imperatives of change. ‘People’ generally, and non-elite
groups specifically, are rendered invisible in such readings of globalisation.
People are positioned as passive receptors of global imperatives who, if they
are sensible, will seize the opportunities of a globalising world economy.
Representations of the globalisation of production, whether framed in
terms of post-Fordism (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1989; Lipietz, 1987), transform-
ations in competitive strategy (Strange, 1996; Porter, 1990) or grand-scale
shifts in the organisation of capitalist societies (Rifkin, 1995; Toffler, 1980), all
tend to emphasise the common effects of transformation in different places.
The restructuring of work is presented as a unidirectional and universal
outcome of restructured production, with global forces determining changes
in everyday practices as though workers were simply passive observers of a
‘bigger’ process. Such analysis tends to feed an economic management logic
that says that all work must become flexible, casual, contingent, feminised and
service-oriented if the opportunities of globalisation are to be seized and the
forces of global production successfully ‘harnessed’. ‘Making globalisation
work’ has thus received a dialectical double meaning in recent times. On the
one hand it has been used to indicate that globalisation has a ‘friendly face’
that can ‘work’, and on the other, the restructuring of work itself is presented
as a panacea with the potential to ameliorate the pain of globalisation.2 The
surface-level shifts of new production technologies and management
techniques are highly visible in such accounts, but the contradictory currents
below the surface remain obscured from view. While the introduction of ICTs
to the workplace, receives a high profile in accounts of the flexibilisation of
work, the temporal practices of work and home life that make their intro-
duction possible are less visible: ‘In stressing the shared patterns of global
processes, there is a tendency to underestimate how the conditions and relations
of everyday life constitute processes of economic and social reorganization’
(Feldman and Buechler, 1998: 623).
The everyday experiences, practices and contests of workers are over-
looked amidst a flurry of activity in pursuit of the definitive understanding of
‘large-scale’ transformations. Indeed, international economic institutions
have cast labour as a commodity that is simply moulded to fit prevailing
economic conditions. The World Bank acknowledges that change is ‘difficult
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and frightening’ (1995: 11), and the European Commission that ‘the reorgan-
isation of work often causes uncertainty’ (CEC, 1997: 8). Yet, the overriding
assumption is that the globalisation process is a given reality, essentially
separate from the social and political restructuring that is undertaken in its
name, and entirely independent of the everyday thoughts and actions of
workers. Indeed, in the effort to construct a discourse of opportunity and
manageability, such interventions represent the agency of workers as a
problem to be overcome on the path to a more adaptable and flexible work-
force. Put simply, there is an implicit warning that the organised actions of
workers will incur the wrath of the not-so-friendly face of globalisation.
Agency uncovered: perspectives from IPE
Critical IPE accounts of globalisation have tended to expose and counter the
dominant discourse with an emphasis on the power of particular individual
and collective agents to drive or resist global change. It must be said, however,
that these agents are identified predominantly in terms of production
structures at transnational and national levels. In short, IPE has appeared
comfortable with production and the empirical study of the firm, and much
less comfortable with the study of labour and work, resulting in the ‘deafening
silence’ that is the ‘almost total neglect of labour’ (Denemark and O’Brien,
1997: 232). As I have shown in my discussion of the firm, transformations in
labour and work are variously given their agency through a focus on the
actions of MNCs as key actors in production (Stopford and Strange, 1991;
Sklair, 2001); the power of the disciplinary forces of neo-liberalism (Gill, 1995);
and, much more rarely, the actions of fledgling global trade union movements
(O’Brien, 2000; Cox, 1999; Radice, 2000). Meanwhile, others point to the
‘embeddedness’ of MNCs in national structures (Sally, 1994), and to the
competing models of national capitalism, particularly industrial relations
institutions and systems of production, that give distinctive character to
divergent patterns of change in forms of work (Crouch and Streeck, 1997).
The approaches outlined provide a valuable antidote to the techno-
economic determinism of the dominant globalisation discourse. They provide
us with insight into the individuals and groups whose actions, knowledge and
power are intertwined with global transformation. However, taken together,
they sustain a separation of labour and workers from the restructuring of states
and firms, highlighting the experiences of workers solely in terms of their
relationship to production, narrowly defined. As Peter Burnham has compell-
ingly argued, the category of ‘labour’ is explored only insofar as it equates with
‘trade union bargaining power’ (1999: 3). It is not difficult to see how even
critical accounts of hyperliberal restructuring could feed a depoliticisation of
labour by reinforcing the image of a spent force. The prevailing common sense
begins to see the elite-level actions of national governments and corporate man-
agers as the sole legitimate ‘researchable’ agents in the restructuring of work.
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In subsuming work into understandings of production and capital, IPE
analysis does tend to treat labour as a singular force, and workers as a natural-
ised category of class that maps on to a global proletariat. As E. P. Thompson
noted: ‘There is an ever-present temptation to suppose that class is a thing’
(1968: 10). The insights of his historical mode of thought are particularly
significant given the way the problem of class consciousness is framed in the
light of contemporary changes:
One of the most puzzling developments of the closing decades of the
twentieth century has been the precipitous decline of working-class
consciousness and organisation at a time of great numerical expansion
of the world proletariat … It was not unreasonable to expect the
capitalist crisis of the 1970s would enhance rather than dampen the class
consciousness of the expanding world proletariat. (Silver and Arrighi,
2001: 53)
To take seriously the historical contingency of workers’ consciousness and
experiences is to problematise the above assumption that ‘class consciousness’,
as a monolithic entity, rises and falls in response to capitalist shifts. Workers
express a multitude of contradictory and contingent ‘consciousnesses’ in the
deciphering of their experiences of restructuring, and are differentially
inserted into relationships with one another, and with global fractions of
capital. The contradictions and compromises of workers’ experiences thus
provide a window on the tensions and inequalities of globalisation. Some
intraworker dynamics and relationships actually intensify and enable the
programmes of hyperflexibility that are enacted in the name of globalisation.
As Dimitris Stevis has it, there are ‘competing experiences and expectations
depending on the “position” of the worker in the political geography of work’,
so that even ‘formally protected workers may be well protected citizens through
other means’ (personal correspondence, 2001). To assume that workers repre-
sent a singular and coherent group of potential ‘globalisation resistors’ not
only seriously underplays the participation of some workers in enabling
hyperflexibility, but it also underestimates the concrete acts of resistance that
emerge in the interstitial spaces outside of formal organised channels. Trade
unions themselves increasingly acknowledge both the importance of
unprotected sites for global campaigns, and the potential contradiction within
the sites’ relationships to other workers.
In essence, state-societies, firms and ‘classes’ are too often assumed to ‘contain’
workers, and are rarely unpacked to reveal the political and social forces
engendered by these workers (Amoore, 2000; Vilrokx, 1999). Where labour is
acknowledged in analysis, this is conceived as an oppositional force of resist-
ance, embodied in the form of organised and represented workers in trade
unions. As a result, while the invisibility and obfuscation of agency in the hyper-
flexibility discourse is challenged, alternative sources and forms of invisibility
emerge in IPE inquiry. The need to address new sources of the invisibility of
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workers is rendered all the more acute by the very restructuring process itself,
which serves to fracture the firm into a myriad of loosely connected or
contracted fragments. As a result, an exploration of the restructuring of work
in particular social spaces cannot meaningfully abstract the workforces of
individual firms from their relationships with the practices of agencies,
satellite plants, workshops and households. There are a number of dimensions
to this fragmentation, each of which contributes a layer of invisibility.
First, the rapid growth in outsourcing,3 contracting out and the use of
temporary employment agencies has moved production to sites that are not
immediately visible if the firm is treated as a bounded entity. As a result, the
contemporary study of MNCs must confront the problem that new flexible
working practices do not sit neatly within the bounded firms that tend to be
the focus of IPE inquiry. As a MNC outsources some of its core and most of its
non-core activities, understanding the social practices of the workplace
extends to the practices of homes, sweatshops, supply-chain workshops with a
contract workforce, and other ad-hoc and unprotected sites of production.
The use of unprotected labour in production for the global economy has led
scholars to focus on the increased use of child labour4 and bonded or slave
labour in the LDCs (see Bales, 1999; Klein, 2000). In the OECD countries, the
growth of precarious and unprotected forms of employment has pushed
workers towards forms of individualised flexibility that carry high levels of
personal risk (Moody, 1997; Coyle, 1997; Beck, 2000b).
The trend towards a fractured firm that outsources production and
business activities intensifies a second key layer of invisibility, that of gender.
As corporations replace full-time protected workers with part-time, tempor-
ary or contracted unprotected workers, they also tend to replace men with
women (Corporate Watch, 2000). The invisibility of the role of women in IR,
IPE and Industrial Relations scholarship has, of course, been widely docu-
mented by feminist scholars (see Enloe, 1989; Marchand, 1996). However, the
feminisation of work that has accompanied global restructuring makes it
particularly important that we ‘see women’ as actors in global restructuring,
and that we ‘recognize gender’ in terms of the webs of power at work within
the process of change (Murphy, 1996; Marchand and Runyan, 2000: 225). At
one level, then, this implies making womens’ experiences and activities visible
in our analyses: ‘$16 trillion of global output is invisible, $11 trillion produced
by women’ (United Nations Human Development Programme, 1995: 97).
Here it is the non-monetised care, family and community, agricultural and
domestic work of women that is absent from our understandings of the GPE.
At another level, however, making gender visible is about revealing the
gendered nature of the power relations surrounding the global restructuring
of work. A focus solely on firms and trade unions as somehow representing
and ‘containing’ workers perpetuates a gendered invisibility that sanitises and
naturalises processes of restructuring.
Finally, and related, an invisibility persists with regard to the reconfigur-
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ation of public and private within the restructuring of work. Janine Brodie
depicts restructuring as a ‘recoding’ and ‘renegotiating’ of the boundaries
between public and private (1996: 387). In people’s working lives, this recod-
ing is manifested in the permeability of the boundaries between ‘home’ and
‘work’. The private realm of home and household is increasingly a site of
production for the global economy. The ILO report rapid increases in the
numbers of homeworkers providing ‘optimal flexibility’ in the industrialised
and developing countries (2000: 114). Households in both ‘advanced’ and
‘developing’ regions are simultaneously sites of production and consumption.
The clothing industry, electronics and assembly sectors, together with ‘non-
core’ activities such as catering and repairs have found their way into homes.
As sites of production, homes are predominantly low paid and unprotected,
based on piecework with no formal contract of employment. Households also
represent the sites in which the global growth in domestic services has taken
place. A ‘new domestic labour’ is said to be ‘flourishing’ (Ibarra, 2000: 454) in a
climate of ‘deliberate economic interventions’ by the AICs to individualise and
privatise care services (Chang, 2000: 3). Given IPE/IR’s predilection for data
on change in production and work, it is perhaps unsurprising that the work of,
in particular, immigrant domestic workers remains ‘hidden’. The ILO standard
classification of occupations fails to describe the roles of migrant domestic
workers and does not provide data on the extent of this work (Anderson,
2000: 15). As a result, what Chang and Ling (2000) refer to as the ‘global
feminization of labour intimacy’ is seriously underestimated and distorted.
As a consequence of these layers of invisibility, there is a serious obfusca-
tion in representations of the power dynamics of the global restructuring of
work. A growing gap between the ‘two IRs’ of international relations and
industrial relations has concealed the connections between workplace and
world order (Harrod, 1997a: 105), making an IPE of labour and work ever
more necessary, yet problematic within prevailing ontologies.5 The legacies of
positivist IR/IPE inquiry persist in the tendency to view power ‘as resource’ in
our studies and to seek out ‘power-wielding’ people as the subjects of our
research. Work is thus equated with monetised economic activity, and workers
are conceptualised as a commodity, so that for those whose working practices
are unprotected or subordinate, there is little or no recognition in IR/IPE
research. In a sense, it is assumed that those who do not possess power as a
resource are not significant to understandings of the GPE. Unprotected
workers are the passive victims of someone else’s power. It is this ‘someone
else’ whom orthodox (and some heterodox) IPE feels it should be concerned
with, whether international organisation, MNC, government or transnational
class. So, to be a significant, research-worthy global agent, one needs to have
the ability and resources to transcend distance – mobility, flexibility, distance-
shrinking telecommunications and portable skills. At a time when work is
increasingly undertaken in a range of unprotected spaces, addressing the blind
spots in existing IPE research is rendered all the more important.
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There is currently a relative invisibility with regard to the meanings and
concrete experiences that workers, and particularly unprotected workers
without formal representation, themselves ascribe to the pressures and trans-
formations of globalisation at work. The IPE of social practice perspective
developed in chapter 2 opens up a number of avenues into the recapturing of
worker experiences, and the repoliticisation of work in a global era. To explore
work as a set of structured social practices is to render visible the webs of
power within which differential experiences of restructuring are played out.
The ‘hyperflexible’ governmental and corporate interventions rely upon a
process of individualisation that breaks up shared understandings and
affiliations. Attendance to the experiences that workers have of restructuring
reveals that patterns of inclusion and exclusion are formed, challenged and
reformed over time, constructing and corroding social alliances and recon-
stituting webs of power (Sinclair, 1999: 158). It is important to understand
these divisions and alliances, and to reveal the ‘minor’ everyday ‘silent
resistances’ that result (Cheru, 1997: 153). While it is undeniably the case that
formalised worker representation is being broken up in many state-societies
(as in Britain), and represents an ‘exclusive club’ in others (as in Germany), it is
not the case that ‘outsider’ worker groups are passive and fungible individuals.
The insecurity and uncertainty of contingent work is increasingly a shared
experience that brings its own foundations for informal organisation, as in the
example of the ‘Homenet’ organisation for homeworkers. The incorporation
of the theory and practice of everyday life into our understandings of the
restructuring of work can serve to heighten the visibility of workers who have
been obscured from view. I do not propose that attention should cease to be
paid to the strategies of organised labour, such work is highly significant (see
Hannah and Fischer, 2002; Gallin, 2002; O’Brien, 2001). However, organised
labour groups must be explored in terms of their power relationship to
discourses of restructuring, and to unprotected and informally-organised
workers. Thus, underpinned by an ontological commitment to understand
work in the broadest sense, as social reproduction, and labour as a diverse
grouping that is neither a ‘commodity’ nor the unified voice of ‘civil society’, it
is necessary to reveal the practices of organised and unprotected workers as
they enable, contest or confound the emerging social relations of globalisation.
Contradictions at work
A focus on work as sets of structured social practices reveals a series of
contradictions within hyperflexible representations of a benign and uncon-
tested process of restructuring. Such representations conceal the tensions and
inequalities of restructuring through an assumption that flexible forms of
work and employment are compatible with human security. Indeed it is
claimed that a failure to deregulate labour markets and seize the opportunities
of new forms of work will result in a loss of security through increased
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unemployment and diminished competitiveness (OECD, 1997; World Bank,
1995). Where it is acknowledged that there may be tensions between flexibility
and security, the problem is presented in terms of ‘striking the right balance’ so
that employees can enjoy ‘greater involvement in their work, more job satis-
faction and the possibility of developing skills and long-term employability’
(Commission of the European Communities (CEC), 1997: 8). This represen-
tation of the ‘benefits’ of flexible work appeals to images of autonomous
workers in an information society, while obscuring the concrete experiences
of workers for whom flexibility means acute personal insecurity. The Euro-
pean Commission’s Green Paper, for example, focuses on the balancing of
work and home life via teleworking, but makes no reference to homeworkers
or domestic care workers, whose working time flexibility is more immediate
and uncertain.6
A focus on the tensions between hyperflexibility strategies and everyday
social practices reveals that general deregulation and new forms of work
organisation replace one identified problem of poverty (unemployment) with
other, less directly visible forms such as income inequality, insecurity, financial
exclusion and indebtedness (International Labour Organisations (ILO), 1995).
Indeed, implicit within OECD figures there is a correlation between those
state-societies that have ‘implemented the jobs strategy’ and those that have
high drop-out rates from education, widening income inequalities and a
growing disadvantaged social group (OECD, 1997). The experiences that
workers have of hyperflexible forms of work reveal the tensions between
flexibility and security. In its most contingent form, flexible working rests
upon and requires acute insecurity and instability on the part of the worker
(Milkman, 1998; Pollert, 1999).
Second, there is a contradiction between processes of deunionisation and
levels of contestation. The restructuring of working practices along UK/US-
style hyperflexible lines is widely associated with an assault on traditional
industrial relations practices. Direct admonitions to deregulate collective
bargaining to the level of individual firms assume that the contests of central-
ised industrial relations can be minimised. However, an exploration of the
ways in which concrete industrial relations practices are challenged by
restructuring, reveals a different picture. The loss of formalised channels of
collective bargaining in the ‘radically restructured’ workplaces does not result
in a diminution of contestation and dissent.7 Rather, the traditional channels
are replaced with less organised and more fragmented tacit forms of resistance
and challenge based on common experiences and feelings. Nor can the neo-
liberal assumption that trade unions distort labour markets, inflating wages
and creating income inequality and unemployment, be upheld. As Coates has
it, ‘inequality is not a product of trade unions. It is a product of unregulated
labour markets’ (1999: 133). Where unions and other civil society groups are
involved in negotiating the shape of future forms of work, such as in the
German Standortdebatte,8 the result has been a focus on skills and job
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security rather a direct stand-off over pay. A focus on working practices
suggests that the experiences of transformation in industrial relations are
simply not universal: they are contingent upon a worker’s position in the
networks of employment, family, welfare, and so on. As formalised traditional
forms of industrial relations practice are diminished, it is important that we
open up our analyses to reveal new relationships that emerge within the firm
and extend into unprotected workspaces (Anderson, 2000).
Finally, there is a contradiction between the global image of empower-
ment and the concrete realities of increased control. Images of empowerment
abound within global blueprints for new forms of work and work organisa-
tion. In an elite group are the ‘symbolic analysts’ whose new ‘weightless’
portfolio careers in web design, business consultancy or financial services
appear to offer flexible alternatives to traditional working practices (Reich,
1991; Coyle, 1997). Yet even within the ranks of these apparent ‘free agents’, the
concrete experience can be ‘net slavery’, when ‘the stock options turn into pink
slips when the company goes belly up’ (Ross, 2001: 81–82). Then, there are the
workers for whom teamworking, quality circles and working time flexibility
are said to offer empowering alternatives to the Ford-Taylor scientific manage-
ment. The experiences of hyperflexible working, as expressed by workers, have
much in common with the monitoring and surveillance of Taylorism,
intensified by the use of self-monitoring and team ‘targets’. At the ‘ends’ of the
supply chain, in the maquiladora factories and export processing zones
(EPZs) of the LDCs, are the predominantly women workers for whom images
of empowering participation in the workforce are played out in the realities of
abuse, exploitation and personal injury (Lui and Chiu, 1999; Soldatenko,
1999).
The disparities in workers’ experiences of production in a global era will
be explored further below. Here the purpose is to emphasise the common
patterns of control and power that lie behind the images of empowerment for
many worker groups. In terms of everyday working practices globalisation has
come to be associated with a hiving off of peripheral activities into branch-
plants, micro-firms, households or the informal economy. This is the concrete
reality behind the much-hyped promise of a flexible and productive global
workforce. In a very real sense production has exploded into a galaxy of strati-
fied, loosely connected workspaces that are, nonetheless, closely controlled
through webs of corporate power. In the example of teamworking, presented
as a potentially autonomous and innovative experience, workplace studies
demonstrate the reality of monotony, repetition, diminished skills and in-
creased surveillance and control (Danford, 1998; Pollert, 1999).9   At the heart
of expressions of change in everyday working practices is the experience of
increased individualisation, intensified risk and heightened tensions between
individuals and groups. The image of individual empowerment emerging out
of globalisation and flexible forms of work is a constructed discourse that
inhibits workers’ efforts to organise.
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Divisions at work
Alongside the contradictions outlined above, a practice-centred perspective
also reveals patterns of inclusion and exclusion that are significant to the
restructuring of work. New forms of work organisation and the rise of flexible
and mobile forms of work imply challenges to past practices and a recon-
figuring of working relationships. However, an assumed to be emerging
‘global consciousness’ (Scholte, 2000: 85), or indeed a ‘class consciousness’, is
not necessarily a unifying characteristic. Within what may be considered to be
a single ‘class’, there are vastly different worker experiences, and differential
opportunities to organise. There are also significant commonalties of experi-
ence that, though they may be uneven, extend across a range of social groups.
Such commonalties include the association of globalisation with increased
risk and short-termism, the intensification and speeding up of work and
feelings of individualisation and acute competition: ‘Flexibility means a redis-
tribution of risks away from the state and the economy towards the individual’
(Beck, 2000b: 3).
Within the contemporary intensification of risk and individualisation, as
in past practices of collectivised industrial relations, the sense of a common
experience and struggle has to be ‘made’, through actions, exchanges, ideas and
interpretations. Leo Panitch, in his incisive discussion of the potential for
labour to ‘strategise’ in response to globalisation, is concerned with the
abandonment of ‘class analysis’ in favour of ‘civil society’. He argues that leftist
scholarship has moved to a pluralist concept of civil society, and in so doing
has tended to leave out labour, affording ‘almost no vantage point for observing
that arena of non-freedom within civil society, the work-place’ (2001: 367).
Yet, given the fragmentation of the workplace into a myriad of contracted
relationships, we have to question whether ‘class’ can adequately capture
contemporary working experiences. The hyperflexibilisation of work cuts
across conventionally held ‘class’ boundaries so that an effective labour
strategy would have to engage in a dialogue across groups.
If workers come to know and recognise change in the global economy
through the lens of their own experiences, and via their relationships with
other workers, this changes the picture somewhat. There is now a need to
explore the stratified social practices of different groups and individuals, and
to avoid the assumption that these necessarily represent a ‘class experience’, or
an expression of the general interests of civil society. I discuss these here in
terms of insider, intermediary and outsider practices, though of course, many
groups cut across these ideal-type boundaries and there are important
patterns of inclusion and exclusion within the groups. The divisions at work
are overlaid by other social divisions and inequalities so that, for example,
some workers’ experiences of increased risks are ameliorated by financial
security, and by inclusion in the defining of the terms of flexibility. For others,
the risks of flexibilisation are exacerbated by social exclusion and poverty.
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Similarly, a worker’s position in terms of state-society, firm and legal status
will condition a particular relationship to programmes of flexibilisation. In
essence, programmes of hyperflexibility in Anglo-Saxon state-societies are
concerned with expanding the ranks of the ‘outsiders’, making these involun-
tarily contingent workers the key group, and giving employers open access to
this pool of labour. Flexi-corporatism, by contrast, reinforces the status of the
‘insider’ workers, using them to define and legitimate restructuring, and
containing the outsiders by denying them access to the restructuring debate.
Insider working practices
Insider workers predominantly take on one of two central roles in the
reorganisation of work. The first is a direct participatory role in defining the
terms of new forms of work and work organisation, and in reinforcing the
global image of flexibility and mobility. These ‘portfolio people’ (Handy, 1995)
represent a managerial elite, to include business analysts, policy advisors,
consultants and auditors and marketing and advertising agents. The inten-
sified ‘risks’ taken by these groups, such as their eschewal of company pension
packages and job security, are matched by the potential rewards –  working
autonomy and high renumeration. As Coyle argues, there is a stark contrast
between those working in the ‘weightless industries’ who can use the new
flexibility to ‘turn themselves into stars’, and those people for whom flexibility
‘boils down to being exploited’ (1997: 91). For the insider groups an increas-
ingly mobile and flexible lifestyle serves to reinforce their own security.
Indeed, as Beck (2000b) suggests, the security and mobility of these groups
rests upon the relative insecurity and immobility of other groups who are
excluded from a defining role. Stability is not experienced by insider groups in
terms of a single workplace, but in terms of the ability to enter multiple
workspaces, as consultants, commentators and managers of change. It should
not be assumed, however, that such elite groups do not contest the demands of
working arrangements on their lives. For instance, after Merrill Lynch made
Working Mother magazine’s ‘best employers’ list in 2000, a group of women
stockbrokers, who had sued the company for sex discrimination, campaigned
by hiring light aircraft with banners and storming a shareholders’ meeting
(New York Times, 30 January 2001: 3).
The second key group of insiders is the core skilled workers whose
working practices enable restructuring, though perhaps not as consciously as
the first group. The highly skilled German craftspeople in manufacturing, and
the software programmers in the British service sector, for example, have
become wrapped up in the discourse on restructuring. Their stock options,
bonus-led pay structures and performance-related pay, together with the
nature of their work, ties their interests into particular programmes of
flexibility. In the examples of the UK, US and to a lesser extent Germany, there
is a common trend towards skilled workers ‘playing the labour market’ in a
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way that mirrors the ‘leanness’ of corporate organisations: ‘Well-paid
technicians, engineers, and designers became independent contractors …
“Employees without jobs”, they moved from company to company, “pollin-
ating” the seeds of innovation, according to the new flexible style of corporate
organization’ (Ross, 2001: 79). As core worker-stockholders and mobile skill
traders dominate the ‘high’ end of the contingent workforce, they become
emblematic of the possibilities of flexible work, featuring heavily in govern-
mental reports and media images. The threats of globalisation and the demands
of everyday working life are more comfortably reconciled and interchangeable
for insider groups than for those working at the margins of the spaces they so
fleetingly occupy.
Intermediary working practices
Intermediary workers can be understood as those whose practices provide a
‘buffer’ function at the interface between the demand for flexible labour and
the need for employment and work. In essence the intermediaries insulate the
insiders from responsibility for the risks and reprisals of the reorganisation of
work. They take radically different forms, from the proliferation of recruit-
ment and employment agents, through informal subcontractors, to the
individuals and gangs trading in the supply of undocumented, unprotected or
slave labour (Bales, 1999). At one end of the scale management and human
resource consultants move fluidly between insider and intermediary functions,
maintaining the ‘expertise’ of an ‘external agency’, necessary to legitimate their
role in prescribing work reorganisation and to lend an air of objective
neutrality to restructuring. Currently, for example, there is a trend towards the
use of British management consultants on short contracts to oversee the
privatisation of industries in Continental Europe. Similarly, Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers and Ernst and Young have contracts to monitor the implementation
of labour codes of conduct for garment and electronics multinationals. Their
‘independence’ as intermediaries has been questioned by international trade
union confederations, though it is clear that for their corporate clients they
diffuse the risks and responsibilities of outsourcing. As the chairman of Ernst
and Young describes it, the professional service firms ‘provide a more
complete solution’ (The Economist, 7 July 2001: 87), by engaging in both ‘audit’
and ‘non-audit’ activities.
While professional service workers are situated at the boundary between
insider corporate interests and a pool of human resources, intermediaries may
also take the form of traders and buyers of the services of unprotected
outsider groups. One such group are subcontractors who buy in contingent
labour for a specific contract with a client corporation. In the automotive
component, electrical and garment manufacturing sectors, and in service
sectors from logistics and transportation to cleaning and catering, such
practices surround a larger client MNC and serve to absorb the slack in a lean
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production system. Intermediary contractors diffuse the responsibility for
stock inventory, terms of employment and labour costs ‘down the line’ to
SMEs, ‘shop houses’ and homeworkers. As one contract production worker for
an automotive component supply firm explained: ‘In a lean system, someone
somewhere has to take up the slack. It is usually the weakest link in the
chain’.10 Not dissimilarly, Naomi Klein argues that trade liberalisation and
labour law reform has enabled large MNCs to ‘no longer produce products…
but rather buy products and brand them’ (2000: 5). The result has been a
proliferation of subcontractor roles, and an arms-length relationship between
the ‘insider’ corporate managers of the client MNC and the workers pro-
ducing for a subcontractor: ‘Larger firms spread their risks of production by
subcontracting. Subcontractors, in turn, pass on the risk by contracting out to
homeworkers. The latter … are not considered as employees and thus fall
outside the scope of labour protection’ (Lui and Chiu, 1999: 171).
The growth in outsourcing and contracting out production and services,
as documented by Lui and Chiu in Hong Kong and Taiwan, effectively diffuses
risk disproportionately along a supply chain, reducing the responsibility (or
perception of responsibility) the customer firm has for work done in its name.
In terms of working practices, the intermediary traders and buyers will out-
source to sites that demonstrate a higher instance of poor pay and intensified
work loads, and greater use of temporary, unprotected or illegal labour than
the MNCs they supply (European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO),
2000; Klein, 2000). Research into the roles and practices of these intermediary
actors is almost totally absent from the contemporary agenda in IPE. And yet a
focus on the diffuse webs of production and supply begins to reveal an array
of complex relationships between worker groups. The experiences of the
‘outsiders’ among them remain relatively invisible in our understandings of
the contemporary GPE.
Outsider working practices
Outsider groups are those who are excluded from a formal role in defining the
terms and nature of new forms of work and working practices. This is not to
say that their working practices do not play significant roles in shaping or
contesting transformation. Though we may not consider them to ‘wield power’
in a direct sense, their practices and relationships lie at the heart of the webs of
power that constitute contemporary restructuring. The much-prized labour
mobility and flexibility of the insider ‘portfolio people’ is reproduced through
the practices of outsider ‘precarious people’ (Cox, 1999: 87) – a reserve army
of contingent workers in factories, offices and homes. The ‘outsiders’ cannot
be defined in terms of a single class, and indeed the overwhelming trend is
towards a fracturing of common working identities, a ‘patchwork quilt
characterised by diversity, unclarity and insecurity in people’s work and life’
(Beck, 2000b: 1). In this sense the outsiders are themselves divided into an
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array of disparate individuals and groups precisely in order to destabilise and
disrupt the potential for organisation and to provide optimal flexibility:
Every corporation wants a fluid reserve of part-timers, temps and free-
lancers to help it keep overheads down and ride the twists and turns in
the market … One thing is certain: offering employment – the steady kind,
with benefits, holiday pay, a measure of security and maybe even union
representation – has fallen out of economic fashion. (Klein, 2000: 231)
Thus, though outsider groups are fluid, segmented and difficult to iden-
tify, it is precisely for these reasons that they need to enter our understandings
of global restructuring. The ‘rise of the permatemp’ documented by Time
Magazine is indicative of the ironic permanence of temporary and contingent
work (12 July 1999). Despite barriers to the formal organisation of their
interests, and direct efforts to position workers in competitive rather than
collaborative relationships with one another, the experiences of outsider
workers exhibit common patterns and conflicts that must be understood if
meaningful dialogue between protected and unprotected workers is to take
place. First, there is an expression of a consciousness of individualism and
‘hypercompetitiveness’ (Vilrokx, 1999; Sinclair, 1999). The use of HRM tech-
niques such as the benchmarking of the performance of production plants,11
coupled with the ‘storming’ effects of JIT production,12 leads workers to feel
that the greatest threats exist within the supply chain itself. The volatility and
irregularity of production that is commonly associated with efforts to respond
to the perceived demands of global markets, is understood by workers to be
created by the manipulation of orders to fit JIT, to suit shareholders reports, or
to respond to ‘last minute’ short-run contracts. Similarly, outsider groups
associate the use of quality circles and teams with attempts to encourage them
to compete with one another, and this is resisted via tacit and non-direct
means (Rubery, 1996; Danford, 1998; Moody, 1997). Such heightened compe-
tition between individuals often takes on a gender dimension in which women
in precarious working situations both sustain neo-liberal restructuring and
pose a threat to traditional masculine working roles (Hooper, 2000: 60; Chang
and Ling, 2000).
Second, and a related point, outsider groups widely associate globalisa-
tion with a diminution of collective identities and group representation
(Towers, 1997). This is, of course, a phenomenon that is widely documented
by industrial relations scholars in their studies of deunionisation. However,
the changing practices of the unions themselves reveal much about the
character of contemporary change in the workplace. UK and US trade unions
have responded to challenges by becoming individual service providers for
their ‘consumers’, thus reinforcing individualisation and excluding contingent
and non-standard workers (Williams, 1997). Stabilising and protecting core
workers has the effect of further destabilising the already precarious contract
workforce. For a flexibility-seeking corporation, a protected and stable core of
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workers increases the incentives to create a buffer of temporary or outsourced
working practices. This contributes to the polarisation of a core group of
workers who may organise to protect themselves from restructuring (or to
negotiate an insider role in the form of restructuring), and a larger group of
workers in contingent, outsourcing or homeworking roles whose practices
may undermine these efforts, making dialogue problematic (Gallin, 2001).
The polarisation of worker groups is taking place in close spatial proximity, so
that it cannot be understood purely by reference to geographical development
divisions. Research has shown, for example, that restructuring has produced
dramatic increases in socioeconomic and spatial inequalities within the cities
of the developed world (Sassen, 1994; Enloe, 1996). Feelings of belonging and
alienation transcend distance so that precarious workers in the advanced
industrialised world may share some of the characteristics of workers in
developing countries working in the same supply chain.13 Indeed, their
practices may be remarkably similar and they may feel that they compete
directly for their personal security.
Finally, the social practices of paid work are perceived to become
increasingly similar to the social practices of unpaid work in the home. The
British media has observed this trend in terms of ‘family life mirroring the
workplace’ as ‘services such as cleaning, cooking, childcare, DIY and laundry
are “contracted out” ’ (The Guardian, 6 February 2000). Thus, as Brigitte Young
argues ‘the growing participation of professional women in the labour market
is accompanied by the largely “invisible” development of paid work in the
private household’ (2001: 316). To trace the webs of power in the restructuring
of a large European or North American MNC is to cross the permeable
boundaries of public and private, to see the relationships between ‘flexible’ pro-
fessionals and the ‘flexible’ cleaners and childminders working in their homes.
Meanwhile, for the most ‘flexible’ contract workers, the 24 hour instan-
taneous demands of care and household work are contemporaneous with the
demands of production for the global economy. These ‘precarious workers’
(Cox, 1999: 87) convey acute experiences of what one woman working in
electronics assembly termed ‘knife-edge flexibility’ in paid working practices
and absolute rigid constraints in unpaid family work. Commenting on her
husband’s opposition to new working time arrangements, an agency cleaning
worker indicates no clear boundary between paid work for the MNC, and the
unpaid and informal work ‘outside’: ‘I don’t know why they fuss on so much
about the new hours. I have worked like this as far back as I can remember. It is
the same here as at home’.14 In industries such as textiles, garments and
electronics, where the production chain runs deeply into unprotected sites,
women at this ultimately flexible end of production take on acute personal
risks. Their labour is a complex blend of private household and public
enterprise production and, as a result, they are often not legally acknowledged
to be employees. Work that takes place in ad-hoc workshops and in family
living rooms or on kitchen tables tends to be both unprotected and invisible
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(Sassen, 1994: 115; Hsuing, 1996). The rise of the ‘multi-activity society’
(Beck, 2000a: 42) interweaves the social practices of work, family, leisure and
consumption, giving rise to new political questions and potential sites of
political organisation.
Politics at work
A focus on the contradictions and divisions that arise from the restructuring
of work demonstrates that work and workers need to enter the globalisation
debate on a level that reveals the political nature of changing practices. Is it
possible to sketch the terrain of an emergent politics of transformation in
working practices? As large firms fracture their activities and workers
experience intensified insecurity, can we identify spaces of potential political
organisation? At one level the most visible political contests could be said to be
the strategic activities of nationally or transnationally organised trade unions
(O’Brien, 2000; 2001). Here the contradictions of globalisation may create the
pressures and opportunities for ‘global social movement unionism’ (Lambert,
1999), and extend IPE inquiry into the political economy of labour (Harrod
and O’Brien, 2002). The roles of trade unions in forming alliances with non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), partcipating in the highly visible ‘anti-
globalisation’ protests (Waterman and Wills, 2001), and adapting to engage
with workers in the informal sectors, suggest that ‘organised’ labour could
become a more open political mechanism for a global civil society (Somavia,
1999; IILS, 1999a).15
However, at the level of social practices the study of firms, unions and
organisations as primary sites of political activity in the GPE is problematic.
Put simply, the fracturing of traditional sites of production leads us to
question the representativeness of trade unions and other institutionalised
political agencies. In a report for the ILO, Richard Hyman captures the ‘gap’
between the image of a homogeneous labour internationalism, and the
concrete experiences of different worker groups:
It is evident that the traditional core constituency of trade union mem-
bership has dwindled, while there has been expansion at two extremes:
those with professional or technical skills who may feel confident of their
individual capacity to survive in the labour market; and those with no
such resources but whose very vulnerability makes effective collective
organization and action to achieve or perhaps even contemplate.
(Hyman, 1999b: 3)
We are reminded that mechanical and organised forms of solidarity are
imagined and constructed in ways that are historically particular (Hyman,
1999a; Thompson, 1963). As production is actively shifted into unprotected
domains, programmes of restructuring have rendered past myths of solidarity
more difficult to sustain, making it impossible to assume ‘the existence of a
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“normal worker”’, and raising the need for ‘organic’ solidarities based on
‘direct experiences, immediate milieux and specific patterns of social relations’
(Hyman, 1999b: 3; 1999a: 96). Challenges to existing workplace political
institutions have broken open past patterns of solidarity and allegiance. There
are clear dangers but also opportunities here. The dangers lie in assuming that
the workplace, in being deunionised, has become depoliticised, thereby
reinforcing emerging disparities in working practices. The opportunities lie in
a recognition of the common experiences, feeling and challenges within these
diverse practices. In contrast to the idea that labour must ‘operate globally’ in
order to match the ‘scale’ of MNC activity (see Herod, 2001), workers everyday
thoughts and actions defy a global/local opposition. The apparent ‘global’
activities of organisations such as the Clean Clothes Campaign, Women
Working World Wide, HomeNet and the Self-Employed Women’s Association,
are informed by the everyday experiences of workers in precarious sectors.
Likewise, the struggles that are labelled ‘local’, such as plant-level industrial
action and campaigns, or the everyday acts of disruption in a stretched lean
production system, are undertaken within frameworks of thought that blend
the ‘near’ and ‘far’ in personal histories. Contrary to the assumption that the
‘crisis of industrial relations’ has removed the politics from work, the form
and nature of change in work and its organisation remains politically open,
contingent and contested.
Conclusion
The starting point of this chapter was a recognition that the dominant repre-
sentations of global restructuring have rendered the voices, experiences and
practices of workers unheard and invisible. Where in previous chapters I
explored the contested nature of the restructuring of work through the lens of
the policy programmes generated by state-societies, and the corporate agendas
of MNCs, here I have mapped the political relationships of worker groups that
transcend state-firm categorisations. In the wake of the Seattle-style visible
and direct expression of disquiet with globalisation, IPE scholars are seeking
to restore the ‘P’ to IPE (Hay and Marsh, 1999), and to uncover the agents who
propagate or defy globalisation. Yet, where political struggle and agency has
been uncovered in IPE inquiry, this has predominantly taken the form of
individuals, groups and institutions who are perceived to ‘wield’ the power
necessary to engage with the debate on global restructuring. National govern-
ments, corporate agencies, international economic institutions, and (much
more rarely) trade unions, civil society associations and new social move-
ments, feature in the contents pages of IPE texts and journals. Where workers
do feature, they are assumed either to be contained within the parameters of
the aforementioned collective agencies, or to be outside these boundaries as
passive victims of change. Thus, in a very real sense, the capacity of ordinary
people to comprehend, contest or give consent to global restructuring is
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seriously underestimated. This chapter has attempted to reopen some of this
political terrain by asking which groups are visible in IPE analyses, and explor-
ing the grounds on which others are considered insignificant and excluded.
A first order question to be raised in the consideration of the relationship
between the GPE and ordinary working practices, is whether unprotected and
precarious workers actually matter to IPE inquiry. Do they have a rightful
place on our research agendas? I have argued that shedding light on the
experiences and practices of a range of worker groups is not simply about
highlighting what we might consider to be ‘grassroots’ or ‘ground level’ poli-
tical activity. Indeed, I have shown that our conceptual categories of ‘global’
and ‘local’ are significantly problematised and transcended by the concrete
thoughts and practices of people in their everyday lives. Not only does the
neglect of unprotected workers further entrench them at the margins of
globalised social relations, but their invisibility also obscures central aspects of
transformation in the GPE. Even for those studying the activities of MNCs in
mainstream IPE, an understanding of ‘life in the supply chain’ brings signi-
ficant insights. The fractured firm moves production into unprotected sites,
cutting across public/private boundaries along complex supply-chains so that
it becomes difficult to trace lines of responsibility and relations of power and
control. The failure to bring workers’ experiences into the global restructuring
debate actively allows the MNC to commit this sleight of hand without a trace
of it in our analyses. While anodyne business management literature extols the
virtues of ‘successful outsourcing’, IPE is slow to catch up with critical readings
of the social power relations of outsourcing practices.
Raising the profile of unprotected workers not only exposes the ‘new’ sites
in which work is done for the GPE, but it also makes visible the political
contestation taking place over the reality and representation of the restruc-
turing of work. Following the analysis of this chapter, workers do not simply
passively respond to a global force that is somehow ‘greater’ than them and
beyond their reach, rather they actually both constitute and contest the
meanings of that force for their everyday lives. In their frameworks of thought
and action, workers engage with the restructuring of their own practices:
differentially, unevenly and contradictorily, and within the constraints of
prevailing webs of power. The assumption that the perceived dictates of
globalisation and flexibilisation are transmitted uncontroversially through the
layers of organisations, states, firms and workers, is subjected to serious
challenge. The insecurity that is evident in concrete working practices directly
undermines the benign images of security, empowerment and choice that
accompany doctrines of flexibility. It becomes clear that complex patterns of
inclusion and exclusion emerge from transformations in the nature and form
of work, with increased security for some resting upon and requiring inten-
sified risk for others. For the insider ‘portfolio person’ the risks of flexibility
can be reconciled comfortably with the opportunities offered by mobility.
Meanwhile, for the most ‘flexible’ precarious worker at the end of the supply-
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chain risk and insecurity are intensified. An understanding of such relationships
is vital to the mapping of potential political terrain that may connect formally
and informally organised workers. Viewed in this way the restructuring of
work is inherently political, contested and contingent. While we choose to
depict or ignore particular ‘realities’ of global change, highlighting the
sanitised spheres of technology and corporate strategy, we leave the ‘messier’
realms of work and labour in deep shadow. In doing so we risk obscuring the
politics of restructuring that gives the character and form to contemporary
change in the workplace and in a wider world order.
Notes
1 This focus on the relationship between epistemological bias and invisibility owes
much to the work of Roger Tooze and Craig Murphy (1996). They suggest that poverty
and the poor have been made invisible by an IR and IPE predilection for empiricist
epistemology and positivist methodology. For further discussion of the positivist and
empiricist underpinnings of international theory, see Smith (1996).
2 IMF Managing Director Horst Köhler outlined his view of the future of the IMF as ‘an
active part of the workforce to make globalisation work for the benefit of all’ (2000a:
2). Similar themes are evident in the British Government’s White Paper on ‘Elimin-
ating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor’ (Department for
International Development, 2000), and The Economist’s ‘The Case for Globalisation’
(2000: 19).
3 The Outsourcing Institute (2000) estimate that outsourcing is growing in the US at
around 15 per cent annually. While it is clear that this practice is growing across the
OECD countries, its rate is difficult to estimate as the boundaries between ‘inside’ and
‘outside’ provision are increasingly fluid. For example, some German firms report the
part-purchase of a supplier, making the production ‘in house’, yet maintaining the
relationship of an external supplier. The supply of cleaning, maintenance and catering
services is commonly outsourced in British companies, though is rarely recognised
and reported as outsourcing, as it is not considered to be a production function. In
terms of research on outsourcing, business journal articles on ‘how to outsource’ are
burgeoning (see Elmuti and Kathwala, 2000), though there is little critical analysis of
the nature and effects of outsourcing (see Bittman, Matheson and Meagher, 1999).
4 The ILO estimate that there are around 250 million children (5–14 years old) working
in economic activity worldwide. For 120 million this work is full-time and excludes
schooling. For the remainder this is combined with schooling (ILO Bureau of
Statistics, 1998).
5 Harrod and O’Brien (2002) bring together the insights of labour studies, IPE,
industrial relations, IRs and the sociology of work. The collection addresses the
common problematics that global restructuring brings to these disciplines.
6 The ILO use the term ‘homeworker’ to define people working at home on tasks that
are generally low paid, insecure and undertaken on a piecework basis, usually with no
direct or formal contract. In contrast, a teleworker may be a manager, a senior profess-
ional or other employee who works flexibly between home and office via ICT links.
7 During 1999 the UK lost 12 days per 1000 employees due to industrial action. In
Germany, where trade unions retain a central role despite declining density, 1 day was
lost per 1000 employees (EIRO 1999).
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8 The German Standortdebatte is the debate between the social partners surrounding
the competitiveness of Germany as a location for production and investment.
9 The 1998 British Workplace Employee Relations Survey reveals that though two-
thirds of workplaces report using teamworking, only 3 per cent of these actually
devolve decision-making autonomy to the level of teams.
10 Confidential focus group interview, South Wales, 16 June 1998.
11 It is not uncommon for workers to be made directly aware of their individual
performance vis-à-vis competitor plants and contractors. This can take the form of
daily or weekly bulletins of benchmark performances, or visible screens on the factory
floor displaying targets.
12 JIT production implies a reduction of slack or buffers in the system, requiring minimal
materials and labour inventory, and an electronic data system, linking the customer to
the firm and the supply chain. For large electronics MNCs this commonly manifests
itself in weekly or bi-weekly estimates of production runs, necessitating instantaneous
responses in working practices.
13 Soldatenko’s (1999) study of Latina garment workers in Los Angeles reveals the
complexities of feelings of shared experience and alienation. The intraworker and inter-
ethnic conflict within sweat-shop conditions problematises the treatment of workers
as a collective body of resistors. A central theme in the explosion of the subcontracting
chain is what Soldatenko refers to as the difficulty in ‘forging an effective culture of
resistance’ (1999: 319).
14 Confidential interview with contract workers of electronic component multinational,
UK, 24 February 1998.
15 The Clean Clothes Campaign Network, for example, includes trade unions, women
workers’ groups and networks and worker education bodies. The purpose is to im-
prove the working conditions of garment workers worldwide.
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Conclusion:
an international political economy of work

In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, we are living in an eraof social transformation that has been defined by the concept of globalisa-
tion, just as it has been shaped by programmes of restructuring carried out in
the name of globalisation. Yet, our era is also one in which people’s concrete
experiences of transformation are diverse and contradictory. While for some,
living in a GPE means holding and managing a portfolio of shares, business
travel for a MNC, and increased prosperity and security, for others it means
redundancy as a share price falls, contract work for a MNC, and increased risk
and insecurity. Despite the rise of globalisation as a ‘dominant discourse …
which produces truth about individuals and their environment’ (Penttinen,
2000: 203), multiple meanings and diverse concrete experiences persist that
make this a debated and contested set of truths. The primary task of this book
has been to offer a route into the revealing of these multiple meanings, experi-
ences and contests.
A rethinking of our dominant mode of knowledge of social change is
needed if everyday spheres such as work, family, consumption and leisure are
to be understood as key realms of globalising social relations. Orthodox IPE
perspectives – conceiving of opposed realms of state and market, domestic
and international, and of power and knowledge as resources – have rendered
invisible precisely those realms of social life where the meanings of globalisation
are constituted. This book has engaged in some reflection on the dominant
ways of thinking that have shaped IPE’s research agenda. I have asked how
particular readings of global social change have achieved ‘common sense’
status, and how they have been discursively employed to enable particular inter-
ventions to be made. This has primarily been an exercise in the politicisation
of global restructuring, and the understanding of social change on which it is
predicated. A first step in such an exercise involves the opening up of space for
the discussion of alternative forms of political representation and, I have
argued, this step can be taken via an exploration of the webs of power, tensions
and contradictions that grip contemporary restructuring. In the spirit of this
discussion, my concluding remarks should not be read as closing comments.
Rather, I am seeking to open up some of the potential terrain for alternative
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modes of knowledge of social change, and a discussion of the utility of the
social practice perspective on work and related spheres of life.
Problematising global social change
Global social transformation has predominantly been communicated to us in
processual terms. That is to say, the common-sense accounts of ‘what global-
isation is’ tend to make appeals to a process that is driven by technological and
economic externalities. It is a short step from this inevitabilist image to the
construction of ‘imperatives’, towards which all state-societies, firms and
people must restructure. In such a reading, historical difference, political con-
flict and social contestation are extracted from a pure drive for global trans-
formation. There is a hungry market for such representations of a process of
global change, precisely because if one can simplify, codify and explain the
dynamics of transformation in this way, it becomes possible to make
prescribed neo-liberal interventions. When represented as an irrevocable and
essential process, that can nonetheless be managed, globalisation becomes a
powerful meaning-generating concept that accounts for ‘what is happening’ at
the same time as it draws the parameters of ‘what should be done about it’.
This book has explored one such representation of globalisation ‘as pro-
cess’ – the widespread propagation of a discourse of labour flexibility, on which
deregulatory interventions are founded. Representing globalisation in a deter-
ministic and apolitical way, I have argued, decisively enables the restructuring
of work to be ordered, disciplined, prescribed and depoliticised. It becomes
possible for a range of international economic institutions, governments and
corporate strategists to confine debate to an instrumental discussion of reforms,
as seen in the World Bank’s (1995; 2001) and the OECD’s (1996; 1997) policy
interventions. In many ways the sphere of flexibility in working practices does
not serve simply as a ‘case-study’ of flexibilisation, but is pivotal in the trans-
formation of social life. Work represents a governmental inroad to the
restructuring of the spheres of home, welfare, family and household. In its
broadest sense, flexibility defines the properties of a society that has embraced
the imperatives of risk, self-responsibility and immediacy and is pervasive
throughout the layers of social life, and across the presumed boundaries of
global and local, public and private.
An alternative set of understandings of global social transformation has
sought to restore the agency and power that is denied by process-centred
readings. This book has depicted these accounts as grouped around a view of
globalisation as a project that is shaped and directed by identifiable individual
and collective agents. In one such representation, globalisation is ‘put back in
its box’ by a restatement of the power of the state, and specifically the per-
sistent role of ‘national capitalisms’ in shaping the parameters of global forces.
In one sense, such accounts highlight difference and historical contingency
within the globalisation debate. Yet, as I have argued in this book, the
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distinctive meanings ascribed to national ‘models’ within the construction of
globalisation are rarely problematised. Indeed, there is an assumption that the
pressures of globalisation have heralded an undisputed victory for Anglo-
Saxon neo-liberalism, and a defeat for social market corporatism. As I have
shown, however, the making of a ‘global Britain’ has served a particular set of
functions in the framing of the need to ‘harness’ globalisation via labour
flexibilisation. Such representations extend beyond the terms of a bounded
national debate into an international discourse on global restructuring.
In a second conceptualisation, globalisation is represented as a trans-
national project that is furthered through the actions of MNCs, financiers, or
a global class or resisted through the actions of new social movements and
trade unions. Despite a clear reinvestment of politics, the political tends to be
viewed as organised, formalised and institutionalised activity. In an era when
labour flexibilisation is making efforts to deunionise and depoliticise the
workplace, there is a danger that indirect, informal and interstitial modes of
political activity will be overlooked. In seeking to problematise the terms of
the contemporary debate on global social change, this book has presented a
challenge to those engaged in exploring the project of global restructuring,
whether identified as national or transnational: that is to raise the question of
how those who are governed or defined by the project are also implicated in its
reproduction. The assumed project must be opened up to reveal the concrete
practices that enable, confound or contest its dictates.
Politicising global social change
An IPE perspective that is attuned to the diverse social practices that together
underpin or transform world order, I have argued, can unmask the tensions
and contradictions of global social change. Research that sets out to explore
the restructuring of social practices that is carried out under the banner of
globalisation brings the abstract concept into the concrete realms of political
bargaining, governmental intervention, social accommodation and contestation.
A focus on restructuring can offer a countervailing pressure in an environ-
ment in which the mainstream media, political and academic commentaries
construct an ‘other worldly’ globalisation – one that is unreachable, ‘grander’
than ourselves, and whose only link to everyday life is a top-down ‘impact’ on
local practices. The multiple layers of the restructuring of work, when viewed
from a practice perspective, are simultaneously undertaken in the name of global-
isation, while they also interpret, contest and give meaning to that name. This
book has sought to offer three preliminary steps towards an IPE of social practice.
Historicity, contingency, diversity
The critical potential of IPE, as Robert Cox has it, lies in its capacity to stand
back from the prevailing world order, to ask how it came about (1981: 130),
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and to consider ‘the ways reality is defined for different people in different
eras’ (1995: 35). Such a position assumes that social structures and social
transformation are not predetermined, or externally driven, but are historically
constituted through the actions and reflections of people. Viewed in this way,
the restructuring of work does not simply ‘happen to’ people – either as a
result of an unstoppable techno-economic process, or as a strategic and
calculated project. Rather, it is always experienced, reflected upon, interpreted
and lived in the context of historically-specific spaces. As I argued with
reference to the restructuring debates in British and German state-societies,
the making of a particular representation of globalisation, and a concomitant
programme of restructuring interventions, is historically contingent, and
generates its own distinctive tensions, problematics and divisions. The
thoughts and actions of those living in the fractured world of contemporary
global production are at least as central to the furthering or undermining of
restructuring as the states, firms and technologies that constrain and limit
them. Overall, a historical mode of thought reminds us that the material
restructuring of MNCs that has so preoccupied IPE inquiry, is intimately
bound up with the everyday histories of workplaces, and with our received
understandings of what these workplaces constitute.
Webs of power
A central problematic in the analysis of the politics of global social change is
the question of how power is exercised in the shaping of practices. On the one
hand, an overly structural conception of power may overstate ‘control’ and
leave no space for agency, while on the other, an overly individualistic con-
ception may overstate the capacity for agent to resist (Clegg, 2000: 78). This
problematic is exacerbated in some IPE inquiry which commonly identifies
power with an elite group of ‘global actors’ and a set of institutions that act as
‘bearers’ of structure. As a result, the webs of power that circulate via social
relationships, creating and constraining spaces and opportunities for trans-
formation, are rendered invisible by conceptions of power ‘as resource’. This
book has positioned power-knowledge relationships centrally in the explor-
ation of the restructuring of work. I have argued that in order to understand
the knowledge and governmental techniques that have made the flexibility
discourse possible, it is necessary also to reveal the webs of power relations
that suffuse the restructuring of work. Such an approach transcends bounded
‘global’, ‘national’ and ‘local’ levels of analysis. In my analysis of the firm, for
example, I focused on the relationships between social groups, demonstrating
that these cut across the ascribed boundaries of MNCs. The transnational
activities of bankers, corporate managers and management consultants are
taken out of the realm of an ethereal global market, to consider their
relationships to the practices of non-elite groups such as unprotected labour,
contract workers and homeworkers. These relationships, I have argued,
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cannot be grasped by a simple opposition of the promotion of global
restructuring versus the resistance to global restructuring.
The everyday
This book has argued that global social change is experienced, given meaning,
reinforced and challenged through the everyday structured practices of
individuals and social groups, such that the concept of globalisation should be
understood through the contestation that takes place over its realities and
representations. As Kaplan and Ross have it, ‘the Political is hidden in the
everyday, exactly where it is most obvious: in the contradictions of lived
experience, in the most banal and repetitive gestures of everyday life’ (1987: 3).
Globalisation thus becomes one conceptual means of identifying and naming
‘grand scale’ social change, but is potentially also disguising the myriad of
meanings and experiences that are translated in the networks of everyday life.
As I have shown, the restructuring agendas of national governments, corpor-
ate actors or international institutions are never wholly predictable, linear and
unproblematic. Interventions designed to transform working practices meet
with ongoing social struggles and are translated in numerous ways. Out of the
Anglo-Saxon drive for individualism in working practices has emerged a
reforging of worker identities, with new patterns of alliance and division. Far
from a benign and depoliticised workplace, the study of everyday working
practices reveals a politics of direct experience that moves as fluidly as the
MNC that moves to outsource and disperse production. To pronounce the
‘death’ of workplace politics is to neglect the ability of political life to
transform itself.
Towards an international political economy of work
Having reconceptualised globalisation as an ongoing, non-linear and unpre-
dictable transformation of social practices, this book opens up alternative
routes into thinking about work within IPE.
First, I have challenged conceptions of work as merely a function of the
global production process. The dynamics of the restructuring of work cannot
be understood as an outcome of transformations in production, for this is to
miss the diversity of experiences of working in a GPE. The restructuring of
traditional paid production work, for example, is having significant implica-
tions for paid and unpaid domestic and care work. Indeed, an exploration of
the roles and functions of unemployment in a GPE is also fundamental to
thinking about work and the governmentality of work. As the ILO’s ‘Decent
Work’ agenda reminds us ‘almost everyone works, but not everyone is em-
ployed’ (1999b: 3). Societies face varied challenges and questions in their
framing of future modes and forms of work. This will include necessary
reflection on the function that unemployment or semi-employment may
Amoore_Global_08_Concl 6/19/02, 1:55 PM162
163Conclusion: the IPE of work
serve in their political economy, the consequences of the casualisation of work
and the growth of a relatively unregulated service sector, and the rethinking of
the concept of ‘work’ these questions require. In most cases this will also reveal
complex patterns of inequality, inclusion and exclusion. The durability of the
hyperflexibility discourse is dependent upon its ability to continually adapt
and metamorphose in order to conceal its social consequences. The early
twenty-first century linking of labour flexibility to concepts of corporate
social responsibility is almost certainly just such an attempt to ameliorate the
effects of corporate restructuring and silence the critics. A conception of work
that extends beyond an understanding of productive or class relations is essen-
tial if we are to maintain a critical gaze on the slippery concept of flexibility,
even as it adopts the mantle of corporate responsibility and risk management.
Second, this book has urged IPE to extend its understanding of workers
and their agency beyond a conception of organised labour, to consider the
complexity of patterns of solidarity, collaboration, fragmentation and dissent.
There seems to be some comfort taken in IPE from the idea that organised
labour may be a ‘voice’ for global civil society. But, in normative terms, is a
single channel or formal voice what is being looked for? Following E. P. Thom-
pson, a unified body of collective consciousness must always be wrought from
something, and will necessarily draw boundaries and exclude practices. The
practices of ‘insider’ workers, of whatever form, will have their ‘outsider’
counterparts whose working practices may be in tension. To speak of a single
collective voice of a global civil society of workers is highly problematic. Alter-
native prospects for workers’ agency must be found, and these alternatives
must acknowledge that the potential for politics at work rests upon a com-
peting and contradictory array of agencies. It is in the tensions and contra-
dictions of diverse working practices that the politics of the transformation of
work lie. An exploration of the competing practices reveals some common
ground in unexpected places. The disruption of the boundaries between work
and home (public and private lives), for example, is an experience felt by elite
workers and contingent workers alike, opening up the possibility for a societal
debate on the consequences of such transformation. Similarly, future research
could fruitfully focus on the deepening of tensions and divisions in spaces
where historically one looked for solidarities, such as on the manufacturing
line and within the trade union movement itself.
Finally, this book has sought to reveal the political potentialities that may
lie in the interstices of everyday working practices. There are predominantly
two aspects that come out of my analysis: one is the sketching of a potential
political terrain in spaces where work takes place, the other concerns the impli-
cations of an IPE of social practice for other spheres of social activity. Seizing
the political ground in the contemporary globalisation debate has tended to
imply a direct resistance, exemplified by the so-called anti-globalisation
campaigns. Yet, it is interesting that these resistance groups tend to be depicted
as united ‘against’ a single foe, despite the manifest diversity of their agendas.
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There are other problems associated with ‘contesting globalisation’ as though
it were a clearly defined single entity. Does resistance to globalisation need to
be conscious and planned? Are the small and everyday acts of footdragging, or
acts of ‘getting by’, also acts of resistance? How should we understand the
negotiated engagement with global restructuring undertaken by some trade
unions? Is this tactical resistance or have the unions been co-opted into a
restructuring discourse?
In order to push the boundaries of our understanding of resistance
(whether by unionised labour, social movements or people going about their
daily lives), it is necessary for us to cast our gaze on the practices that enable
and further neo-liberal discourses, as well as those that confound or resist. The
individual and collective ‘acts of survival’ seen in the support networks of
contract workers in Britain, for example, could be interpreted as acts of
resistance in the sense that they defy attempts to individualise workers. Yet
they could also be read as enabling greater functional flexibility, for example in
the mutual provision of childcare. Similarly the growing number of German
workers in the informal economy are, on the one hand excluded from formal
representation in the ‘flexi-corporatist’ debate, yet their practices are also
plugging a gap in state and private enterprise provision.
The identification of emergent contradictions and tensions in restruc-
tured working practices raises questions that may apply beyond work, to other
related spheres of social life. With regard to the financial sphere, for example,
the proliferation of credit unions, local currencies and local exchange trading
schemes, reveals practices conceived as countering financial globalisation,
while also representing spaces that are excluded from ‘insider’ financial
practices. So, these could either be conceived as alternative practices and
political gestures, or as the ‘mopping up’ of social groups who are excluded
from elite practices, and thereby enabling global finance. The debate sur-
rounding the contradictory ‘furthering’ and ‘opposing’ of global restructuring
is one that will be significant in future analysis of the GPE. The growth of
interest in ethical investments and consumer responsibility, for example, is
simultaneously concerned with an engagement with global capital and a
discussion of political-economic and social alternatives. I am not proposing
that such questions can be resolved here, but that an IPE of social practice
makes the raising of these questions possible, and that the power relations,
contradictions and tensions visible in the restructuring of work may be
present elsewhere.
The ‘contestedness’ that forms the title and subject matter of this book is
present in many forms. I have founded my IPE of work on a critical ques-
tioning of the mode of knowledge that has been framed by the master concept
of globalisation. The meanings ascribed to globalisation; the representations
that dominate globalisation; and the experiences that make globalisation
concrete and ‘real’: all are contested on a daily basis. Globalisation does not
exist independently of the meanings, practices and discourses that are made in
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its name, nor is it confined to the elite global practices of states, multinationals
and international institutions. In this book I have depicted an alternative
image, and one that I argue reveals the power and politics of the making of
globalisations. In my framing, globalisation stands alongside other master
concepts used to render social transformation explainable, codifiable and
manageable. We have seen industrialisation and modernisation function in
similar ways. As mobile and empty concepts they become filled with meaning,
and come to represent particular realities for individuals, states, societies and
social groups.
Each chapter of this volume has addressed some aspect of the repre-
sentations of globalisation that have given meaning to the flexibilisation of
work. Once unpacked, the labour flexibility that is constructed as a panacea to
globalisation, reveals a bundle of ideas and images that are appropriated and
deployed to legitimate a range of interventions. There are other concepts
worthy of exploration – risk, responsibility and mobility are also emerging
within a lexicon of restructuring discourse. Ultimately, I have argued that the
meanings of globalisation and flexibility directly engage with the everyday
lives of people. They do so differentially, unevenly and contradictorily, as they
simultaneously seek to remove the grounds for politics, while also redrawing
the lines of shared experience, solidarity and identity. Bringing the rarefied
restructuring practices of global corporate actors, financiers and governments
into their concrete relationships with the everyday practices of work, renders
the spaces of global restructuring reachable and open to debate. In this sense,
our knowledge of global social change is itself subject to contestation, over
how we have come to understand transformation, and who and what we have
made visible and invisible.
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